Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

NEW WRIT

For Torrington, in the room of Lieut.-Colonel George Lambert, T.D. (commonly called Lieut.-Colonel the honourable George Lambert, T.D.), now Viscount Lambert, T.D., called up to the House of Peers.—[Mr. Heath.]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

PORT OF LONDON (SUPERANNUATION) BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL FINANCE

Purchase Tax

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer for what reason potato mashers are subject to Purchase Tax, whatever their dimensions, whereas egg whisks are only subject to tax if less than 12 inches long; what was the revenue received from Purchase Tax on potato mashers and egg whisks, respectively, during the last 12 months for which figures are available; and whether he will review at any early date the liability, or otherwise, to tax of all wire utensils used in the kitchen.

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. J. E. S. Simon): The tax applies to articles of a domestic kind, and egg whisks over 12 inches long are not, according to my information, commonly used in the domestic kitchen. With regard to the second part of the Question,

I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him by my right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorney-croft) on 17th December. With regard to the third part, I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to him by my right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth on 19th November.

Mr. Nabarro: Will my hon. and learned Friend tell the House why an egg whisk used by the housewife is singled out for this vicious and discriminatory treatment, whereas an article almost identical, used by a variety of trades, is free of tax? Is this not an invidious distinction which ought to be remedied forthwith?

Mr. Simon: No, Sir; the egg whisks used by housewives are not subject to tax. Those are the ones under 12 inches long. There is no invidious distinction here, and I do not think that there is any danger of my hon Friend getting his potato mashers mixed up with his whiskers.

Mr. Nabarro: That was a very poor pun.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he anticipates it will be possible to reduce the Purchase Tax on neck ties, cravats, sashes, and muffs from 30 per cent. to 5 per cent., which is the present rate charged on handkerchiefs, scarves, shawls, and braces.

Mr. Simon: I cannot anticipate the possibility or the date of future changes in taxation.

Mr. Nabarro: Yes, but as, for example, a silk necktie is an article of clothing and is made out of precisely the same material as a silk handkerchief, what are the processes of reasoning which have led the Treasury to suppose that it is a good idea to put a 30 per cent. Purchase Tax on a silk necktie and only a 5 per cent. Purchase Tax on a silk handkerchief?

Mr. Simon: That is another question which I would ask my hon. Friend to put down, unless he has already exhausted his quota.

Mr. Nabarro: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why mechanical devices specifically designed for cutting long grass and weeds, and in no way suitable for use as lawn-mowers, have


recently been selected as liable for Purchase Tax as lawn-mowers under Group 16; and whether he will arrange for this decision to be rescinded forthwith.

Mr. Simon: As my hon. Friend is aware, this matter has been reviewed, and the particular machine to which he refers will not, in future, be regarded as taxable.

Mr. Nabarro: That is a great victory for me for once. Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that, after a long battle against the Treasury, the Purchase Tax on these machines has now been removed, although a large number of customers who bought this machine have already paid the Purchase Tax? Would my hon. and learned Friend now be scrupulously fair and authorise the manufacturers who have collected the Purchase Tax to repay to each of the owners of the machines the Purchase Tax which they have been illicitly, at his behest, charged?

Mr. Simon: This is an example of the way the Customs is always willing to review the interpretation, in conjunction with the trade interests concerned. As for any tax which has been paid already on this article, the Customs will, of course, consider any claim for repayment.

Mr. Jay: Can the Financial Secretary explain why the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro) is suddenly opposing all these arrangements when he has regularly voted for them for years on end?

Income Tax and National Insurance Contributions

Mr. Collins: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, including the increase announced on 18th February, the National Insurance contribution represents approximately 7 per cent. of the weekly wage of a farmworker; and if he will revise his proposals so that no employed person shall be required to pay in contributions a sum greater than 5 per cent. of his weekly wage.

Mr. Simon: The National Insurance and National Health Service contribution will be raised under the Government's proposals from 6·3 per cent, to 6·6 per cent. of the minimum wage of a farm worker. It could not be reduced to 5 per cent. without cutting down the provision

for larger benefits and contributions which the House passed last November.

Mr. Collins: Is the Minister aware that this penal tax on rural workers must eventually affect food prices and have a totally disproportionate effect on the country's economy? If the Government reject the principle of the contribution as a percentage of wages, what does he propose to do for the lower-paid workers who are very seriously affected?

Mr. Simon: The increased contributions represent a rather smaller proportion of the average earnings of male agricultural workers than the 1946 Act contributions did in 1946, but, as the Prime Minister indicated, we are at present reviewing the financial basis of the National Insurance Scheme.

Mr. J. Griffiths: In view of the financial basis of the scheme, will the Financial Secretary take one thing into account which marks a significant difference between 1946 and now, and that is to what extent those in the higher income groups derive benefit from reliefs on part of their contribution which is not open to those who do not earn enough to pay Income Tax?

Mr. Simon: The Government will, of course, take all factors into consideration, but the tax is less regressive now than it was under the scheme introduced by the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Jay: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the percentage of total income deducted in Income Tax and National Insurance contribution, together, on the basis of present tax rates and 9s. 11d. a week contribution for the employed man, in the case of a man with wife and one child, and income all earned of £8, £10, £12, £15, £20, and £30 a week, respectively.

Mr. Simon: Assuming the child is not over 11, the respective percentages are 6·2, 6·1, 8·1, 10·8, 15·5 and 21·3.

Mr. Jay: Does the Financial Secretary think that that is a satisfactory rate of progressive taxation?

Mr. Simon: It seems to me to be very highly and sharply progressive on all incomes over £10 a week.

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many people


paying insurance contributions to the National Insurance Fund pay no Income Tax; and how many people contributing to the National Insurance Fund are receiving tax allowances in respect of their contributions.

Mr. Simon: I regret that precise figures are not available, but it is estimated that between one-fifth and one-sixth of insured persons pay no tax; the remainder receive tax allowances on their contributions.

Dame Irene Ward: Will my hon. and learned Friend kindly explain to the House why a Conservative Government maintains a Socialist policy of penalising those who are living in the lower income groups?

Mr. Simon: I cannot accept the implitions of the second part of my hon. Friend's question. We have done a great deal to relieve those who are in the lower Income Tax paying groups, and, as I have pointed out previously, we have also so altered the tax incidence of part of the National Insurance contributions—the whole of the National Health Service contributions—that they no longer rank as deductible expenses against tax.

Dame Irene Ward: A good beginning has been made. and I hope that it will go further.

Cinemas (Entertainments Duty)

Mr. Swingler: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his estimate of the loss of tax revenue in the current year due to falling cinema attendances.

Mr. Simon: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given him by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) on 19th December, 1957.

Mr. Swingler: Will the Financial Secretary now agree that it is clear, if the present rate of tax is maintained, that there will be diminishing returns and that this illustrates the serious situation in the cinema trade? Has he made his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer fully aware of that?

Mr. Simson: I received a deputation yesterday from the industry, and I have passed on the representations that they made to my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Swingler: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, in view of the position in the film industry as a result of the sharp decline in cinema attendances, he will undertake personally to meet representatives of the industry before making any decision about changes in entertainments tax in his forthcoming Budget.

Mr. Simon: I have really already answered this Question. On behalf of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor, I had the pleasure of receiving yesterday a deputation from the industry, and have given to my right hon. Friend a full account of their representations.

Mr. Swingler: In thanking the Financial Secretary for that reply and for what he has done, may I ask whether the Chancellor will reconsider his decision not to receive this deputation, in view of the very serious decline in the cinema trade and the possibly grave repurcussions on film production which will result from it? Will not the Chancellor dive personal attention to the representatives of the all-industry tax committee, which is very perturbed about it?

Mr. Simon: My right hon. Friend has, of course, given personal attention to this problem, and will continue to do so. If I may say so, I think that the deputation yesterday understood very well the pressure on my right hon. Friend's time at present.

Mr. G. Jeger: Would the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that this Question requires very urgent consideration and that a victory for cinemas would be acclaimed on all sides?

Mr. Simon: I rather think that the implications of that question are meant to anticipate the Budget statement.

Capital Investment (Industry)

Mr. Leather: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the figure of total capital investment in industry for the last year for which figures are available; and what percentage of this was financed by net retained profits, by depreciation allowances, and by new capital issues, respectively.

The Paymaster-General (Mr. Reginald Maudling): I assume that by "industry" my hon. Friend intends to cover all companies and unincorporated businesses but


not the nationalised industries nor the trading activities of local authorities and the Central Government. On that basis gross fixed capital formation in 1956 amounted to about £1,450 million, of which about 58 per cent. was covered by the statutory depreciation allowances given for tax purposes, including initial and investment allowances. It is not possible to give the sources from which the balance was met, as undistributed profits and the proceeds of new capital issues are used not only to finance fixed capital formation but also to finance changes in stocks and in other working capital.

Mr. Leather: While thanking my right hon. Friend for those figures, may I ask him to reflect on this? Fifty-eight per cent. is a significantly low figure. Successive Governments since the war have been urging industry to finance investment by ploughing back profits, which in turn means artificially high profit margins. When he and his right hon. Friend consider depreciation allowances in the forthcoming Budget, will they reflect that if they can increase that 58 per cent. a great deal it will make a real contribution towards stabilising prices by allowing industry to reduce profit margins?

Mr. Maudling: That is a very important point. My hon. Friend will appreciate that it cannot be dealt with adequately by question and answer.

Bank Rate (Gold and Dollar Reserves)

Mr. Osborne: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the estimated amount of hot foreign money in the recent increase in our dollar and gold reserves which is likely to be repatriated when the Bank Rate is reduced.

Mr. Maudling: It is impossible to produce estimates on such a basis.

Mr. Osborne: Does my right hon. Friend fear that a substantial reduction in the Bank Rate will cause a substantial outflow of this hot money?

Mr. Maudling: I do not think I should speculate about future movements in the Bank Rate, but, as I said the other day in reply to the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick), I see no reason to think that there is any strong movement of

short-term funds into this country solely to take advantage of the interest rate differentials. The best expert advice I can obtain is that the movement of money represents the flow-back into London of normal commercial deposits.

Mr. Beswick: How can the Paymaster-General reconcile the reply he gave to me, namely, that he sees no reason to believe that there is any build-up for this money, with the reply he has given to his hon. Friend, in which he says that it is impossible to estimate how much of this money is short-term speculation?

Mr. Maudling: It is quite simple. The hon. Gentleman was asking what had happened and my hon. Friend is asking what might happen.

Post-war Credits

Mr. John Hall: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will consider converting post-war credits into a new category of Premium Bonds at the same or lower rate of interest whilst retaining the present restriction on repayment and negotiability.

Mr. Simon: No, Sir.

Mr. Hall: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that "hope deferred maketh The heart sick"? It might go a long way towards curing this condition if those creditors of the Government who hold post-war credits might look forward to an occasional prize.

Mr. Simon: The objection to that was stated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor on 28th January. Premium Bond prizes are the equivalent of interest. If more money is available, the best way to use it is to accelerate repayment.

Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes

Mr. E. Johnson: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will arrange for the Report of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes to be produced in an abbreviated and simplified form so that it will be more widely read by the general public.

Mr. Cronin: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will publish the evidence submitted to the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes.

Mr. Maudling: The Council is responsible for publishing such material as it thinks appropriate. My right hon. Friend will, however, convey to the Council the suggestions made in both Questions.

Mr. Johnson: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the findings of the very distinguished and impartial members of the Council have added great weight to the evidence already provided by the improvement in the rate of sterling exchange and the rise in our reserves of gold and dollars that the financial policy of Her Majesty's Government is eminently sound? Would not he wish to take every possible step to make those things widely known?

Mr. Maudling: I am not dissenting from anything my hon. Friend says, but I think this goes a little beyond the scope of his original Question.

Mr. Roy Jenkins: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that most economists who submitted evidence at this Committee did so at the invitation of the Committee and not on their own initiative? As it is clear that the Committee took no notice of the advice of the overwhelming majority of them, is not the least the Committee can do to publish all that they say?

Mr. Maudling: I do not think I can accept the assumption on which that supplementary question is based.

Mr. Chapman: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) whether he will now broaden the Cohen Council by adding a trade unionist and an economist of known progressive views;
(2) when he proposes to wind up the Cohen Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes.

Mr. Maudling: I will, with permission, deal with both Questions together, though I find it difficult to reconcile them with one another. The Government have no proposals to make either for winding up the Council or for making changes in its membership.

Mr. Chapman: Have we not established a constitutional tradition that committees like this shall represent both sides in the controversial matters affecting the community and both views about such things as the degree of laissez faire and the use of subsidies and as these eminent

gentlemen frankly admit their one-sided standpoint in this basic field—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—certainly; they admit their one-sided standpoint on these issues which divide the community—is it right that they should go on unconstitutionally promulgating their own views?

Mr. Maudling: I am afraid I cannot accept the imputation in that supplementary question. Of course they should go on promulgating their own views. It would be foolish if they promulgated anybody else's views. The hon. Member should not assume that failure to agree with him is evidence of partiality.

Mr. Jay: Will not the right hon. Gentleman note that the suggestion in my hon. Friend's second Question is much more sensible than that in his first?

Mr. Maudling: I am not quite sure what the basis of comparison is, but I have given the Government's answer to both questions.

Sir G. Nicholson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the country as a whole is far more likely to pay attention to the views of men who have practical experience of affairs than to people who merely tell others how to do things?

Mr. Prentice: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how far Her Majesty's Government accept the conclusion of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes that it would not be alarming if unemployment were to rise above the existing level.

Mr. Maudling: A high and stable level of employment continues to be a main objective of Government policy, and it is our belief that the present restrictive measures which are necessary for the strength of sterling and stability in the price level do not conflict with this objective.

Mr. Prentice: Will the right hon. Gentleman answer the Question? The Report indicates that the Council would not regard it as alarming if unemployment were at a higher level. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it would be very alarming for the people concerned to become unemployed, and for their families? Would it be alarming to the Government?

Mr. Maudling: The Report is not to the Government alone but to the country


as a whole. The Government do not consider it their function to comment on the Report as a whole, and even less upon individual sentences.

Mr. Jay: Would the right hon. Gentleman answer the perfectly fair question put by my hon. Friend? Do the Government agree, or do they not agree, with this specific statement by the Council?

Mr. Maudling: I have already answered that the Government do not intend to comment either on the Report in general or, even less, on individual sentences taken from their context.

Mr. J. Griffiths: In view of the fact that the Government now disclaim responsibility for this body, what is the use of continuing it in being?

Mr. Maudling: The use is that an impartial report is received from three very distinguished men on matters of great importance to the whole country.

Mr. Griffiths: In view of the reaction of the Trades Union Congress to this Report, does the right hon. Gentleman think that it can be in any way accepted as impartial or as of any use?

Mr. Maudling: I see no reason for thinking the three gentlemen concerned to be otherwise than impartial.

Mr. John Hall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Leader of the Opposition is apparently prepared to accept at least 3 per cent. unemployment?

Mr. D. Howell: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what action the Government intend to take following the first Report of the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes; and whether he will state the Government's policy in regard to the continued existence of this Council.

Mr. Maudling: The Council was established to report independently and from time to time to the community at large. No immediate action by the Government is called for on the recent Report, but they will naturally bear in mind the observations of the Council. There is no change in the Government's policy in regard to the Council.

Mr. Howell: Is it not clear that the only thing of value to come out of the Report is the assurance that we now have

that Conservative freedom works only under a degree of unemployment, a stagnant economy, a high Bank Rate, and the fact that increased wages cannot be tied even to increased productivity? In these circumstances, with this Committee producing such a biased Report, which does not hold the support of both sides of industry, is it not a waste of public money to allow the Committee to continue in operation in its present form?

Mr. Maudling: If that is the hon. Member's impression of the Report, he cannot have read it with a clear and unbiased mind.

Trade and Industry (Political Advertisements)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will introduce legislation to prevent the deduction from taxable income of expenditure for political purposes.

Mr. Simon: I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

Mr. Allaun: In view of that answer, can steel advertisements dealing with the merits of different economic and political systems possibly be considered as expenditure wholly for the purpose of the taxpayer's trade? Since one-third of recent steel advertisements reporting the chairmen's speeches have dealt with such matters, are they not clearly taxable?

Mr. Simon: That is a matter of interpretation of the law with which I do not think it would be proper for me to deal.

Mr. J. Griffiths: If a trade union used its industrial fund to advertise its political opinions, what would be the Government's view?

Mr. Simon: That is equally a question of interpretation of the law, and equally I do not intend to be drawn into it.

Small Fixed Income Groups (Income Tax)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give an assurance, in view of rent increases to many people living on fixed incomes who do not qualify for supplementary grants on National Assistance, that he will undertake to restore the Income Tax relief in the bands of income which operated in 1955–56.

Mr. Simon: I have noted my hon. Friend's suggestion, but I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

Dame Irene Ward: Will my hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that everybody is trying to find a way to help those on fixed incomes? Will he convey to his right hon. Friend that this would be a way of helping the small fixed income groups? Will he also bear in mind that I am delighted that he cannot anticipate the Budget statement provided that I get my way in the Budget?

Mr. Simon: I noted both parts of my hon. Friend's observations.

Arts Council (Grant)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in view of the proposed increase in expenditure in university education, he is satisfied that the grant in aid of the Arts Council is sufficient to ensure that graduates desirous of seeking employment in the field of arts will find a reasonable guarantee of employment.

Mr. Simon: The purpose of the grant is to encourage the arts and to make them accessible to the public.

Dame Irene Ward: What purpose is there in finding considerable sums of money through the Ministry of Education to give young people a chance to acquire an educated knowledge of the arts when, having obtained it, they find that there is not sufficient money in the kitty to ensure that they can get jobs in the arts in which Government grants have already been expended on them? Is not that a nonsensical way to go on?

Mr. Simon: The recent increases in university building which my right hon. Friend announced were between two-thirds and three-quarters for the benefit of the sciences and only the remaining part for the arts, and a very small proportion of the latter relates to the fine arts. The Government have decided to propose a grant of £1,100,000 for the Arts Council for 1958–59, which compares with £985,000 for 1957–58. That is an increase of 11 per cent. I think the House will agree that, in view of the over-riding need for economy in Government expenditure, my right hon. Friend has been generous with this body.

Jewellery

Mr. V. Yates: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware of the large number of Purchase Tax anomalies in jewellery; why ladies' brooches are rated differently from tie pins; and whether he will examine such anomalies.

Mr. Simon: As the House knows, my right hon. Friend is examining alleged anomalies in Purchase Tax, and he will bear the hon. Member's points in mind.

Mr. Yates: While thanking the Minister for that answer, may I point out that there are very many anomalies in this matter? I should be glad if the Minister looked at such examples as two identical brooches, one free of tax and the other carrying 60 per cent. tax, the only difference being that there is a safety cap on one and not on the other.

Mr. Simon: I will certainly examine that case.

Mr. Yates: And deal with it?

Mr. V. Yates: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many Purchase Tax officers are engaged in connection with the jewellery industry; and how many complaints have been made to them concerning the alleged black market activities and evasion of Purchase Tax in that industry.

Mr. Simon: Customs and Excise officers deal with Purchase Tax work in relation to jewellery along with other duties, and the information sought could only be obtained with disproportionate effort and expense.

Mr. Yates: Has not the Chancellor of the Exchequer accused the whole of The jewellery industry of a conspiracy of silence, in spite of the fact that hundreds of complaints have been made to Purchase Tax officers? Is it not reasonable that something more expeditious should be done to meet these very large number of complaints which must have been made to Purchase Tax officers from time to time?

Mr. Simon: What my right hon. Friend said was that it was no use making general complaints but that what was needed is specific complaints which can be investigated.

Mr. V. Yates: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is now in a position to report on the case of the copying of a design by Messrs. Hill and Company, fashion jewellery manufacturers, in Birmingham.

Mr. Simon: As my right hon. Friend promised on 28th January, he has written to the hon. Member.

Mr. Yates: He has, but is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that it is quite unsatisfactory and that this firm, which has been making complaints now over many months, has made another complaint about the copying of a design of an article which is now being sold by another firm in Birmingham at a price which obviously has evaded tax? Is it not reasonable that some speedy action should be taken in these matters?

Mr. Simon: Investigations into the allegations relating to Birmingham showed that tax had been paid. As to the copying of the design, I would ask the hon. Member to put a Question to my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade.

United States (Trade Recession)

Mr. Chapman: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will make a statement on the impact of the current United States recession on the British economy and on the sterling area.

Mr. Maudling: No, Sir. The question will be covered in White Papers to be laid before Parliament in the next few weeks and in the Budget debates.

Mr. Chapman: I do not want to start a debate, but could the right hon. Gentleman say anything helpful at the moment about the effect of the American recession, particularly on British exports? Could he say whether the slack in British exports at the moment in any degree results from the American recession, and could he say something about progress in exports in the rest of the sterling area?

Mr. Maudling: This extremely important question is so big and complicated that it would be unwise to try to deal with it in answer to supplementary questions. I am afraid that partial information, which is all I could give in answer to supplementary questions, would be misleading. I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me in the circumstances.

Housekeeper Allowance

Mr. John Hall: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what has been the cost of the housekeeper allowance for the financial year 1957–58.

Mr. Simon: About £3 million.

Tax Reserve Certificates (Interest)

Mr. John Hall: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, although according to the terms of issue interest on tax reserve certificates is exempt from Income Tax, Profits Tax and Excess Profits Tax, nevertheless such interest is grossed up for the purpose of assessing Surtax and distributed profits tax; and if he will either amend the existing terms of issue or ensure that such interest is not chargeable to tax.

Mr. Simon: No, Sir. Interest on tax reserve certificates is exempt from both Surtax and Profits Tax.

Sadlers Wells and Carl Rosa Opera Companies

Mr. G. Jeger: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the proposed merging of the Sadlers Wells and the Carl Rosa Opera Companies which will curtail their activities; and whether he will take immediate action to make the necessary financial aid available by direct grant to ensure the continuance of both opera companies.

Mr. Simon: The answer to the first part of the Question is "Yes", and to the second "No". These are matters for the Arts Council and, following the policy of successive Governments, my right hon. Friend does not propose to intervene.

Mr. Jeger: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman not aware from various letters and articles which have appeared in the Press lately of the great concern in the country over the proposed merger of these two companies and the gross curtailing of their joint and several activities? Is he aware that this disaster could be averted for what by comparison is the paltry sum of £35,000? Could not the Government take this step as an immediate measure of alleviation, while setting up a committee to inquire into the general position of the arts in this country and how far they should be


financed from public funds and what the future policy of successive Governments should be?

Mr. Simon: I have indeed followed the controversy in the public Press, where a number of conflicting views have been put forward. As to the grant to the Arts Council, as I said in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward), my right hon. Friend has decided to propose a grant of 11 ner cent. more than the previous year—that is a figure of no less than £1,110,000. I think it would he generally accented that that is treating the Arts Council with great generosity.

Rent Act

Mr. Arbuthnot: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the estimated increase in taxation revenue anticipated from a full year's operation of the Rent Act, 1957.

Mr. Simon: I regret that there is not yet enough information on which to make an estimate.

Mr. Shinwell: Is it possible that, arising from this matter, though landlords will nay more taxation, tenants will have nothing left with which to pay tax?

Mr. Simon: No, Sir. One would expect that the landlords would certainly have to pay more tax in so far as their rents are raised.

Husbands and Wives (Taxation)

Mr. Arbuthnot: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would have to be the standard rate of Income Tax to bring in the same revenue were husbands and wives to be assessed separately, including the personal allowances applicable to single people.

Mr. Simon: The standard rate would have to be increased by about one-twentieth of a penny, on the assumption that the separate assessment was optional; and applied only to earned income; and that each spouse was entitled only to the personal allowance of a single person.

Pottery Industry

Dr. Stross: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has noted the improvement in the pottery industry for

the year 1957 as compared with 1956; and whether he will give urgent consideration to the crippling effect of 60 per cent. Purchase Tax on ornamental pottery.

Mr. Simon: I have indeed been pleased to note this improvement, but the hon. Member will not expect me to anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.

Dr. Stross: Is it not true that this partial but very welcome improvement cannot be dissociated from the fact that there was a remission of Purchase Tax from 30 per cent. to 15 per cent.? In view of the fact that the heaviest competition from abroad which this industry faces in Britain is in ornamental pottery, may we not have at some time or other, and as soon as possible, some remission of this tax?

Mr. Simon: In view of my answer, the safest thing I can do is to refer the hon. Member to a reply which my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade gave to him on 12th November.

Blind Persons (Guide Dogs)

Wing Commander Bullus: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will introduce legislation to grant blind persons an allowance, for purposes of Income Tax, for the upkeep of a guide dog.

Mr. Simon: I have noted my hon. Friend's suggestion.

Wing Commander Bullus: While thanking my hon. and learned Friend for his hopeful statement, may I ask whether he will ask his right hon. Friend to give sympathetic consideration to a concession which should not cost very much?

Mr. Simon: I hope that all my replies are read in a strictly neutral tone.

Local Authority Loans (Interest Rates)

Mr. Gower: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what considerations have led recently to a reduction in the lending rates to local authorities; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Maudling: The interest rates on loans to local authorities from the Local Loans Fund were reduced as from 25th February in accordance with the established policy of keeping them in line with


the rates prevailing in the market for loans to local authorities. The change is in no sense a sign of any relaxation in credit policy.

Mr. Lipton: Has not the time come for a cut in the Bank Rate?

Mr. Maudling: As soon as the time comes, action will be taken.

Sterling Balances (Publication of Figures)

Mr. Roy Jenkins: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will publish monthly figures for sterling balances.

Mr. Maudling: Monthly changes can be much influenced by fortuitous factors and could therefore be very misleading. Consideration is however being given to the quarterly publication of sterling holdings.

Mr. Jenkins: But are not the monthly gold figures equally liable to influence by special factors? Will not the right hon. Gentleman also confirm that the figures asked for are known to the Bank of England? Will he not also agree that if we are to see the true position from month to month, we ought to see not only the movement in our assets as represented by the gold reserves, but also the movement in our liabilities as represented by these figures?

Mr. Maudling: This is an important point, but even if we published the sterling balances and the gold reserves, that would not be the full picture of our assets and liabilities. If we give the impression that the picture is full, it might be misleading. I agree that the monthly publication of gold reserves might give a misleading impression because of the short-term factor, but that is established practice. I appreciate the point which the hon. Gentleman has in mind.

Income Tax

Mr. Lipton: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will restore the lower rates of Income Tax to what they were in 1955–56.

Mr. Simon: The lower rates of Income Tax at present in force are the same as those for 1955–56.

Mr. Lipton: Is the Financial Secretary aware that the old rate on the first £100

was 2s. 6d., on the next £150 it was 5s., and on the next £150 it was 7s., whereas now on the first £60 it is 2s. 3d., on the next £150 it is 4s. 9d., and on the next £150 it is 6s. 9d.? Is he therefore aware that under the present rates a single person or a widow with a taxable income of £250 is paying £5 17s. 6d. a year more than was required before, and does not that make many small taxpayers think they were swindled by what was held out to be a cut in the tax rates in the 1955–56 Budget?

Mr. Simon: The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong. The figures he has just quoted were in force in 1954–55, not 1955–56, and they were reduced in that year.

Mr. Lipton: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

Australian Beef

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what improvement he has recently noted in the quality of the new chiller grade of beef imported under the long-term agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia; and if he will make a statement.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. J. B. Godber): The special bounty for chiller grade beef only came into operation in Australia in mid-January, and its effects cannot be expected to become apparent for some time to come.

Fish (Distribution Costs)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, in view of the costings investigations into the price of fish which began in 1952, if he can yet make a statement on the conclusions reached.

Mr. Godber: The report of the White Fish Authority's inquiry into the costs of distributing white fish was published in March, 1957. The information it provided will, I hope, have helped to dispel


any idea that exorbitant profits are being made in the distribution of fish.

Mr. Dodds: Are no further investigations taking place into the costings of fish by the White Fish Authority? Is this the completion of five years' study?

Mr. Godber: I would not say that there are no further investigations taking place or that none will take place. This is a matter for the White Fish Authority to decide on its own initiative, where it thinks necessary.

Mr. G. R. Howard: Is my hon. Friend aware that, as reported in the Fishing News of 28th February, at a meeting between the British Trawlers' Federation and the fish fryers, it was stated that:
For the 12 months ended September, 1957, prices were higher but costs higher still. … Earnings averaged 73s, a kit and the costs, without allowing for interest, were 75s., so that a loss of 2s. on every kit landed was suffered,
I do not think there are any exorbitant prices there.

Mr. Willey: Can the hon. Gentleman say what inquiries are taking place? Will he not agree that there is plenty of room for improvement in the distribution of fish?

Mr. Godber: If the hon. Gentleman will put down a Question on that point, I shall be happy to answer it.

Meat and Livestock Industries (Report)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will make a statement on the progress made by the Committee investigating problems of the meat and livestock industries.

Mr. Godber: During the past year the work of the Committee has included questions of animal diseases, beef bull progeny testing, carcase assessment, consumer requirements, prepackaging, meat shrinkage, certain feeding techniques and the establishment of a Meat Research Station.
I should like to make it clear that this Committee was not established to investigate any specific problems, but is a continuing committee charged with the duty of keeping under review all matters affecting meat research and of advising Ministers on them.

Mr. Dodds: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the previous Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food agreed that the problems which the Committee was to consider affected the housewives very much? Can he say, therefore, if a housewife was put on the Committee? Furthermore, can he also state what has happened about the proposal for smaller joints and leaner meat at more reasonable prices, for which most housewives are waiting?

Mr. Godber: On the position of the housewife, my right hon. Friend the present Chancellor of the Exchequer said in reply to a Question put by the hon. Gentleman that the interests of the housewives were represented directly on the Committee by Mrs. Hilda Whitlow, who is a housewife and a journalist.

Mr. Lipton: A Hampstead housewife.

Mr. Godber: So I am advised. As regards smaller joints, housewives themselves can do a great deal in this respect by choice in the shops, which has exactly the effect—

Mr. Dodds: Smaller cattle.

Mr. Godber: Smaller cattle are being produced.

Grey Seal Colony, Fame Islands

Sir C. Thornton-Kemsley: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he is aware that the size of the grey seal colony on the Fame Islands doubled between 1939 and 1950 and has increased considerably since; whether he is aware that the salmon fishing industry is, in consequence, suffering heavy and avoidable loss; and if he will authorise a drastic reduction of seal calves during the 1958 breeding season.

Mr. Godber: I am aware that the size of the grey seal colony has much increased since 1939 and that some of the grey seals are taking salmon and damaging salmon nets. As for the last part of the Question, I would refer to the answer given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland on 4th March.

Scrapie

Mr. Baldwin: asked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he is aware that the Government of New Zealand makes scrapie a notifiable


disease followed up with a slaughter policy and restriction of movement; and whether, in view of the success of this policy, he will now take similar steps for Great Britain.

Mr. Godber: Yes, Sir, but the disease never became established in New Zealand, whereas it has been prevalent here for a very long time. Because of this, and for the reasons given in my reply to my hon. Friend on 12th December last, the measures taken in New Zealand would not be practicable in this country.

Mr. Baldwin: Will my hon. Friend reconsider the matter? Is it not the case that if we do not take steps to deal with this disease it will become endemic in this country and seriously affect our export trade in sheep to many parts of the world? All we are asking is that, where the disease is obvious, it should be notifiable and that a slaughter policy should follow.

Mr. Godber: This is a very difficult problem. I know my hon. Friend's concern about it. It has been encountered in this country for a very long time, but the difficulty is the very long incubation period. It is for that reason that my right hon. Friend has not felt able as yet to take the steps which my hon. Friend wishes, and I do not see how we could implement such a policy.

Oral Answers to Questions — SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Prime Minister if he will seek to have representatives of China invited to the forthcoming summit talks.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): No, Sir. The composition of an eventual Summit Conference must depend on the outcome of the preparatory talks, and will have to take account of the subjects which it may be agreed to discuss.

Mrs. Jeger: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that about half the population of the world lives in Asia and that if we are to try to achieve at the Summit Conference a realistic relaxation of tensions it will be essential to pay at least some attention to the situation in Asia?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, but I think the important thing about a Summit Conference is that both the agenda and the membership should be such as to make possible some definite progress on some of the most urgent problems. I did observe that the Chinese People's Republic was not amongst the States named as suitable participants in such a conference in Mr. Gromyko's recent letter to the French Prime Minister.

Mr. Gaitskell: Whilst agreeing with the Prime Minister that the preparatory talks must deal with the question of the participants and of the agenda, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable confusion about the present position of the diplomatic exchanges in this matter; that an impression has been created that whereas at an earlier stage the Western Powers were seeking a meeting of Foreign Ministers and the Russians were opposing it, we now appear to have reached the opposite position in which the Russians are saying they are prepared to have a meeting between Foreign Secretaries and the Western Powers are saying no? Is it not desirable to clear up this matter?
Would the Prime Minister also give an indication whether he does not feel, even if it proved difficult to make much progress with sifting out the problems as contrasted with the agenda, that it would be desirable to have his summit talks in order to break the ice and move on from there to further discussions?

The Prime Minister: If I may be allowed to say so, neither of those supplementary questions really arises out of the question whether China should or should not be invited to the conference. I will, of course, do my best to answer those two questions if the right hon. Gentleman will put them down. I would not wish at the moment to make a statement without thought, except to say that our position broadly is that, whatever the machinery—whether Foreign Secretaries or diplomatic discussions, or perhaps both—what we are anxious to do is to arrange for this conference in circumstances which are likely to lead to at least partial success.

Mr. Bevan: Is it not a fact that the Russians have stated that they are now prepared for the Foreign Secretaries' conference to discuss three questions:


composition, which arises out of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary answer, the date of the conference and the items on the agenda? What the Americans are suggesting is that it should also consider questions of substantial agreement, which the Russians say should be left to the Summit Conference itself. Would he like to make an observation about this?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir, because at the present time I understand there are some diplomatic negotiations going on directly between Russia and Washington, although of course the Americans will consult us and the N.A.T.O. Powers before making their reply. I think the general position of the Americans and of all the allies is not that they should be assured that there is agreement before the conference, and that the conference is merely to put the seal upon it, but that the agenda for the conference, and the circumstances of the conference, should be of such a kind as to make it have a reasonable chance of success, and not merely a conference doomed from the start to unfruitful debate.

Mr. Gaitskell: Does not the Prime Minister agree that the nature of the Soviet régime itself may well be of such a character that a Summit Conference would appeal more to the Russians than a meeting of Ministers below that level? Will he bear that point of view in mind in any representations he makes on this subject to the United States and the U.S.S.R.?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. That is why I am so pleased to find that all the Western countries are now taking up the position that, whereas before they thought that it might best be done by Foreign Secretaries, or ambassadors, or a combination of both, that is not now essential, and the essential thing is that the preparatory work should be done in such a way as to give an agenda which will have some hope of success as a result.

Oral Answers to Questions — RENT ACT

Dr. Dickson Mahon: asked the Prime Minister what reply he has given to recent representations made to him by

hon. Members concerning the possibility of amending the Rent Act, 1957.

The Prime Minister: I would refer to the reply given on my behalf on 3rd March by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal.

Dr. Mabon: Since the most prominent of the hon. Members concerned was the hon. Member for Dulwich (Mr. Robert Jenkins), and since that hon. Member has made a speech in his constituency saying that there will be no evictions in October, will the Prime Minister confirm that statement? Will he also tell the House whether the Minister of Housing and the Secretary of State for Scotland have made it clear that they have ample powers so to sustain that position, or whether an amending Bill will have to be introduced this Session?

The Prime Minister: Neither of those questions arises from the original Question, in which I am asked to make a statement about representations made to me by hon. Members. I prefer to keep the tradition, which I think the right one, that I will not discuss in public private communications which I commonly receive from both sides of the House.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Prime Minister to what extent the speech delivered at Kelvingrove on 28th February by the Secretary of State for Scotland, in which he appealed for greater restraint on the part of Scottish landlords in operating the Rent Act, 1957, represented the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that some years ago the Clan Macmillan in Scotland was evicted and that, as a result of this eviction in the Isle of Arran, some of the Clan Macmillan came to London, with disastrous results? Does he not think it would be most appropriate if he remedied the position by introducing a Bill to abolish evictions in Scotland?

The Prime Minister: It is not true that my grandfather was evicted from Arran. He came to London, like many another Highland lad, to search to improve his position, and he had a perfect right to do so.

Oral Answers to Questions — DISARMAMENT

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the recent official statement by President Eisenhower that some North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries would not support a first stage disarmament agreement providing for a temporary cessation of nuclear tests, he will make a statement on Her Majesty's Government's policy with regard to participation in such an agreement.

The Prime Minister: The policy of Her Majesty's Government remains as stated in the proposals for partial disarmament put forward by the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the United States on 29th August last year. Under these proposals, a temporary cessation of nuclear tests would form part of a first-stage disarmament agreement.

Mr. Henderson: While many of us take the view that disarmament should cover both nuclear and conventional weapons of mass destruction, we also consider that an agreement to suspend nuclear tests might well facilitate the breaking of the present disarmament deadlock. Can we be assured by the Prime Minister that when he goes to the Summit Conference he will not be opposed to such a first-step agreement?

The Prime Minister: If, as I hope, the Summit Conference meets, and if, as I hope—because I believe it to be one of the most helpful subjects—some form of disarmament is arranged, it would be very inadvisable for me to go to the Conference having declared beforehand the precise position our country would take.

Mr. Bevan: Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that in this respect his position should be rather different from that of the U.S.S.R.? He says that the suspension of nuclear tests should form part of the first stage of disarmament, whereas the Russians have said that it should be the first stage of a disarmament agreement. In view of the importance of this matter, would it not be desirable for us to declare our readiness to suspend H-bomb tests and to meet the Russian point of view in the hope that when that is done a more favourable climate would be created for further agreement?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. That would be bad diplomacy and bad psychology.

Mr. Bevan: In view of the position taken up by the Russians and their recent diplomatic success, they appear to be very much more successful than the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Rankin: asked the Prime Minister what reply he proposes to make to the petition for nuclear disarmament which has been sent to him by 204 teachers and research workers of London University.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Prime Minister what is the nature of his reply to the letter sent to him by 204 teachers and research workers of London University urging that, pending international negotiations on nuclear disarmament, Great Britain should suspend nuclear patrol flights, stop hydrogen bomb tests and not establish missile bases.

The Prime Minister: I have acknowledged the letter and taken note of the views expressed. The position of Her Majesty's Government on the matters raised has been made clear in this House and in the country.

Mr. Rankin: Can the Prime Minister say why it is that in relation to the missile and its use we always seem to be taking our cue from the American State Department? Is it not the case that when we first got the hydrogen bomb the right hon. Gentleman promised that we would have greater freedom of action in foreign policy? Why has that promise not materialised?

The Prime Minister: The Question I am asked is whether I have received a letter and what reply I have made, and I think it would be more courteous to allow my reply to reach the communicants before I state its nature. We have debated the general question over and over again. Of course, we shall soon have the advantage of the formal views of the Labour Party on the matter.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the Prime Minister think there is some significance in so many eminent scientists being critical of his hydrogen bomb policy? How does he explain that?

The Prime Minister: I receive a very large number of communications in the opposite direction.

Mr. Callaghan: I wonder.

Oral Answers to Questions — AIRCRAFT (NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Prime Minister if he will appoint a committee to inquire into the co-operation between civilian and Service fire fighting and first aid teams and to report how these can be improved; and, in particular, how far, having regard to security considerations as well as to the safety of the public, it is in the public interest to continue the present policy of refusing to train local authority fire brigades to deal with crashed aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister: There is already the closest co-operation in all these matters between the Service and civil Departments concerned, and I do not consider a special committee to be necessary. As regards the training of fire brigades, I would refer the hon. Member to what was said by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary in reply to his Question of 27th February.

Mr. de Freitas: Have not the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Air disclosed a situation in which the civilian fire brigades may be called upon at any moment to perform tasks for which they are totally untrained and unprepared? Is the Prime Minister aware that in the Eastern Counties and Lincolnshire, especially, there is a great deal of disquiet on this subject?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I think that the arrangements made are very satisfactory.

Oral Answers to Questions — EURATOM—UNITED STATES AGREEMENT

Mr. H. Hynd: asked the Prime Minister what will be the extent of the British association with the new agreement for joint working between Euratom and the United States Government.

The Prime Minister: I understand that the agreement provides for co-operation between the United States and Euratom on the erection of prototype nuclear power reactors in the Euratom countries. Her Majesty's Government are not associated with this agreement. We favour the forms of co-operation which I mentioned on Tuesday. We have for instance already signed an agreement

with Italy covering the supply of power reactors, and an Italian undertaking has decided to buy such a reactor from a British firm. We are ready to make other arrangements of this kind.

Mr. Hynd: Is it not regrettable that we are not associated with this agreement? Is it not desirable that we should be in on all these movements in view of the lead which this country gave in the peaceful use of atomic energy?

The Prime Minister: I do not think we can play a useful part in this agreement for the provision of nuclear power reactor prototypes. What is very satisfactory is signs that we are making satisfactory bilateral agreements and the growth of the export trade in that direction.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for next week?

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 10TH MARCH—Supply [8th Allotted Day].

Air Estimates, 1958–59, will be considered in Committee on Vote A.

TUESDAY, 11TH MARCH—Committee stage of the National Health Service Contributions Bill.

WEDNESDAY, 12TH MARCH—Second Reading of the Nationalised Industries Loans Bill.

Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.

Report and Third Reading of the Recreational Charities Bill [Lords] and of the Maintenance Orders Bill.

THURSDAY, 13TH MARCH—Supply [9th Allotted Day]: Committee.

Navy, Votes 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 and Navy Supplementary Estimate, 1957–58.

Army, Votes 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11.

Air, Votes 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 11 and Air Supplementary Estimate, 1957–58.

It is proposed to divide the time available equally between the three Services.

At 9.30 p.m., under the provisions of Standing Order No. 16, the Question will be put from the Chair on the Vote under discussion, and on all outstanding Estimates, Supplementary Estimates and Excess Votes required before the end of the financial year.

FRIDAY, 14TH MARCH—Consideration of Private Members' Motions.

It may be convenient for me to inform the House that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget on Tuesday, 15th April.

I may also state that we hope that it will be possible to adjourn for the Easter Recess on Thursday, 3rd April, and resume on Tuesday, 15th April.

Mr. Gaitskell: May I, first, express the thanks of the Opposition to the Leader of the House for conceding our request that, on the Army Estimates, the suspension should be for an indefinite period? That is for this evening. May I also ask him whether the Government are likely to be able to make a statement on Cyprus in the near future?

Mr. Butler: I have no statement to make today in reply to the latter part of the right hon. Gentleman's question. The making of a statement depends on the development of events.

Mr. Nabarro: Would not my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the last time the House had a debate on the proposal for a European Common Market was in November, 1956? Having regard to the tortuous character of the negotiations being conducted by the Paymaster-General and the attitude of the French, would it be possible for time to be given before Easter for a debate, or, at least, for a Government statement to be made on this important topic?

Mr. Butler: I would not describe the negotiations of my right hon. Friend as being tortuous. I would describe them as being assiduous, and, I hope, likely to be crowned with success. I have sympathy with my hon. Friend and the House in wanting information on this matter. I think that we are all in agreement on that point. I would suggest that he should give me an opportunity of consulting my right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister before I arrange anything, perhaps through the usual channels.

Mr. Beswick: May I ask the Leader of the House whether, in view of the confusion and concern among the people of this country, to which reference was made a little earlier, about recent exchanges concerning the proposed Summit Conference, it would be possible to have another debate on foreign affairs so that the House of Commons, at any rate, can express its views and its consternation at the recent speech of Mr. Foster Dulles, in which he described the Russian proposals as "a hoax and a fraud"?

Mr. Butler: I must not go into issues of policy in answering business questions. I would only say that if the hon. Member were to study the whole of Mr. Foster Dulles' interview, he would not derive quite so pessimistic an impression from it as he has done from a single sentence.
In reply to his main question, I could not give any undertaking about a foreign affairs debate at present, although I appreciate the anxiety on this matter in the House.

Mr. H. Fraser: May I ask my right hon. Friend whether, in view of the assiduous but apparently fruitless negotiations with the Egyptian Government on the question of compensation for British subjects, he could give time for a short debate, maybe only half a day, before the House goes into the Easter Recess, because the misfortunes of these people have gone on without much alleviation, and they do deserve the proper attention of the House?

Mr. Butler: This certainly is a matter of great importance. I understand that these negotiations are temporarily adjourned from the Rome discussions, and I think it possible that they may be brought to a further conclusion before very long. It would be difficult to give time for this. I think that I had better both examine the course of the negotiations and perhaps keep in touch with my hon. Friends who are interested in this matter before I give any further answer.

Mr. Houghton: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he has noticed the growing support for a Motion on the Order Paper in my name and that of right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of this House on the counting of unestablished service for pension in the Civil Service?

[That this House takes note of the recent Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (Command Paper No. 9613) and the observations of the Commission in Chapter XV, paragraph 743, on the subject of the reckoning of unestablished service for superannuation purposes in the Civil Service, to the effect that there is no question of merit or principle outstanding, that it is in fact now common ground that it is right that unestablished service should reckon in full, that Parliament conceded that as regards service after July, 1949, by the Superannuation Act, 1949, that the Royal Commission were of opinion that the Superannuation Act, 1946, afforded a precedent for retrospection and supported the argument that if a certain treatment is right at one point in time it is also right at others, and that in the view of the Royal Commission the sole consideration was that of cost; and this House is of opinion that all unestablished service prior to July, 1949, of civil servants subsequently appointed to established posts should be reckonable in full for superannuation purposes (instead of one-half only) on the grounds put forward by the right honourable Gentleman the Member for Monmouth, in his speech to Standing Committee B on the Superannuation Bill, 1949 (Hansard, 10th May, 1949, Cols. 155–158), and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to take the necessary action.]

Does he appreciate the growing urgency of this matter, having regard to what is to happen in shore establishments in the Admiralty in the near future? Before this Motion is overtaken by one dealing with unsuccessful suicide attempts, will he either provide time for a debate or ask his right hon. Friend to provide a remedy?

Mr. Butler: It would be a pity if we confounded the two Motions on the Order Paper, copies of which I have before me. It is important to make up one's mind on the latter difficult question before the House decides upon the solution of the former. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will give me the opportunity of a little time to consider it, because I want to give him a satisfactory answer.

Dame Irene Ward: Has my right hon. Friend noticed a Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper on the subject of subsidising opera? As this is a very

urgent matter, as far as public money and employment are concerned, can he find time for a debate on this subject?

Hon. Members: Sing it.

Mr. Butler: I think that my hon. Friend would make a fortune in any profession.

Mr. K. Robinson: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he has seen the Motion on the Order Paper on the law relating to suicide, which is signed by more than 170 Members of all political parties and of all shades of religious opinion? Would he, as Leader of the House, provide time for a debate, or, better still, as Home Secretary, introduce a simple Bill to give effect to the terms of the Motion?

[That this House is of opinion that the existing law of England relating to suicide has no deterrent effect, is capricious in its incidence and can no longer be regarded as reflecting the attitude of society; and considers that suicide and attempted suicide should now be removed from the category of criminal offences.]

Mr. Butler: I do not think that the question of suicide being a crime is as simple as all that. There are a great many feelings and opinions on this matter. If the Opposition would wish to find time on a Supply Day for this or any other similar general question, it would be an interesting subject for the House to discuss.

Mr. Harold Davies: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether, in view of the confusion existing in farming and agricultural circles about Government policy, he will give the House a chance of debating the Government's policy on agriculture before the Recess?

Mr. Butler: We have just published the Agriculture Bill, and I sincerely hope there will be an opportunity for debating it on Second Reading before the Recess. The conclusion will be twofold; first, the Bill will be passed by a very big majority; and, secondly, the position will be clarified for the agricultural community.

Mr. Brockway: In view of the urgency of the matter, and the fact that a man's liberty and perhaps life are involved, will the right hon. Gentleman provide an


early opportunity for a discussion of the Motion, which carries the names of more than 100 hon. Members of the House, relating to the threat that Joaquim PerezSelles may be deported to Spain?

[That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to grant political asylum to Joaquim Perez-Selles, an opponent of the political regime in Spain, from which he has on three occasions attempted to escape and where he has already served four and a half years' imprisonment, and who is now in Brixton Prison awaiting deportation to Spain.]

Mr. Butler: I have seen the hon. Member about this case, and I have written to him. I am also causing letters to be written to other hon. Members who have approached me on this matter. I cannot accept that this case has the features which the hon. Member has brought to my attention, and, having examined it, I do not think that it is a case for affording political asylum to this man. Therefore, I must return a negative answer to the hon. Member.

Mr. Rankin: Can the Leader of the House say whether the suspension of the Standing Order will be unrestricted on Monday, when we debate the Air Estimates?

Mr. Butler: We propose a suspension of two hours, as in the case of the Navy Estimates.

Mr. Callaghan: Following up the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), will the Home Secretary agree not to deport this man until after we have had a debate, which will be coming on very shortly on the Home Office Estimates, which will give Members who feel strongly about this case the opportunity of deploying their arguments and also give the Home Secretary an opportunity to make his reply to them?

Mr. Butler: No, Sir. We have found very often that it is not fair to keep these cases hanging on, if we are satisfied about their merits. I have been into this case very fully. I have found that this man is a stowaway who has come here on previous occasions. I do not find that the political dangers which hon. Members have put to me are as severe as they fear. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion

that this case must be decided in the sense that I have stated.

Mr. Gordon-Walker: Would it not be much more unfair to send this man back to Spain—a man who has refused military service in Spain and would, therefore, be subject to political prosecution if he were sent back to his own country?

Mr. Hirst: A very good reason for sending him back.

Mr. Butler: The right hon. Gentleman has seen me about this matter and he knows that there is quite a complicated history relating to this man—and it is not a satisfactory history. There are features of it which are not political, but which relate to the man's refusal to do his military service and his absconding from a variety of responsibilities in military service. If I thought that this case were a purely political one, I should take a different view, but I do not believe it to be so.

Mr. Bevan: Would the right hon. Gentleman come to the same view if this man had come from behind the Iron Curtain? Has he prepared his mind to reply to the representations that many Members have made to him, that instead of sending this man direct to Spain he might enable him to go to some other country whose hospitality might be more generous?

Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. At the request of hon. Members I did examine the possibility of sending this man to France, and I got in touch with the French consul with a view to seeing whether it would be possible. I found that it was not likely to be received as a request from this Government, and, therefore, there was no help in this direction. It was against that background that I saw no alternative to the policy that I have decided to pursue.

Mr. Bevan: We understand the reply of the French Government, but why did the right hon. Gentleman think that it was a good idea to ask the French Government? Was he hoping that they would relieve him of his own anxieties in the matter?

Mr. Butler: No, Sir. I did that because I have been seen, within the last 48 hours, by the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), and


the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), who requested me to ask whether a transit visa to France was possible. I accordingly investigated the matter, and I am sorry to say that it does not appear to be possible.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We seem to be getting away from the question of business.

Mr. Gaitskell: I think that the Home Secretary realises that hon. Members on both sides of the House are very sensitive to this question of the hospitality which is afforded to aliens escaping from foreign dictatorship countries. That has been evidenced, for instance, in recent weeks by the decision of the Home Secretary in regard to the Hungarian stowaways. [HON. MEMBERS: "Quite different."] Will not the Home Secretary at least delay a decision in this matter for a week or ten days, to enable him further to consider representations made on behalf of this man?

Mr. Butler: No, Sir. I think that I would be doing wrong if I did so. I always examine these cases with the utmost sympathy. I realise that hon. Members opposite feel strongly about the suffering that might ensue if the man is returned to the hands of the Government of Spain. I have examined the matter very closely and have taken all the evidence that I could get and I find that my decision is the right one. It is, therefore, better to take a decision, and tell the House so, than to cause further delay and confusion in the mind of this man, which might lead to further suffering.

Mr. Gaitskell: The right hon. Gentleman cannot get away with the excuse—which is quite unworthy of him—that he cannot review his decision because it would cause confusion in the mind of this man. I ask him to reconsider the matter. Is he really saying that he will send this man back to the Government of Spain, knowing perfectly well what kind of fate awaits him when he gets there? Does he want to get that sort of reputation as a Home Secretary? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am astonished that hon. Members opposite show no interest in people coming from Fascist countries, although they usually show some interest

if they come from Communist countries. Let us have a sense of consistency in these matters. I ask the Home Secretary, once again, whether he will be good enough to reconsider the matter upon representations being made to him.

Mr. Butler: The case has been considered on exactly the same level as it would have been if the man had come from any other country—Communist or otherwise. I am satisfied that hon. Members have supported this case without realising two things—first, that it is not altogether a satisfactory case, and, secondly, that it does not conform to the general understanding reached by my predecessors in office—not only of one but of all Governments—about the qualifications required for political asylum. I do not believe that this man qualifies for political asylum in this country and I have, therefore, no other course than the one that I have adopted.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I must remind the House that this question arose out of the discussion of business for next week.

Mr. Dugdale: On a point of order, Sir. Would it be in order to move the Adjournment of the House on a matter of urgent and definite public importance, namely, the refusal of the Home Secretary to grant asylum in this country to a man threatened with death if he returns to Spain?

Mr. Speaker: That would not comply with the conditions of the Standing Order. This is an operation in the ordinary course of law. Are there any other questions which are strictly related to business?

Mr. Fernyhough: Yes, Mr. Speaker. Will the Leader of the House reconsider his decision in relation to next Monday's business. He informed us that the suspension of the Standing Order would be only until 12 o'clock. Is he aware that on Tuesday many hon. Members wanted to take part in the Navy Estimates debate but were kept out, and that the pressure to speak will be even greater on Monday? In the circumstances, will not the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the matter?

Mr. Butler: I do not think that it will be necessary. I think that two hours should be sufficient to enable us to transact the business.

Mr. Paget: Further to the point of order raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale)—

Mr. Speaker: I have dealt with that point of order. We have passed from it.

Mr. Paget: With respect, Mr. Speaker, you asked immediately afterwards whether there were any other questions on business. As a matter of courtesy I left that question to be answered, but this is a point of considerable importance, and I venture to say—I am speaking from recollection—that there is a direct precedent, which you will find in Erskine May, for granting the Adjournment in the case of a proposal to deport an alien who claims political asylum. I have not Erskine May with me, but my recollection is that there is a direct precedent for this course being taken.

Mr. Speaker: This question has been tit issue for a long time. There is a Motion on the Order Paper about it. It is not like a question that has suddenly arisen.

Mr. Rankin: Reverting again to the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) and myself on Monday's business, does not the Leader of the House agree that every hon. Member has the right to raise a grievance before Supply is voted? Does not he realise that in restricting the duration of the debate he is restricting the rights of hon. Members on both sides of the House? Will he not reconsider his decision?

Mr. Butler: We are not restricting hon. Members; we are extending the debate by two hours, which I think is satisfactory.

Mr. Brockway: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You said just now that the matter of Joaquim Perez-Selles was on the Order Paper. The Home Secretary has announced his decision today. The boy is in danger of being sent to Spain tomorrow, certainly to a long imprisonment, and possibly to his death. Under those circumstances, will not you allow

us to move the Adjournment of the House on a matter of public urgency?

Mr. Speaker: I cannot do so under the Rulings which exist on the interpretation of the Standing Order. This is a matter which follows in the due course of law. The decision is left with the Home Secretary. He may be accused afterwards of having done wrong, but there is no power to raise this matter on the Adjournment.

Mr. Gordon Walker: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, this is not a matter of the due process of the law, but of administration which is under the direct responsibility of the Home Secretary. There is no court involved and no matter of law. This is a matter of Government administration, and it is very urgent.

Mr. Speaker: I understood that it was a matter of extradition or repatriation and entirely a matter laid down by Statute.

Mr. Bevan: The whole question could never have arisen were the Home Secretary automatically obliged to repatriate this man, but it rests entirely within the clemency of the right hon. Gentleman and his administration. This matter has been raised over and over again in the House. It is a question whether the Home Secretary, in the exercise of his powers of discretion, would grant asylum to this person in this country having regard to all the facts of the case.
As the facts of the case have not been unfolded to the House of Commons, all that my hon. Friends have suggested is that the Home Secretary should defer his action until the House has had an opportunity of finding out whether, in fact, his judgment is sound or not. Surely it is perfectly reasonable and within the rules of order to raise this matter in this way.

Mr. Speaker: I must adhere to my Ruling. I do not consider that this matter has reached a stage which justifies me—

Mr. Brockway: Tomorrow he goes.

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not know the facts about this. [HON. MEMBERS: "Let us get the facts."] The House should listen to me. I have just heard about this man being deported tomorrow. Is that so?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Butler: I am not aware which day he would be deported, Mr. Speaker. It is a question of the means of communication. I have written to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) conveying my decision to him and—

Mr. Brockway: Joaquim goes tomorrow.

Mr. Butler: —that is the position so far as I see it.

Mr. Bevan: So that you, Mr. Speaker, may be able to form your judgment upon the urgency of this matter, is it not proper that the Home Secretary should inform you how urgent it is?

Mr. Speaker: I should like to know, to enable me to make up my mind, when this deportation is to take place. Can somebody tell me?

Mr. Butler: I will certainly acquaint myself with the exact time of the deportation and meet you at your convenience. Mr. Speaker.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. My trouble is that I have to decide the matter now and that I really do not know what is the answer.

Mr. Butler: I have ascertained that I am perfectly correct, Sir. I have no information in my possession at present, as Home Secretary, about exactly when he is likely to leave. I have written to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough, whom I saw in company with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) and conveyed to him my decision on the basis of facts. I doubt whether the Leader of the Opposition or the right hon. Member for Smethwick are aware of the facts, but I am certainly ready to meet right hon. Gentlemen and inform them of the facts on which my decision was taken, if that would be for the convenience of the House. What I am not going to do is he forced to take a decision against my better judgment and the facts in my possession simply on the basis of what I believe are the kind hearts of hon. Members opposite who have not been able to study all the facts. I have as kind a heart as anybody on that side of the House and I have taken this decision

only because I think it the right one in the circumstances.

Mr. Bevan: In view of the Motion which it has been sought to move, and on which you, Mr. Speaker, are now proposing to rule, is it in order that the Home Secretary may escape the frontiers of your Ruling by refusing to give information to the House of Commons about the urgency of the matter? May it not be that before the House sits next week this man may be sent abroad? How are you, Sir, able to rule upon the urgency of this question, and that is one of the submissions to you, unless the Home Secretary puts you in possession of that information?

Mr. Speaker: I have to act on the best information I receive. The hon. Member for Eton and Slough said definitely that this man was to be deported tomorrow. Is that correct?

Mr. Brockway: According to my information, Sir—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—this boy was a stowaway on the MacAndrew Line and the boats of the MacAndrew Line leave tomorrow or on the 11th.

Mr. Speaker: Will the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) bring his Motion to me?
The right hon. Member for West Bromwich moves that leave be given, under Standing Order No. 9.
to move the adjournment for the purpose of discussing a definite matter a urgent public importance,
namely, the refusal of the Home Secretary to grant asylum to Joaquim PerezSelles threatened with death. I think that the House is sufficiently seized of the matter. I am in the dark as to the precise facts, but I think that in the circumstances, accepting what is said by the hon. Member for Eton and Slough, I should allow this Motion. If we have a short discussion at seven o'clock the facts can then come out and we might feel justified in providing an opportunity for the House to find out what is happening.

The pleasure of the House not having been signified, Mr. SPEAKER called on those Members who supported the Motion to rise in their places, and not less than 40 Members having accordingly risen, the Motion stood over, under Standing Order No. 9 (Adjournment on definite matter of urgent public importance), until Seven o'clock this evening.

Mr. Butler: On a point of order. May I ask your advice, Mr. Speaker, for future guidance? I had no warning that this matter would be raised on business, and I have not brought any of my papers connected with this very difficult case. I was, nevertheless, submitted to questioning on business and had to answer without any of my information being at my disposal.
I accept your Ruling absolutely, of course, and I shall be only too glad to tell the House the reasons which have led me to this decision. It is perfectly reasonable that I should do so and I am not questioning that at all. What I am asking is for some guidance on Parliamentary procedure. If a Minister is to be submitted to this sort of cross-questioning without having his information by him, could we have some understanding that it is not done on business but in a more formal manner?
I happen, on this occasion, to have all the information in my head with the exception of the one point that I have not been informed by my office as to the time that this man was sailing. I do not believe that any final decision has been taken, but I will give the House the latest

information at seven o'clock. I am only explaining to hon. Members that I could not have the latest information because I did not get warning.

Mr. Speaker: I think that we should pass to other business now, but in answer to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House I would recall that this matter started with a proper question on business, whether the right hon. Gentleman would find time for a debate on the matter In reply, the right hon. Gentleman informed the House that he could not do so and gave reasons which led to a rather prolonged debate on the merits of the matter, which came into question. I have taken the course which is, perhaps, the best in the circumstances, but may I say that hon. Members should not use business questions for raising matters of substance.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House.)—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[7TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1958–59

VOTE A. NUMBER OF LAND FORCES

Motion made and Question proposed,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 386,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March. 1959.

4.4 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Christopher Soames): The money which is required for the Army in the coming financial year is estimated at £401·9 million net, an increase of half a million pounds over the amount voted a year ago. First, the Committee will wish me to explain why, with the smaller Army, there is no reduction in this year's net Estimates since the strength of the Army, which is about 325,000 now, will be down to 285,000 in a year's time.
There are several reasons. The cost of improvements in pay, allowances and conditions of service, which have already been announced, will be about £13 million; and payments under the compensation scheme announced last July will add about £11 million to the Vote, making a total of £24 million. Last year, we received £3¼ million in cash as mutual defence assistance from the United States, and this year there will be none. I have taken German support costs for the Army of the Rhine as £39½ million, which is £1·3 million less than last year.
We have also absorbed a considerable rise in wages and prices. These extra charges almost exactly counterbalance the gain which we receive from reduced numbers. We have done everything possible to keep the Estimate down by using accumulated stocks for normal maintenance without replacing them. This year we shall be using about £20 million of stocks compared with £14 million last year. We shall continue to use up stores for maintenance purposes,

but the saving from this source will become progressively smaller. We are, so to speak, living on our hump at present to the extent of 8 per cent. of the whole cost of the Army. This process cannot last much longer, so the Committee must expect the ending of it to be reflected in future Estimates.
In his speech introducing the Army Estimates last year, my predecessor announced a programme for releasing nearly 100,000 acres of land and promised a further review. This further review, which took account of the Land Powers (Defence) Bill—which has had a Second Reading in this House—has now been completed; and as a result about 50,000 acres more will be given up during the next two or three years. We shall release this land as quickly as we can, but the programme will take time. Unexploded missiles, for instance, must be cleared, and the legal and other processes gone through. Some of the land will be needed for a year or two, and can only be given up as the run-down of the Army progresses.

Mr. George Chetwynd: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when it will be handed over, and which parts?

Mr. Soames: It is a very scattered process, I am afraid. I could not give the details now.
We are now entering the second of these five years which will see the biggest reshaping the Army has known in peace since the days of Haldane. When my predecessor introduced the Army Estimates last year, plans for the reorganisation were still being worked out and the time for public announcement had not yet come. Under my right hon. Friend's guidance the foundations were laid. The Army owes much to his wise counsel during this most difficult period. As the decisions were taken, my right hon. Friend announced them to the House; but since this is the first major debate we have had on the Army for some time it might be for the convenience of the Committee if I were to collate and summarise the decisions.
In the first place, there has been the regimental reorganisation scheme set out in the White Paper of last July. I need not tell the Committee today how deeply this was felt by those who were personally


associated with the regiments, and, indeed, by many more who regretted the passing of their individual identities. Although every corps in the Army has suffered to some extent from these changes, the effect is most acute in the infantry and the Royal Armoured Corps. Thirty regiments of the line and 12 regiments of the Royal Armoured Corps are affected by the amalgamations announced last year. Except in one case, all of them, under the leadership of their colonels, accepted the duty placed upon them with commendable promptitude. The Committee will be pleased to know that the two new colonels of the Royal Scottish Fusiliers and the Highland Light Infantry have now said that they are working out the details of their amalgamation. I hope that it will not be long before those details can be announced.
The effect of the Army's run-down on the careers of individual officers, warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s has also been serious. By the beginning of 1963 the total number who will have had to be retired will amount to about 5,000 officers, and more than 6,000 warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s. The selection of those who have to go, apart from being an invidious business, is a very complex one.
It is obviously impossible to envisage the exact order of battle for 1963. We can tell roughly what it will be, but changes will constantly have to be made and we cannot tell now in detail the numbers in every rank, regiment and trade in the Army which will be needed then. The position will become clearer year by year.
What, at the moment, is the measure of the problem? About 78 per cent. of all Regular officers of the rank of major and below and about 70 per cent. of all warrant officers and N.C.O.s of the rank of sergeant and above will not be retired as a result of the reorganisation; and they have been told so. During the year 1,280 officers and 1,820 warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s will be retired; and they also have been told.
The Committee will realise that with a planned run-down of the Army over a five-year period it is not possible for all the officers and n.c.o.s to leave in the early stages. Lists of names of those to

be retired will be issued every six months, so the number left in uncertainty will be progressively reduced. Our policy is to meet redundancy as far as possible by releasing those who wish to go, and in the first year nearly nine out of 10 will be volunteers.
The terms of compensation announced last year, and the fact that, so far, we have been able to rely to such an extent on volunteers have together meant that this process is being carried through with much less personal anguish than many people at first feared. It is also encouraging that the schemes for the resettlement of individuals in civil life, to which many people have contributed, are working so well.
I turn now to recruiting. I mentioned increased pay and allowances as one of the factors which have caused this year's Estimates to be larger than they otherwise would have been. The last major Services pay review before this year took place two years ago; the new rates of pay came into effect on 1st April, 1956. They introduced the principle of more pay for longer engagements. Experience has shown that this is a good principle and that it is not affected by the pay increases which have recently been announced and will come into effect next month.
The purpose of these pay increases has been to bring the pay of the forces more into line with the present level of civilian wages and to give additional assistance at the lower end of the scale. In particular, the pay of recruits has been brought up to the same rate as that of the private. This means that a six-year recruit will get an increase of 3s. 6d. a day compared with 2s. 6d. for other six-year men. In the case of officers increases are on a rising scale; but the 4s. increase for junior officers is a larger proportionate increase than the 6s. for senior ranks.
We have tried, by the improvements in allowances, to remove some anomalies, and to even out some of the financial differences caused by the incidence of Service life which particularly affect married men. The man who has not been provided with an official quarter and has had to make his own arrangements to accommodate his family has, for a very long time, been worse off than the man in married quarters. By raising the rate of marriage allowance and extending


the out-of-quarters allowance to other ranks, much will have been done to close the gap between the two.
Financial benefits are by no means the whole answer to the problem of recruiting men in to the Army, and keeping them once they have joined. Opinions vary as to whether increases in pay or improvements in accommodation rank higher in importance. I am quite certain that we shall not get the number of recruits or prolongations of service that we need if we do not get on with our permanent building programme with the greatest urgency. I would go further and say that we should not deserve to. Barracks and married quarters must be brought up to date wherever possible; where that is not possible, they must be pulled down and new ones built in their place. There is a great backlog of work to be done and it is a formidable task. This is not due to any failure in the past to appreciate the problem, or to any skimping on works Votes, but has been due to force of circumstances.
Between 1947 and 1957—in ten years—no less than £255 million was spent on works services; but of that figure £140 million had to be devoted to maintenance and minor improvements of existing buildings. Of the remaining £115 million, roughly £40 million has had to be spent on temporary accommodation and the like. Not a year has gone by when there has not been some emergency somewhere abroad, and the precious works service money has had to be spent on temporary accommodation which contributed in no way to the permanent wellbeing of the Army.
The net result is that the War Office has been able to allot, during the last ten years, only an average of just under £6 million a year to the improvement and construction of permanent living quarters at home and overseas, out of an average of £25 million a year on the works Vote.
In the next five years we plan to spend about £45 million on a barrack rebuilding and married quarter programme at home. That is in addition to the work already in hand. Although the work will be spread over a number of years, it will not be long before the effect of it begins to be seen wherever troops are stationed in large numbers.
We are already at work on new barracks far two infantry battalions at

Colchester, an infantry battalion and an armoured regiment at Tidworth, The Royal Artillery Depôt at Woolwich, the Household Cavalry at Combermere Barracks, Windsor, and the first phase of the Aldershot rebuilding plan. And a considerable programme is planned overseas as well. The size and precise locations of some barracks overseas have not yet been decided, but we are going ahead as quickly as possible with the building of new accommodation where we know the strength of the forces to be deployed.
Now about dress. A good uniform makes all the difference to a soldier's pride and outlook. Battledress served its purpose well during the war, but it is not a smart dress either for parade or for walking out; and the Committee will agree that it is time the soldier had something else to wear besides battledress. Some years ago the Army Council decided to equip the Regular element of the Army with blue patrol or No. 1 dress. This has now been issued to Regulars down to the rank of lance corporal; so we have some experience of it.
I am not convinced, and neither was my predecessor, that blue patrol for walking out and ceremonial occasions and battledress for everyday wear is necessarily the right or the whole answer to the problem. There has been a growing feeling for some time now of the need for a smart Khaki Service dress. To equip the whole Army with a new uniform is a considerable and expensive undertaking. Once the machine is put into operation to produce uniforms of a certain colour and quality of material and a certain cut, one is committed. One cannot change uniforms every few years; and there is probably no single subject affecting the life of the Army on which so many different opinions are held.
We have decided to have a number of troop trials of different types of uniform which will be issued to chosen units. Those trials will take place during the next twelve months, and we shall then decide what is the most suitable uniform for issue to the Army.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Are we to have some red?

Mr. Soames: This is a Service dress uniform.
As we move towards an all-Regular Army, we have decided to review our


methods of discipline, management and instruction from the point of view of their effect on the soldier as an individual. A committee composed of serving officers with recent regimental experience has been set up under the chairmanship of General Sir Lashmer Whistler. It has a free hand to travel where it will within the Army, and to take evidence from whom it wishes. We must not be afraid of change, and where a departure from existing practice—however longstanding that practice may be—is shown to be desirable, it will be put into effect.
This brings me to the overriding question which confronts everyone concerned with the Armed Forces—shall we be able to fulfil our intention of ending National Service by the beginning of 1963? Hon. Members will have seen the recruiting figures given in the Defence White Paper. They will also have noticed the warning that, since the three-year engagement ended only at the beginning of October, it was too soon to draw any further conclusion about future trends. What we can say, however, is that the figures so far are encouraging.
It would be very rash to prophesy yet whether or not we shall get the numbers we need. For instance, we do not know what will be the result of the better pay and allowances when they come into effect at the beginning of April; nor can anyone accurately forecast what will be the effect of the approaching end of National Service on the mind of a man who wishes to be a Regular soldier. It will certainly make a big difference.
There is considerable evidence of this in the transformation which has taken place in the Territorial Army volunteer recruiting figures since National Service men ceased to train with volunteers at the end of 1956. Up to that time the wastage of true volunteers—that is, those with no National Service obligation—was greater than recruitment to the extent of 450 a month; but during 1957 our net gain of these volunteers, after allowing for wastage, was 700 a month; and the number of true volunteers in the Territorial Army is now almost exactly 70,000, an increase of 9,000 in the past year.
Of course, we all realise the differences which exist between the Territorial Army

and the Regular Army; but there is no doubt that the main feature which has brought about this considerable increase in its recruiting has been the withdrawal of the National Service element.
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of Lord Haldane's great concept of the Territorial Force. In the last fifty years it has fought in two world wars, and served the country far better than its founders could possibly have imagined. Its primary rôle for the future will be its traditional one of home defence in all its aspects, and its continued existence as a strong fighting force means that it will have a contribution to give in any great emergency which may face the country in the future, either at home or overseas.
The position as regards the reserves is very much in the minds of the Army Council. Naturally, we had to get the structure of the Regular Army settled before we could size up the problem of the reserves; but the list of our possible requirements and assets in the years ahead has been drawn up. The two must be made to match, and this is the next big problem to be solved.
As I have said, there are undoubtedly many factors which affect the level of recruiting. The most important of all is that a young man should feel that he is joining a worthwhile Army which is respected by his fellow countrymen and of which he can be proud to be a member. If that basic pride is not there, then all the other incentives will be of small avail.
I should like to say a little about the structure and rôle of the new Army. I will deal, first, with the Army's organisation for war. Ever since atomic weapons became a possibility on the tactical battlefield, the large concentrations of men and material which were normal in both the last wars have become a thing of the past. The organisation for fighting formations has had to be adapted to the new circumstances.
Many countries have been carrying out trials to find the best answer to this, and all are agreed that the large division of 20,000 men and more is not what is required. Most have come down in favour of a smaller division varying from 10,000 men, which, I believe is the smallest division being considered by any


Western country, to the armoured division of 15,000 men, which, I believe, is the largest armoured division being considered.
Those military thinkers who take this view—that the smaller division is the answer—must be of the opinion that the atomic land battle could be fought with the same detailed command and control by a divisional commander as land battles have been in the past, although in most cases arrangements are now being made for a deputy commander with his own staff to command a portion of these divisions. But it must surely be right that one's basic organisation should be that which one considers will be most generally used. If one believes that the normal requirement will be for a division which can occasionally be split into two or more, then one should adopt the divisional organisation.
But if one believes that modern weapons demand, as a normal rule, a degree of dispersal greater than could be controlled by one commander at one headquarters, then one's basic organisation should be something smaller. Should one, therefore, have as a basic formation a division which can be divided into two or more packets, if need be, or should one have something smaller than a division, a brigade group, two or more of which can be put together under a divisional commander if greater concentration is required?
It is unnecessary for me to assure the Committee of the careful thought and study which has been given to this problem by the Army Council. It is the Council's unanimous view that we should adopt the system of brigade groups, of which there will be two types—armoured and infantry. The diagram in the Appendix to my Estimates Memorandum shows their composition.

Mr. F. J. Bellenger: What the right hon. Gentleman is saying is interesting. Could he tell the House how the brigade groups will be formed, particularly the infantry brigade groups, and of what arms they will consist?

Mr. Soames: The right hon. Gentleman will see that in Appendix D of the Memorandum the organisation of the brigade group is set out, showing what the arms are. It does not give the numbers, for evident reasons, but he will see the arms

there. He also asked where they will be formed. There will be brigade groups in Europe, in Germany, and there will be brigade groups in this country, too.
Divisional headquarters, though smaller than what we have been used to, will be retained and will be capable of commanding from two to four brigade groups, which may include both types. The necessary supporting units will be corps or Army group troops and will be allotted as the tactical situation demands; and the capability to concentrate, for instance, either artillery fire or engineer effort will be available to the divisional commander through his commander Royal Artillery or commander Royal Engineers.
Thus we have a basic fighting formation organised in the best way to meet what we consider would be the normal situation in nuclear war, while retaining in the divisional headquarters the power of centralisation should it be required. We think that the brigade group system is thoroughly sound for global war, and is readily adaptable to our needs for cold and limited war.
I turn to the structure of the Army. In addition to the active United Kingdom Army there will be the Brigade of Gurkhas and some colonial forces, and there will also be the W.R.A.C. which we hope will have considerably increased in numbers by 1963. In the all-Regular active army we plan to have a higher proportion of men in the teeth arms. In comparison with the present-day Army, in which 59 per cent. are serving in the infantry, Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers and Signals, there will be 64 per cent. in those arms and only 36 per cent. in the rest of the Army.
We can achieve this only by employing proportionately more civilians in the administrative services than we do at present; but even so, the total number of civilians to support the smaller Army will be considerably less than it is today. The proportion of civilians to soldiers on Army Votes is now three to five; by 1963, we see that proportion being one to one.
The barrack rebuilding programme will take ten years to complete; but by 1962 most of the wartime camps in this country will have been evacuated, and at least half the Army at home will be in good, permanent barracks, most of which will have been of post-war construction.


With the help of the Armed Forces Housing Loan, we shall be continuing with married quarter building, and the number of separated families, and the length of their separation will both have been greatly reduced.
As to the weapons which the Army will have in 1963, my predecessor last year devoted a considerable part of his speech to a description of them. There has been no great change in our plans since then, and research and development is going forward. Two artillery regiments are being trained and equipped with the Corporal guided missile, and one of them will join the Army in Germany before the end of this year. Money for 36,000 British-made F.N. rifles has been included in Estimates. In the next twelve months, many infantry battalions will receive these weapons, and the improved anti-tank gun, the MOBAT. There were some troubles in the development of MOBAT ammunition, but I am glad to say that they have been overcome. Trials for a replacement of the Vickers machine gun have been carried out on several weapons, and severe comparative tests are to be carried out during the next six months.
Now for the rôle of the Army. Apart from global war, the tasks which it has to be prepared to perform can be listed under the two main headings of internal security and limited war. Internal security is a commitment that is always with us, whether it be a campaign like Kenya or Malaya, or assistance on a smaller scale to keep the peace, such as has recently been the case in the West Indies. We will keep Army garrisons for internal security throughout the world wherever British interests have to be maintained and where a measure of responsibility to keep the peace falls upon us. There is no substitute for the soldier on the spot, ready to intervene whenever trouble threatens and to prevent small outbreaks of violence growing into something more serious.
That is the main task of the British Army outside Europe. But many of these garrisons will be small, and, from time to time, it will be necessary for more units to arrive quickly, either as reinforcements or to give the local commander a reserve. This will be one of

the main purposes of the strategic reserve. It will be kept at a high state of readiness in this country to be flown out to trouble areas overseas. We are confident of our ability to transport troops by air, with the light equipment required for an internal security rôle, anywhere in the world at short notice. Hon. Members will be aware of a recent exercise, when about 500 men of 24 Infantry Brigade were flown from this country to Libya. They took with them jeeps, trailers, and about 10 tons of equipment. This exercise was arranged at fairly short notice, and only a small number of available aircraft in Transport Command were used. I am sure that it is very important that troops in the strategic reserve should be accustomed to this sort of activity and exercise, and we will be having more like it.
In the nature of things, however, there are severe limitations on the type of force, and its equipment, that can be sent by air between theatres. Broadly speaking, it is limited to troops with light weapons and equipment suitable for internal security functions. A situation where disturbances are such that heavier weapons are required we shall meet in two ways. In the first place, the lightly-equipped formations flown out from this country can take over the duties of the units already overseas, which can then be released to take on the heavier rôle for which they have their weapons ready to hand. Secondly, by keeping stocks of the heavier weapons and equipment at strategic points overseas, we can bring the formations flown from home up to war scales far more quickly than would be the case if they had to wait for them to be shipped out from home.
The tasks for which we must be prepared are very different in their scale and in their objects, and, by virtue of that, place heavy demands on the professional ability of officers and men, and on the flexibility of the Army's organisation and plans. It cannot be stressed too often that an Army of the size that we are envisaging will be able to carry out its commitments only if it is of the highest quality, both in men and materials, and directed with a clear understanding of what it has to do and how it can best do it.
To change from a mixed Army of 400,000 men to an all-Regular Army of less than half that size involves a very


considerable reorganisation. To achieve it, many unpleasant decisions have had to be taken in the last twelve months—decisions which meant that many thousands of officers, warrant officers and n.c.o.s who were devoting their life to the Army were to have their careers abruptly terminated; and decisions on the amalgation and disbandment of regiments which struck deep into Army tradition and were bound to be taken hard by those who valued that tradition.
Many must have wondered at the time how the Army would react to these considerable blows. Regrets there surely were, but the Army has realised the necessity of these measures and has faced up to the business of reorganisation with a will. No one who follows the Army's fortunes could fail to have been impressed by the spirit and the loyalty with which the decisions were accepted. What matters now is that when the reorganisation is completed, the best possible Army should emerge as a keen, vital and effective fighting force.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman referred to the disbandment of certain regiments, and expressed his satisfaction at the spirit with which it had been received. Is he aware that officers of the Highland Light Infantry and of the Royal Scots Fusiliers decided in favour of disbandment?

Mr. Soames: Before the hon. Member graced us with his presence this afternoon. I dealt with both those regiments.

4.38 p.m.

Mr. John Strachey: It falls to my lot this afternoon to congratulate yet another Secretary of State for War on the introduction of his Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman has done it, as his predecessors did, in a most agreeable and acceptable way. Of course, the rate of turnover of Secretaries of State for War is not anything like so high as that of Ministers of Defence. However, it is speeding up, and we now see yet another.
Before I come to my speech proper, I should like to say a word on the melancholy fact that my lieutenant in these affairs, Wilfred Fienburgh, is dead, and will no longer be taking part in our debates. I am grateful to the Minister of Defence for the words that he used

last week, and I know that the Committee, and the House, echo them. On the other hand, I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) whom we welcome to this Front Bench for the first time—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—will perform his function later tonight—or, perhaps, tomorrow—with great distinction.
I shall refer to a good many of the more detailed points that the Secretary of State made, but, before doing so, I want to say something on what I think he himself recognised as the main point—the rôle of the Army today. This is a very difficult question, and one which we really cannot think about, or discuss, too much. Unless we have clear the rôle of the Army, above all of the main body of the Army which is still our contribution to N.A.T.O. and our forces on the Continent of Europe, we cannot plan or reorganise our Army or, indeed, know what kind of Army we want, whether it be a small professional Army such as the Secretary of State spoke of, or a mass, conscript Army. Moreover, we cannot know how we want to arm our Army.
The Secretary of State, in his winding up speech in the defence debate last week, said:
… no Government can say in advance to what weapons they would need to have recourse …
I quite sympathise with him there, but he must think about that very carefully, or else he will not know what weapons to provide the Army with. We must be as clear as we possibly can about these eventualities, at any rate otherwise, I do not know how we can rationally discuss the matter at all. Thirdly, unless we have the rôle clear, we may blur in our minds the importance of the contribution of the Army to N.A.T.O. forces. That is something I want to speak about during the course of my remarks.
In his speech last week, if I may say so, the Secretary of State said something which is, or at any rate ought to be, an admirable definition of the rôle of the Army. He said that
… the strength of N.A.T.O. troops on the ground is such that it would need a major aggression to overcome them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th February, 1958; Vol. 583, c. 665–8.]
That certainly ought to be true. Whether it is quite so true as he affirmed is another


matter, but it is certainly the objective which we all ought to have before us. I like that way of putting it, if I may say so, better than phrases about tripwires, plate glass windows, and other such analogies. I think that the right hon. Gentleman's is the better way of expressing it. We should have sufficient forces on the ground to give pause to any Russian aggression, to impose a breathing space in which, even at that stage—talking now about purely conventional warfare—there is the opportunity for the aggressor to draw back and desist. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), in the debate at the end of the year, put it extremely well in the very graphic language of which he is a master. He said:
It is one of the advantages—terrible though it is—about conventional warfare and the use of conventional troops and the exercise of police action that that fact itself does give an opportunity for reflection. … The point I am making is that where the great nations find themselves face to face with a situation in which they are likely to be embroiled in hydrogen war they draw back. Surely, that being the case, it is our duty to provide a cushion of time, an opportunity, a period, during which passions can be held in control, reflection take place, and mankind be able to see clearly where it is going."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1957; Vol. 580, c. 578.]
It is because of that essential function which, I believe, can be performed by nothing except ground forces, by the Army, that we on this side are profoundly concerned about the strength of the N.A.T.O. forces and the British contribution to those forces. I trust that the Secretary of State is right when he says that they are in Europe today adequate for that purpose. If they are not, they must be made adequate to give pause to aggression, to interpose that cushion of time in the event of any aggression in that area. They must be sufficient to be able to do that, at any rate, by purely conventional means, without resorting to nuclear arms of any sort.
I realise that, if the whole Committee probably agrees with that, there are some who do not agree that the Army should have any further function; they believe that should be the only function of the British Army—to have those conventional powers of resistance. Indeed, they must think that, because they are in favour of Britain unilaterally discarding all nuclear

weapons, even though maintaining her alliances. For example, I understand from public statements that that is the position of the Liberal Party today. I do not know whether all people who take that view—which may be an attractive view, at first hearing—realise that, as a logical consequence of saying that we should discard all nuclear weapons for our ground forces, amongst others, we should have to go back to a mass, conscript army. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) was frank enough to say so in the debate last week, but I am not quite sure that everybody realises the full implication of it. Anyhow, I do not believe that anyone advocating that line realises what the result would be.
The result would be that we should have a mass, British conscript Army of the traditional sort, armed only with conventional weapons, without any nuclear capability at all, facing the great Russian Army lavishly equipped with every kind of nuclear device. That is, after all, a situation which must give cause for reflection on our part. I know that those who advocate it have an answer, at first sight. What they have in their minds really is that our Army in Germany would have only conventional weapons but, of course, behind us would be our American Allies lavishly equipped with nuclear weapons. If that is really what they—the spokesmen of the Liberal Party, for instance—have in mind, I would make one comment upon it.
Older Members of the Committee will recollect how very sensitive the French always were, in two world wars, in their alliance with us lest there should be a division of function by which the French supplied the main force of ground troops, supplying, they felt, the major sacrifice, while Britain specialised only in longer range, naval or air warfare. The French, therefore, felt that they were in danger of becoming cannon fodder on our behalf. Whatever grounds there may have been for those French apprehensions, anyone who desires for the British Army the rôle I have just described would, of course, be running into the danger of making it not cannon fodder but nuclear bomb fodder of the most terrible sort.
That would be the position between our American allies and ourselves, a


division of function far more unfavourable to us than the French ever dreamed that the old division between themselves and us could be. This is the kind of consideration which those who are advocating this—at first hearing quite plausibly, I repeat—have not, I think, worked out. Any division of function by which the long-range warfare, rocket warfare, nuclear warfare and air warfare in general, was left to the Americans, the infantry and armoured warfare being left to us, would be the most undesirable form of specialisation within the N.A.T.O. alliance that one could possibly imagine.
Therefore, I appeal to every part of the Committee, the Liberal Party in particular, although it is not represented here at the moment. There are undoubtedly—perhaps not only on this side of the Committee—who would be tempted by this conception; yet it would lead to one of the most nationally disastrous and intolerable positions one could imagine.
That is why, if we are to have an Army at all and to make a contribution to N.A.T.O. and to its forces on the Continent, I cannot possibly deny that it must be a dual-purpose Army. It is vitally important that it must have a capacity for conventional war, but it must have a nuclear capacity as well.
I cannot see any escape from that, for the simple reason that if, after we had given pause, after we had provided the cushion of time of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, to an initial Russian aggression of the limited kind, or of the satellite kind—then if the stakes were raised and the Russians resorted to tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield, it would be necessary to have tactical nuclear weapons on our side. It is necessary to have the tactical nuclear capacity precisely in order to avoid, at the second stage, having to go to the ultimate stage of the hydrogen weapon and the end of everything.
It seems to me that there is no doubt about the argument for a dual-purpose Army. That leads, of course, to the argument we had last week in the defence debate and to something which, if the Government like to call it that, is undoubtedly graduated deterrence. The trouble with that phrase is that it has been associated with what is to my mind the totally chimerical idea that there could be conceivably some sort of agreement

before hand with the other side on the limits that warfare should take. I do not believe in that for one moment. I think that that is impossible.
But what I do believe in is the conception that we should have the capacity at each stage to match what the other side might be doing, so that the stakes should not be raised at once to the ultimate, mutually suicidal, level. In that sense graduated deterrence is of the utmost importance. Our quarrel with the Government's statement in the notorious paragraph 12 of the White Paper is precisely that they seem to us simply not to have thought this matter out. I recommend to them the thinking that has been done recently on both sides of the Atlantic. American authors, such as Kissinger, whom I quoted last week, Hoag and others, have gone into this very fully and realistically and with very considerable moderation. I do not think that the Government's mind is really up to date in this matter. That is, at any rate, the most charitable explanation of paragraph 12 of the White Paper.
All this leads us to pay great attention and to attach great importance to the strength today of the N.A.T.O. ground forces, British and otherwise.
I now come to paragraph 43 of the Defence White Paper, which is entirely concerned with the Army and in which we are told that last year we reduced our forces in Germany from 77,000 to 64,000 and that there will be a further reduction this year to 55,000. That may not be by any means the end of it if we do not come to an arrangement with the German Government. That is a very grave contingency. I do not doubt for a moment the equity of the Government's case against the Germans.
I think that this year, at any rate, they certainly ought to pay up, but I should like some information from the Government about how far they propose to reduce our forces in Germany below the 55,000. When one looks at the N.A.T.O. forces on the ground today, it is a little hard to feel confident about the Secretary of State's statement that they are capable of giving pause to any aggression. The Committee must surely be astounded by the cavalier treatment which the Government have given to N.A.T.O. over this matter in the last eighteen months. I recall very well


indeed the lectures that we were given eighteen months ago when we first put forward the proposition to end National Service. We were first told that it was impossible to do it. Then we were told that it was something that we ought not even to discuss without consulting N.A.T.O. That is literally true. The Minister of Labour said that. I have his words here. He said:
Surely, if that is so, then consultations with our N.A.T.O. Allies have to precede and not to follow disclosures of our own thinking."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st July, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1191.]
We were not even to discuss it aloud, or to think aloud about it at all, without putting it to N.A.T.O. and getting N.A.T.O.'s agreement. We thought that the Government went too far. We did not think that we could limit ourselves as much as that. But it is remarkable that this was what was being said eighteen months ago by a Government which in the last eighteen months have already made two very substantial cuts in our contribution to N.A.T.O., in the teeth of N.A.T.O. protests, and are now proposing, not on military grounds, but purely on financial grounds, to make another substantial cut.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: This argument has been trotted out so often and it has been refuted by the Minister of Defence, who is not here today to reply. When the right hon. Gentleman says that this was done in the teeth of N.A.T.O. protests, that is not true. What happened was this. The discussions went on for a considerable time. There was very strong protest originally when the suggestion was first made, but finally agreement was reached, and when I was in Paris in the autumn at the N.A.T.O. Parliamentary Conference that was confirmed. I know that that is true. The right hon. Gentleman is resorting to the old political trick of putting up ninepins and knocking them down.

Mr. Strachey: I think that it is straw men who are usually put up and knocked down. The simple point is that N.A.T.O. was extremely reluctant, and the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows that perfectly well. I am not saying that the decision to reduce our forces to 55,000 at the end of this year was wrong. I am saying that it is coming fairly near the limit. Yet

we are now saying that unless we can come to what we consider, I think rightly, an equitable arrangement with the German Government, we shall go lower than that. If we do, what is there left of N.A.T.O.? After all, because of the unspeakable tragedy of the French activities in North Africa, there is very little left of the French contribution. There will be very little left of N.A.T.O. at all if we go very much lower. Therefore, the Government ought to take that matter very seriously into account.
That, of course, brings me to the financial picture which the Secretary of State put before the Committee. He took some pride—and at first sight he was right to do so—in having kept the Estimates down to approximately the same figure but he must remember that he is carrying £39 million of assumed contributions from the Germans which he has not received. Let him remember that, if the Germans will not pay and if we then carry out our threat to withdraw most of our men from Germany, it will not save him money. It will only save him Deutschmarks. He will still have to pay the money if the men are at home.
I should like to know—perhaps the Under-Secretary will tell us when he replies—what happens in that case. Have we to face a very large Supplementary Estimate? I presume that we have. Therefore, when we look into the finance of these Estimates, they do not seem to be by any means as favourable as they appear at first sight.

Mr. Soames: I was trying to compare like with like. Last year, there was a contribution from Germany of just over £40 million and this year we were allowing for £39 million. Of course, if Germany does not pay, that will very much alter the aspect of the Estimates. We have not endeavoured to show anything in a more unfavourable light than it is.

Mr. Strachey: I was bringing that out because I did not think the Committee was necessarily forewarned of what might be likely to happen.
Then, as the Secretary of State frankly disclosed, there is another approximately £40 million this year in the way of living on stocks. That is 8 per cent. of the total. There are, therefore, two items of £40 million which have to be


taken account of—I am afraid, on the wrong side. It is odd how these loose items of the order of magnitude of £40 or £50 million seem to crop up in the Government's finances just now. The last item of £50 million of this kind caused great changes on the Treasury Bench—perhaps it took the Secretary of State into his present office. These are two loose items of that order of magnitude which have to be accounted for.
Now, I want to say a word or two about dispositions. Paragraph 15 of the right hon. Gentleman's Memorandum states:
General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces will remain in Cyprus. It will he responsible for our garrisons in Cyprus and Libya and for our commitments in support of the Bagdad Pact.
That, I suppose, refers to Episkopi. Under the heading "Works". we are told that the contracts for that very elaborate headquarters at Episkopi are being completed.
Paragraph 14, however, tells us that a separate headquarters is being set up at Aden, reporting direct to London. I should have thought that for the functions of supporting the Bagdad Pact, this was incomparably better than Headquarters Middle East Land Forces in Cyprus, especially as paragraph 14 tells us that:
Today we can no longer rely on unrestricted sea passage through the Suez Canal or on unrestricted overflying rights for military aircraft.
Is it not rather silly to have the headquarters for the support of the Bagdad Pact in the Mediterranean when that is what we are told?
As to Libya, paragraph 17 states that the 10th Armoured Division was disbanded in July and the Libya garrison reduced to a military mission. I cannot understand why we need those two headquarters in the Middle East. I cannot help feeling that the Aden headquarters is really the new one that is being established and that the headquarters at Cyprus is merely being carried on.

Mr. Soames: I appreciate that paragraph 17 might be read to mean, as the right hon. Gentleman suggests, that the Libya garrison has been reduced to a military mission, but that is not the case. I cannot say exactly to what extent it has been reduced, but a quite considerable

force is still there. There is no question of its being only a military mission.

Mr. Strachey: That may be, but I should have thought that the very elaborate base at Episkopi should be looked at again.
Concerning dispositions, I should like to call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to paragraph 29, which I do not understand. It states:
A part of the United Kingdom central reserve will be stationed in Kenya from the spring of 1958. Permanent barracks will be built for it.
That paragraph might well be' headed, "When is a United Kingdom central reserve a United Kingdom central reserve?" and the answer, apparently, is, "When it is in Kenya." I do not know what this means. I suspect that it means something very unfortunate and indicates that the old process, which I know how difficult it is to avoid, of scattering units about the world and then calling them the United Kingdom central reserve is simply going on. That is a great pity. It may be necessary to station a battalion or whatever it is in Kenya, but do not let us call it the United Kingdom central reserve when we have done it, because that is simply deceiving ourselves.

Major H. Legge-Bourke: Can my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State help us at this stage? Is it the object that there should be a turn-round of members of the United Kingdom reserve going backwards and forwards to Kenya in order to train there, where they have the space to do it?

Mr. Strachey: Perhaps the Secretary of State can explain these things for himself. Does he wish to intervene?

Mr. Soames: The battalion in Kenya is part of the strategic reserve. It is not part of any internal security force. The right hon. Gentleman himself has quoted the remarks concerning the difficulties of ensuring always that we shall be able to have passage through the Suez Canal or passage for aircraft from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Surely, it is only wise that we should keep some portion of our strategic reserve south of the Suez Canal. It will be there as part of the strategic reserve.

Mr. Strachey: That is an explanation of having, not a United Kingdom central


reserve, but another and second reserve somewhere east of the Suez Canal. All I am saying is that we are deceiving ourselves if we call it the United Kingdom central reserve and then station it in Kenya. It is a mistake to have it both ways like that.
It was probably inevitable that "Operation Quickstep" should have been a small and not very impressive operation first of all, but I agree that it is a very good thing that we have begun any air transportability of that sort. I will not say more about it.
I want to say a word or two about organisation, of which the Secretary of State said a good deal that was interesting. I do not for one moment pretend to know the relative merits of a brigade group and a pentomic division. To have a view on that, one must be a currently serving professional soldier, but it seems to us difficult to believe that there is all that difference between the two. If there is not all that difference between them, the disadvantages of our having the brigade group, which is utterly out of step with what almost all our Allies in N.A.T.O. appear to be doing, seem to be very heavy.
Unless there are great military advantages, it seems a strange choice to have taken, especially because we abandon anything which is called a division and we go down to something that is called a brigade group. There is a good deal to be said for the name, by which we never get it out of the heads of our European allies that we have reduced our forces much more even than we have done because we have gone to the brigade group conception instead of the small light division, the pentomic division, or whatever one likes to call it.
Having put those questions, let me say on paragraph 46, concerning the Territorials, that I sincerely congratulate the Secretary of State. It is a wonderful thing that Territorials are coming forward in that way and I certainly congratulate not only the right hon. Gentleman, but the men who are coming forward. It is remarkable.
Finally, a word about manpower, recruiting and pay, National Service and that very big issue which the Secretary of State raised. It is remarkable, as the Committee will note, how quickly things

go these days. Only eighteen months ago I was ridiculed for talking about the £10 a week private. It was thought a preposterous figure, not only by hon. Members on the benches opposite but by some on this side of the Committee too. It was considered preposterous, and that it would ruin the country. According to the Minister of Defence, I was wrong, but I was wrong on the modest side. I did not go far enough. I realise that it is not quite on all-fours and that he adopted a different principle, but the fact remains that a married private living out will now receive not £10 but £11 13s. a week, which is a very considerable sum.
The Minister of Defence did his pay increases quite differently from what I had in mind. He may have done them well. I do not know. I would have felt that there were some criticisms to be made. My hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey, who has a great knowledge of these matters, will voice some of the criticisms. I would have thought that the differential between the six-year man and the nine-year man was not wide enough. There are a good many criticisms in that respect but, nevertheless, the right hon. Gentleman has come round to a rate of pay very roughly comparable to the one I suggested at that time.
Now that he has done this, let the right hon. Member make full use of it. The public relations side of this matter is really very important, and I was very sorry to hear the Secretary of State for War still talking today in terms of daily rates of pay. I do not think that that conveys anything to people. What they want is the weekly rate. We should always talk about that rate because that is what people have in their minds when they make comparisons with industry. If the right hon. Gentleman compares weekly rates of pay he can carry out some very effective advertising and public relations work. I have referred to the Minister of Defence announcing a rate of pay of £11 13s. a week for the married private, and I can see advertising being put out by the Secretary of State saying, "Join the Army, marry the girl and you get 11 13s. a week." It has a very considerable appeal.
The Secretary of State and the Minister of Defence have made statements to the effect that pay is not everything. I entirely


agree. It always draws a cheer when that is said. I am afraid that I shall be very unpopular if I say that the Government have come round to the view that though pay is not everything it is quite an important factor in the situation. I was thought very crude for emphasising that eighteen months ago, and I see that the Minister of Defence still puts it very differently indeed.
This is how he put it in last week's debate:
… I have never thought that men could be bribed into the forces, or that, we should try to do so.
Perish the thought! But he went on to say:
On the other hand, I have no doubt that under-payment discourages recruiting."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1958; Vol. 583. c. 385.]
That, of course, is much better put than I put it. I realise that absolutely. But I think that, substantially at any rate, in deeds if not in words, the Minister has come round to the view which I ventured to put to the Committee before.
As to results, I entirely agree with the Secretary of State for War, that it is still too early to say what they are, but I think that he is justified in saying that they are not discouraging today. I would only say again to those of my hon. Friends who were certain that it was impossible to recruit 165,000 men by 1963 that probably it would be prudent of them not to express that certainty as a mathematically proved certainty quite so vigorously. I should have thought, on present measures, that not quite enough has been done but, nevertheless, so far, in the very early stages—and it may still be a flash in the pan, for we cannot tell yet—considerable promise is shown by these figures.
Whether they will give the Minister the necessary number of men in time is another matter. There may still be a gap, but there are expedients by which that gap may be met. It is something which we, on this side of the Committee, often think about, because it certainly will be we who will have to meet that gap.

Mr. Cyril Osborne: Would not it be wise not to put it too crudely?

Mr. Strachey: We are simply concerned by the fact that we shall almost certainly have to face it.

Mr. Thomas Steele: It is stating the obvious.

Mr. Strachey: I agree.
I do not know what our commitments will be in 1963. I am not necessarily accepting the Government's view either of the commitments or of the 165,000 as the appropriate number to meet those commitments. We shall have to look at these things for ourselves again, but I am glad to say that it looks as though our policy, originally advocated eighteen months ago—which we were told then was absolutely out of the question—of abolishing National Service is proving both militarily correct and practicable.
I should like to join the Secretary of State in the tribute which he has paid to the Army on the way in which it is taking all the reorganisations that have to go on; and I am not blaming the Government for the re-organisations. There are re-organisations of units, there is technical re-organisation, and reorganisation from a mass conscript Army to a small professional Army. Three or four re-organisations are going on at present. The spirit, morale and resilience of the Army in facing this situation is, as the Secretary of State has said, very fine indeed, and we can be profoundly grateful for it.

5.18 p.m.

Brigadier Sir John Smyth: The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), as an ex-Secretary of State for War, speaks on these matters with very great wisdom and authority. I am sure that we have agreed with a great many of the things he has said. There are, however, certain things which I want to argue out with him a little later, particularly what he said of the rôle of the Army in N.A.T.O.
I should like to start where the right hon. Gentleman finished and say a few words about re-organisation and amalgamation and administration in support of what he said in congratulating all those who have had to do such a tremendous amount of work in all these matters during the last six months or so. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War paid particular tribute to my right hon. Friend the present Minister of Agriculture. I am sure that we would all agree that he played a very great part in bearing the burden of these amalgamations. From the point of view of the


lower ranks of the Army, politicians have always been regarded as a lot of "old so-and-so's."

Mr. Maurice Orbach: In that respect that view applies to politicians on both sides of the Committee.

Sir J. Smyth: Yes, but it is really the Service chiefs who have to bear the brunt of criticism when it comes to such things as amalgamation of battalions, although the politicians have to take the responsibility. I should like to say how very much we sympathise with the Service chiefs in the tremendously difficult task which they have had to carry out in some cases.
We all agree that the terms for redundant officers have been extremely generous. The difficulty has been over the amalgamation of units, and especially the disbandment of units, because in the British Army there is a great tradition, which is one of the reasons why it is such a magnificent Force. A quotation was given in the House only the other day to the effect that "the moral is to the physical as three to one." That saying was attributed to Field-Marshal Montgomery, but it goes back long before his day and has, I think rightly, been attributed to Napoleon. Anyway, it has been so quoted in staff colleges, and so on, for many years. Esprit de corps is the foundation of the British Army, and badges, buttons and flashes mean a great deal and are as steeped in tradition and antiquity as is the procedure in this House. There are also all kinds of queer expressions in the Army dating back years, and sometimes we do not know what they mean.
I remember many years ago watching a football match in India. The Green Howards, the battalion to which I belonged, were leading 1-nil towards the end of a strenuous game. One of the players kicked the ball into the stand and a little Indian boy below me shouted "H.L.I." This cry was taken up by all the spectators and I asked one or two people what it meant. They did not know, but they said that whenever this happened in the closing stages of a strenuous match they all shouted "H.L.I.". Eventually, I got to the bottom of the mystery. It was an old

Army tradition. In the final of the Army Cup in India, when the H.L.I. had been leading 1-nil at the end of a close game, during the last ten minutes—within the rules of order—they had kicked the ball mostly into the stands. Ever afterwards in the British Army that expression "H.L.I." has been used, and it will continue to be used, I am sure.
We have paid tributes to the commanders and to the officers, and I want to pay a special tribute to the British soldier, because the transfer from a conscript National Service Army to a voluntary Army will be a difficult time for the ordinary soldier. I pay tribute to his tolerance and his sense of humour. Often, when things get difficult at the summit one takes comfort from, and comes down to earth through, the humour of the British soldier. One instance of this, I was told, was when there was a vital conference at Gallipoli to discuss whether the peninsula should be evacuated or not. The conference had reached a tense stage and feelings were rather heated. The tent flap was lifted and a British soldier shoved his head inside and said, "Hi, have any of you baskets seen my dixie?" That, somehow, brought all the generals down to earth and they realised it was the British soldier about whom they were making all these decisions.
I also want to pay a tribute to the National Service man, who has done a wonderful job. We are inclined to overemphasise the grouses from some of these men, and we do not realise sufficiently, I think, how much many of them have enjoyed their Army service. As regards getting the necessary number of voluntary recruits, I feel that this is a question of confidence and that all Members of Parliament on both sides of the Committee can help tremendously.
We all want to see the end of National Service, and, therefore, it should be realised that there will be a very little enthusiasm for anyone to enlist in a mixed force of National Service men and volunteers. Many would-be recruits are watching at present to see whether we really mean to abolish National Service. I am sure the Minister of Defence was wise not to repeat in his White Paper this year the words of last year's White Paper, namely, that if voluntary recruitment fails, the requisite numbers needed would


have to be found through some form of compulsory service. We know that this prospect remains, but we all hope that it will not materialise. As I say, it is a question of confidence, and all Members of Parliament can help.
In this connection, may I ask the Under-Secretary of State to say something about the recruitment of Gurkhas? Could we use them more to make up the necessary numbers in our new voluntary Regular Army? Today we miss the Indian Army greatly, as I have said in this House before. I had the privilege of staying in Nepal for some little time and I know how keen the Gurkhas are to serve, how useful they have been in Malaya, and how useful they could be if we recruited them in increasing numbers.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West rather criticised the placing of part of the general reserve in Kenya. I do not agree with him on that point. I believe that as long as the general reserve, or any part of it, is not committed to any other task, and is free to move immediately, it is a good idea to spread it about. Also, may I ask my hon. Friend to say something about liaison and co-operation between our Army, the armies of the Commonwealth and the Colonial Forces? This was mentioned in another place yesterday by Lord Freyberg, who commanded our New Zealand Corps in the war. The noble Lord intimated that perhaps it was not as good as it might be.
The rôle of the Army today, laid down in the White Paper, in overall terms is to stop a war rather than to fight one, and to put out "bush fires" at once. It will be remembered that at the beginning of this year's Defence White Paper there were these words:
"Never in peacetime has the British soldier, sailor or airman had a more vital part to play."
That is principally because of the man's new rôle of trying to stop a war as his first task rather than, as in former days, training himself to light a war when it came along.
I see the hon. Gentleman the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) in his place. I have always agreed tremendously with the importance he attaches to the status of the soldier. The status of the soldier has been raised out of all recognition over the past fifteen years, but it still lacks something which we can

give it. In the not too distant future we shall have to consider giving the soldier a whole-life career in Government service in the same way as a civil servant has it. Only then shall we get the sort of Army and the sort of permanency in that Army which we are seeking.
I want next to consider the tasks of the Army. In the Memorandum it is laid down that the Army has to be prepared for the different tasks of the cold, limited and global war, and it has to act in accordance with what is laid down in the Defence White Paper. It has two main tasks—that of playing its part with the forces of allied countries, particularly in N.A.T.O., and that of maintaining internal security—a task which was outlined by my right hon. Friend—and the defence of British possessions against local attack, a limited operation of the "bush fire" variety.
There used to be a saying in India—I cannot think why it should have been in India, but it was—which I will not repeat in Hindustani, but which meant, "If it is good enough for Nelson, it is good enough for me." Why Nelson should have been quoted, I cannot imagine, but I have been led to think of Nelson because of something which the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty said when moving the Navy Estimates on Tuesday. He said:
It is not only total war that we seek to deter it is any war. We must smother even the first flickers of war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th March, 1958; Vol. 583. c. 986.]
I believe that most emphatically.
In my maiden speech in the House on 16th March, 1950, I said:
Our whole attitude towards defence should be that the war of the future must never be allowed to start.
I have gone on saying that ever since. On that occasion, the then Mr. Attlee said how much he was in agreement with that theme, and in his winding-up speech he made this significant statement:
I think that many people delude themselves if they think that one can get rid of the menace of the atomic bomb by some sort of Queensberry Rules being applied to warfare."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1450; Vol. 472, c. 1367–97.]
We all agree that modern war, even with the conventional weapons of fifteen years ago, is a grim and unpleasant business and we certainly do not want any more of it if we can avoid it.
In the debate in 1950—this is pertinent to many of the subjects which we are discussing today—my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), said that the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), then Minister of Defence, had been a model of "non-informatory eloquence". It is interesting to remember that, because the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) was saying the other day that the Opposition never got sufficient information about atomic power and so forth. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington had rightly not given more information on this point than he thought proper.
It was also in that debate that my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford said:
I do not believe there are a couple of well-formed brigade groups which could be sent abroad at short notice…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950; Vol. 472. c. 1287.]
How significant that was with the Korean was coming soon afterwards! It was not a question of not having two brigade groups to send overseas. We had to scrape the barrel to find even one.

Mr. R. T. Paget: By the time we got to Suez, it was even worse.

Sir J. Smyth: That is a lesson for us today, and I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to tell us whether we are in a better position today for the sort of operation like Korea than we were when my right hon. Friend made that comment.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West had much to say about the difference between the brigade group and the pentomic division, the other form of organisation discussed in the pamphlet by my friend Captain Liddell Hart which was quoted by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) when he referred to this subject recently.
The right hon. Member for Belper is against the brigade group. He gave his reasons, and the right hon. Member for Dundee, West has given a few more today. Some of the reasons given in favour of the pentomic division and against the brigade group are somewhat "phoney". Although only five infantry

battalions are included in the pentomic division, it is suggested that there would be less outcry in N.A.T.O. if we reduced our forces on a pentomic basis than if we did so on a brigade group basis. It is suggested that because of the name less alarm would be caused. Another reason given is the fact that Continental statesmen like to deal in divisions rather than in brigade groups.
I congratulate the Minister and the Army on deciding upon the brigade group organisation. I know that in certain quarters there was a prejudice against it, but it is much more suited to the tasks which the British Army will have to face. I had what was the fairly unusual experience at the time of commanding a brigade group at the beginning of the war, not only in its training, but through the Dunkirk operations. At that time, in a quickly moving situation when it was impossible to make any sort of divisional fire plan, when we were engaged in the sort of fluid operations which we might have to face in the future, I felt that the brigade group organisation worked extremely well.
I should like to give one word of advice to my hon. Friend, although I am sure that he will receive it from other sources. The real snag in the working of the brigade group is in the staff. If divisional headquarters keep too many of the staff, the chances are that an unfortunate brigade group commander suddenly faced with some situation has to deal with it with his infantry brigade plus a field regiment, an anti-tank battery, an R.E. company and all the rest of it, with an inadequate staff. That is what happened in my case, and having to cope with all those extra units without any increase in staff almost killed my brigade staff. The staff must be detached to the brigade group from the very start and not kept at divisional headquarters and sent down to the brigade when thought to be required.
I should like to ask the Under-Secretary or the Minister some questions on a point on which I am not too clear. What is the position regarding tactical atomic weapons in our Army on the Continent, and what is the position, as we know it, about the Russians' tactical atomic weapons? I take it that, if our forces have got tactical weapons, the Russians will also have them. That is


obviously so, and that is why I do not understand some of the remarks of the right hon. Member for Dundee, West which I want to take up in a minute.
General Norstad, the Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O., made a most important speech on 25th February, in the course of which he most vigorously opposed, from a strategic point of view, any sort of European zone freed of nuclear weapons. He actually said:
That would make us quite defenceless
because the defence of N.A.T.O. is laid out on certain lines, and the sudden drawing back from the present positions would make enormous difficulties for the Supreme Commander. He emphasised this important point in regard to the task of N.A.T.O. He said the first task was to prevent Western Europe from being overrun, and the second one was to prevent any local incident from spreading. I am absolutely in agreement that those are the true tasks of N.A.T.O. But there is something which I think is not the task of N.A.T.O., and this is where I join issue with the right hon. Gentleman opposite about his speech of Thursday last and what he has said today.
Obviously, the Supreme Commander does not envisage the forces of N.A.T.O., as they are organised and in their present numbers, being able to fight a prolonged major battle in a conventional war on the Continent. That is why I think the statement of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence in the much discussed Paragraph 12 of the White Paper is so important. I take the right hon. Gentleman opposite to mean, by his speech on Thursday last, that the policy of the Labour Party is that, in the event of a major conventional attack on the Continent, we shall reply with only conventional weapons. I should like him to make his view quite clear on that point, because he took my right hon. Friend very much to task for suggesting that at any stage in such an operation we could reply with what is known as "massive retaliation," including nuclear weapons.

Mr. Strachey: May I interrupt the hon. and gallant Gentleman, because this is all-important. I can only do it very briefly, but I think our misunderstanding arises from this. I regard this hypothesis, which the Minister of Defence, chiefly, put to us in his White Paper and

in his speech, of 200 Russian divisions suddenly rolling westwards as a completely false hypothesis. It is so unlikely that I simply think it misleads us if we start from that basis.
As I see it, the danger to the world is something starting, probably with nobody's will, in a local incident—I gave Berlin as an example—perhaps in the Russians following the Hungarians into Austria; one cannot say what, but some local incident, a quite limited Russian thrust, or satellite thrust, at the start. What I have said is that it is madness to say that we would do anything except resist that by conventional means at the first stage. Then, we must always put the onus on the enemy to raise the stakes to, first, the tactical nuclear stakes, and so finally to the end one. Why I attacked Paragraph 12 was for giving the appearance that we could use the H-bomb at once in the first stage.

Sir J. Smyth: I think the right hon. Gentleman has clarified that matter quite a lot, but, in all fairness to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence, I think he has clarified and supported what he said as well. What my right hon. Friend said in paragraph 12 of the White Paper was not to do with frontier incidents developing into something more—we are all agreed about that, and there is no argument or controversy about it—but in the case of a major aggression. It was on this that the right hon. Gentleman opposite took my right hon. Friend so severely to task in the defence debate. As both the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister have said several times, in the event of a major Russian attack, then we would reply with all the weapons at our command.

Mr. Strachey: Would not the hon. and gallant Gentleman agree that a Russian attempt to turn us out of West Berlin would be much more than a frontier incident? Would he call it a limited attack if two Russian divisions had followed the Hungarians into Austria? These are the realistic hypotheses of what the Secretary of State for War called the "grey area" hypothesis, and it is in regard to these eventualities, which we really ought to be considering, that the White Paper, perhaps unintentionally, gives a totally wrong impression.

Sir J. Smyth: I would not say that. We are all agreed that an operation by one or two divisions, perhaps on a wide front, is the sort of operation with which the N.A.T.O. forces can cope perfectly well. I think that this little argument between the right hon. Gentleman opposite and myself has probably clarified the whole thing a lot.
I would reiterate what was contained in the White Paper, and what the Minister and the Prime Minister have been anxious to get absolutely clear. It is that it was only in the event of a major assault with conventional weapons that that would happen. It was that particular point, which was made, I thought, so very ably—and it has been quoted before—by the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker), at Derby on 6th March, 1955, and I will repeat it, because I think no one has put it better than he has, and I think we should all ponder it. He was replying to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who had had some difference of opinion with Mr. Attlee, as he then was, on this point, and the right hon. Member for Derby, South said:
We all revolt against the horror of nuclear war, but nuclear war will never happen unless some nation is guilty of aggression".
He said that the policy of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, of separating conventional from a nuclear war, would be an open invitation to the Communists to commit aggression, to conquer Europe, sweep forward to the Channel ports and then destroy our cities by thousands of V.2's with non-nuclear warheads. He went on:
In such a war, nuclear weapons would in the end be used, but we should have sacrificed the whole purpose for which they have been made—that of preventing criminals from starting war. For what other reason did the Labour Government make the atom bomb?
I think these were very wise words, and I feel that they clarify the situation very much. All I would say is that if anyone really thinks that N.A.T.O. would have to fight a major conventional war in Europe, I am quite certain that our contribution is not nearly enough, nor are the contributions in conventional forces of all the other countries concerned. I think we should be quite clear on that point.
In conclusion, I should like to refer again to something that my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford said in the debate of eight years ago from which I have been quoting, because I think the things that he says are always full of wisdom, and seem to get better for keeping. He said:
Let us therefore labour for peace, not only by gathering our defensive strength, but also by making sure that no door is closed upon any hope of reaching a settlement which will end this tragic period when two worlds face one another in increasing strain and anxiety."[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th March, 1950: Vol. 472, c. 1297–8.]
That speech was made eight years ago. There was great tension then, but I maintain that N.A.T.O. and the nuclear deterrent have preserved the peace for eight years, and we still have peace today.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: In spite of all this.

Sir J. Smyth: Despite the tension that remains, the fact is that since those words were spoken we have had peace, and the British Army is still making a great contribution to it in and out of N.A.T.O. We should be very careful not to let rash counsels, unwise men, or, I regret say, vote-seeking, imperil the safety of our country and destroy the peace of the world.

5.51 p.m.

Mr. Maurice Edelman: I listened with great attention to the expert observations made by the hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) about a number of organisational matters, as I did to the remarks of the Secretary of State. I especially welcome the fact that he broadened the question to cover certain wider issues relating to the function of the Army. I listened to his speech with attention and I was much impressed by his analysis of the Estimates, but I could not help feeling that in presenting them he was dealing rather with the Estimates for 1930 than for 1958. I found some difficulty in recognising that the potential situation which the Army might have to face may be one in which nuclear weapons will be used upon a massive scale.
I hope to refer again to the question of mobile defence units which are referred to in Vote A, but I first want to refer to some of the remarks made by my right


hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) about the immorality of those who are in favour of the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons. I agree with him when, in his remarks about the attitude of the Liberals, he says that, while they denounce these nuclear weapons, they are content to shelter behind an American nuclear umbrella. That is a form of hypocrisy which has no relationship to the attitude taken by some of my hon. Friends, who feel that we should go further than the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons. In their opinion, the possession, manufacture, testing and anything associated with the development and use of nuclear weapons is wholly immoral.
I will explain why some of us—including myself, although I am not a pacifist and believe that we should develop our conventional weapons—regard it as immoral to produce, test and develop nuclear weapons. My argument is simply that, although we may be fully entitled to mutilate and destroy each other in our own generation when we are involved in quarrels with our neighbours and enemies, we are not morally entitled to produce and use weapons which deform the faces of future generations. That seems to be a basic moral issue upon which we are entitled to take sides. I should, therefore, like my right hon. Friend to consider whether he ought to abandon the charge of hypocrisy which he has levelled against some of his hon. Friend who, although they are not pacifists, feel very strongly that nuclear weapons should be renounced.

Mr. R. J. Mellish: In fairness to my right hon. Friend, I should point out that he did not say that they were hypocrites. He was putting a case against their arguments. As he is not in the Chamber, I think that that should be made clear.

Mr. Edelman: It seems to me to be a strong implication of hypocrisy if it is urged against hon. Members that, although they are prepared to engage in the processes of war by conventional means, if necessary, they are none the less insistent upon renouncing one form of weapon.

Mr. Paget: Does it also occur to my hon. Friend that the cap might fit? [Laughter.]

Mr. Edelman: Although my hon. and learned Friend has evoked laughter from hon. Members opposite, he should remember that all that he has offered is a taunt, and not an argument.
The question that we must ask ourselves is whether we are in a position to fight a nuclear war. I want to deal with the subject that has hitherto been called Civil Defence, but in view of Vote A must in future involve the use of troops. I address myself to this problem because my constituency has been much concerned in the various arguments which have taken place about the possibility of a satisfactory defence against nuclear attack.
I am relating my arguments to that part of the Estimates which deals with the use of troops to support the civil authority. Vote A says that
The Mobile Defence Corps provides immediate assistance in rescue work in war to civil authorities in the United Kingdom.
I am sorry that the Secretary of State did not develop that argument further, to illustrate what kind of support the Mobile Defence Corps might give.

Mr. Soames: The Under-Secretary will be winding up the debate, and I have no doubt that he will refer to that matter.

Mr. Edelman: I am delighted to hear that. Perhaps I may put to him certain aspects of the argument which require a wider consideration.
First, it may well be that although the general conception of a hydrogen bomb war is some sort of universal holocaust in which both sides are mutually annihilated, such a war would take a different form. Having listened to and read the very interesting argument that has gone on between my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who has been described as a "juvenile politician," and the "superannuated philosopher," Bertrand Russell, I could not help feeling that they were really arguing about a hypothesis which might never be realised, namely, that nuclear warfare would result in mutual annihilation.
If we consider what happened towards the end of the Japanese war, we see a


wholly different picture. There, the two towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were selected as demonstration towns, and no sooner had the two bombs fallen and killed 150,000 Japanese than the war came to a prompt end. I submit that Great Britain itself—a country rather than a town—might be the demonstration target of the next war, upon which the Soviet Union might, in the first few hours of the conflict, concentrate all its forces to show the power that it has available. Although the large cities of the United States might suffer as a result of attack by long-distance bombers the country would survive to mourn the disappearance of the launching base which Britain had once represented.

Dr. Barnett Stross: If we were entirely spared—this is the exact opposite thesis—because we were completely neutral and declared that we had no such weapons and were not even involved, and if a hydrogen bomb had fallen on Europe because there was war between the Soviet Union with her allies, and the United States, with, perhaps, Germany and France assisting her, would my hon. Friend agree that there would be no safety for us in Britain because the wind might blow death to this country and wipe out the whole population?

Mr. Edelman: I agree. My argument is that the possibility of passive defence which we possess in this country is inferior to that of either of our allies or potential enemies, and, in addition—

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The Russians have not got any civil defence.

Colonel Richard H. Glyn: The hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) draws the analogy of the atomic attack on Japanese cities. Does he believe that those atomic bombs would have been dropped on the Japanese cities had Britain and America known that Japan was then in a position to retaliate with an atomic attack on London and New York? Would not that have proved a deterrent to the use of the atomic bomb at all?

Mr. Edelman: I do not believe that for a moment. Had there been mutual possession of the atomic bomb at that time, the only question would have been

which of the two opposing Powers would have anticipated the other in its use.
The point I wish to develop, and now, perhaps, I may be permitted to proceed with my argument, is this. We in this country are able to launch missiles with a range of 1,500 miles, including Moscow, and a great arc—

The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): Order. Rockets are a subject far from this debate. The question of rockets may be discussed in a defence debate, or a debate on the Air Force, but not in this debate.

Mr. Edelman: With respect, if I may continue my argument I think you will agree, Sir Gordon, that it is directly related to Vote A and the question of the Mobile Defence Corps, and deals with the provision of rescue services in this country in circumstances of aggression or counter-attack. I submit that the argument I am advancing is directly relevant to the provisions made in the Estimates for dealing with that circumstance when it arises. For that reason, I should like to develop my point for another one or two sentences.
The range of our potential attack will include a vast area of the Soviet Union, even if we use long-range—

The Deputy-Chairman: Order. The hon. Member may refer to defence, but not to attack.

Mr. Edelman: I think that the point is now clear and I will deal with the defence part.
Russia has missiles on the Western frontiers and if she attacks with nuclear bombers we represent the most obvious and concentrated target of any of the belligerent countries. The point is, therefor, what are we proposing to do after the flurry of the first few blows in a nuclear war? What are we going to do to deal with the situation which may then arise?
I will not say that the Minister has shown a remarkable indifference, since he assures me that the Under-Secretary will deal with these matters later this evening—but he should remember that this is something which is agitating the minds of everyone in the country. He should take note of what the young people in the universities feel about this question


of defence against nuclear war. He ought to take note of what they are saying, because of their convictions that the Government are incapable—I will not charge them with being unwilling—of providing even a minimal amount of protection against the consequences of nuclear warfare.
I recall that after 1945, when the consequences of an atom bomb attack on Japan had been noted and the subsequent development of radiation diseases was observed, the late Lord Waverley—who was certainly a most humane man—when called on to give his views about a potential defence against radiation, suggested the provision of brown paper as a form of shelter against the effects of radiation. He was laughed at, but none the less it was something which was advanced on some form of scientific basis.
Now the Government seem to have washed their hands of the whole matter. They seem no longer to concern themselves with the possibility of passive defence in any form. When the Coventry Council decided to have nothing to do with Civil Defence because it was an encouragement to those producing the atom bomb, I personally—and I made my view known at the time—thought it was wrong simply because I felt that we all have a responsibility to succour the victims of war in whatever circumstances that war may occur.
What encouragement is being given today to those who would willingly volunteer for Civil Defence but feel that the Government have made no constructive proposals to deal with such a situation were it to arise? So far, little has taken place. We can be sure of one thing, that if a nuclear bomb were dropped in London, there would be conditions of local chaos in which civil government might well break clown. In those circumstances, the practical problem is: what would the Government do? What arrangements would the Army make to provide the rescue services which are referred to in the Estimates? So far as one gathers, there is practically no—

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Who said that?

Mr. Edelman: So far as one can gather—

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: The hon. Gentleman must not think that because

they are doing nothing in Coventry the rest of the country is not doing anything. There is an extremely efficient organisation. If the hon. Gentleman would take the trouble to investigate he would know more about the subject he is discussing.

Mr. Edelman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has not realised the magnitude of the problem. He is still thinking in terms of the Boer War.
Here we are dealing with a massive problem of an altogether different character. We shall have people suffering from radiation and burns and a total breakdown of all services to an extent and a degree which has not taken place in any previous war. Therefore, I believe that there must be some form of close liaison, indeed more than liaison, some form of integration of the medical services with the Army authorities, because I do not believe for a moment that the ordinary courageous and tolerant spirit which we saw in the last war would survive.
I have addressed myself specifically to this question of the part of the Army in Civil Defence in the event of an outbreak of nuclear war. I do not think that enough has been done. After all, it is the function of a private Member to ask the Government for information and not to be in a position of knowing in advance. Apparently nothing has been done to provide that degree of support and co-operation which will be called for. I hope that the Under-Secretary will address himself to that matter.

6.10 p.m.

Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I am glad of the opportunity to follow the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman), because I happen to know a bit about Civil Defence in this country. I should not like to accuse the hon. Gentleman of deliberately trying to create alarm and despondency, but there is no doubt whatever in my mind that the result of his remarks, if they are widely read, will create alarm and despondency. Whether the hon. Member did that inadvertently or not, I do not know.
This is not a Civil Defence debate and I deplore the fact that, having had a foreign affairs debate, in which the whole question of nuclear defence was discussed at length, and a defence debate, in which the whole question of nuclear


defence was discussed at length, when we have an opportunity to debate the Army in detail that opportunity should be used for another debate on nuclear defence.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: The hon. and gallant Member was fortunate enough to be able to put his views in that debate. Others were not so fortunate and have to take what opportunities are open to them.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Nevertheless, when there is a debate which is understood to be on the Army Estimates surely that is what we should be discussing, not the White Paper on Defence.

Dr. Stross: Dr. Stross rose—

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I am not going to give way any more. I am far too generous to hon. Members opposite. When I ask them to give way, they do not do so. I cannot extend to them the same courtesy. I do not wish to keep hon. Members waiting because, owing to the actions of hon. Members opposite, we have to suspend this debate at 7 o'clock and there are other hon. Members who wish to speak in the debate on the Estimates.
I hope that we shall discuss very fully the detailed organisation and efficiency of the new Army we are trying to build up. As I have said on no less than two occasions, the rôle of the Army is threefold. It has to produce, at short notice, a form of police force. It has to be prepared to fight a limited conventional war on the scale of Korea or less. It also has to play its part with its allies in a global war. I have said before, and still believe, that global war, particularly on a conventionally-armed basis, is extremely unlikely—I put it no higher than that—for reasons I have already given.
Therefore, I concentrate more on the likely rôles of the Army, the police rôle and the minor rôle in smaller conventional wars. Very conveniently, shortly before this debate two companies were flown out to Libya. I know that my hon. Friend the Secretary of State was not interested in this aspect of our discussions in those days, but it is no less than two years since a brigade was formed in the North of England with the specific task of being transported by air

anywhere in the world at short notice. At that time I welcomed it. The following year I asked how long it was to be before the brigade took to the air and had a little practice in the job it had to do? How much warning would it need before it could get into the air? It has taken two years for the War Office to get two companies into the air.
I get hot under the collar about this. We are back to the old sort of attitude of mind of the hierarchy which very nearly lost us the war at its beginning. It was not until we got rid of that deadwood—I will not mention names—that we managed to get a move on. We are getting back to it with all the paper, with all the "bumph" as we called it, and it has taken two years to get those two companies flown to Libya. It really is not good enough. If the Army has not officers capable of doing the job I could name about ten who would do it.
I am delighted with the new organisation, the brigade group. That makes sense. We have two organisations, the infantry brigade group and the armoured brigade group, both eminently suitable for any of the small conventional war tasks for which they might be called upon. They might easily be brought together on the strength of two brigades to form a division on the old basis.
There is one thing about which I am a little worried. Taking the example of the limited war which I have quoted, I believe that nothing short of a brigade group would be needed. In most cases it would be needed in a very great hurry, but our strategic reserve is sitting here in England. How are we to get that brigade group out to an area where it might be needed east of Suez? It would have about 180 Centurion tanks weighing 60 tons each, about 24 medium self-propelled guns with ammunition and the rest.
My right hon. Friend said that equipment will be kept at various spots in the world to cope with that problem. If he can see that that is really done and it is all there in detail, that is fine. I am not sure that we can afford it. We shall have to think of many places where the whole equipment of a brigade group could be stored. Do not let us have any silly questions about transport by air. No one will build an aeroplane


big enough to take any number of Centurion tanks. That is out of the question altogether. We could get a police, jeep-borne, force with personal weapons conveyed in that way, but nothing else in the way of heavy equipment.

Mr. Paget: If we did, by the time they got there and tried to take the equipment to the dump it is a monkey to a matchbox that something essential would be missing.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I agree. I remember taking over a brigade of tanks in which every tank had a spring missing which could have been bought in a cycle shop. This is not a practical solution and we could not possibly afford it. What alternatives are there? Have we to do as in the case of Suez and move at eight knots, or less, for a distance of 2,000 miles before we even get to Suez? Those who talk about a Kenya base should remember that Kenya is 2,000 miles from Aden or the Red Sea. In old wars, of course, we had to go by sea and take a long time, but in these days things will not wait for that sort of manoœuvre.
This touches slightly on foreign affairs, but only for a second to illustrate the point. Is anyone really convinced that we shall be allowed to keep bases on territory which is not ours indefinitely? There is such a thing as nationalism, which is a force that has to be taken into account, whether we like it or not. We have pulled out from Suez and the Yemen has now gone in with Colonel Nasser. If hon. Members opposite get into power, will Aden be a base east of Suez? I hope that my right hon. Friend will ask some of the hierarchy in the War Office and the Ministry of Defence to give very earnest consideration to this matter and to working out the cost and the possibilities. We want a fleet train like the Americans have, an aircraft carrier type of ship used as a vast depôt. That can carry any number of cannon and field guns with ammunition. The Americans have done it. There is a mobile headquarters which, although vulnerable by daylight, need not always be in the same place, and can be dispersed.

Mr. Paul Williams: Is my hon. and gallant Friend

aware that this is exactly one of the propositions which was put to the Committee two days ago, during the debate on the Navy Estimates?

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I regret to say that I was not present on that occasion, because I had another engagement. I am glad to hear it and I support my hon. Friend, but I will ask my hon. Friend who said it whether he had worked out how much it would cost. In the long run, it would be a good investment. Finally, we should save money on it. From the point of view of overall world tactics, it is the only thing that makes any sense.
That was really a point for a defence debate, Sir Gordon, and I apologise.
When we have a small and highly efficient Army there are two absolute essentials. One is intense tire power. I do not mean heavy fire power, but intense individual fire power. I think that it must be six years ago since I raised the question of the replacement of the Vickers gun during an Estimates debate. I cannot remember whether hon. Members opposite were in power or we were in power. I know I was told that we had a magnificent alternative weapon invented by the Swedes or the Norwegians. Today, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War comes to the Dispatch Box and says that the Vickers gun will be replaced in the fairly near future. What has been going on all the time? We had the Vickers gun in the 1914–18 war. It was a very good gun, but when we need mobility of fire power we do not need a heavy gun. It is nothing like even the gun that was used by the Germans in the late war.
I had experience myself, in the recent conflict, of trying to get infantry in protected vehicles to an objective at speed, with supporting tanks. The days are really over when people walked up to a thin red line and were subjected to intense mortar fire and defence fire from artillery, and so on. I had an experience, which I will not go into in detail, but which was nearly 100 per cent. successful. We had only two casualties in the whole formation.
I have been asking ever since whether a vehicle has yet been produced for carrying infantry into battle, not for just moving them strategically from one part of the front to another but carrying them


right into action in reasonable safety. I looked at new vehicles at Bovington about four years ago. There was a vehicle capable of carrying people on wheels and not on tracks, and there was a beautiful demonstration. The men were very smart and got in and got out again very quickly. At last, I thought, we have got it. I went to the Staff College not long ago to talk about something and I got on to this subject. I was told by one of the senior officers that not one of those vehicles had been issued to B.A.O.R. I hope that something will be done about this.
Let me get to the subject of recruiting. It is a tragedy that today the fun has gone out of the Army. It used to be good fun in the old days. We were stationed in some nice places. Look at the sort of place the soldier is in today. He is most likely to be stationed miles away from anywhere, with nothing to see but yellow sand stretching for miles around. There are no amenities and no sport and, therefore, the place is not attractive. That is one of the reasons why officers, at least, are not joining as they did in the past.
Great thought should be given to this aspect of the matter. It might be worth setting up a War Office committee to discuss it and to make recommendations. A lot more could be done, if there were a little more imagination, to make the soldiers' lives not only amusing but interesting and exciting. I hope that my right hon. Friend will take this matter into consideration.
I wish to warn him however, with all the emphasis at my command, against an extension of the foreign tour abroad. We fought to get that down to three years maximum and we got it down. We fought to arrange it so that the entire battalion would change as a battalion and the position would not arise that a man arrived within six weeks of having to come home again. The whole battalion must be kept together. My right hon. Friend may find voices being raised to get the tour period extended to longer than three years. If he extends it, he will kill the recruiting programme.
I am delighted to hear what my right hon. Friend said about accommodation and the new barracks programme. I went to Salisbury not long ago and saw some

magnificent accommodation buildings. Who were they for? Headquarters, Southern Command. Why should it get first priority? Why not give the new buildings to the fellows who have to go abroad and have to be out in the rain? Why not let them have the barracks and let Headquarters, Southern Command carry on until the other people are dealt with? This applies all over the commands. It is not the officers who are getting the priority, but clerks.
My right hon. Friend said he hoped that by 1963 the number of civilians in the Army would be down to one to one. I am interested in two aspects of this question. A civilian costs a great deal more than a soldier, because his wages are higher. Are we really saving anything? We are saving in manpower, but not in money. I would like to have this point cleared up. The other point to remember is that cooks and batmen have had to fight in the past. Do not let us have civilians in units which are to fight. If the units are not capable of going to war in their present formation we must have dilution of personnel. I hope that civilians will not take the place of soldiers where soldiers will be needed in war-time.
Finally, a word to the Press. It is up to the Press to help to build the new model Army. In the past, it has been a little too quick to seize on a little incident that has happened in the forces, particularly if the Press is short of news. They find a National Service man, for example, with a grievance about peeling potatoes. The Press seems to forget the thousands of men who have been doing a magnificent job, cheerfully, willingly and well. The Press has a great chance to make the country realise that it owes an immense debt of gratitude to hundreds of thousands of young officers and other ranks who have kept us free to be able to express our views as we are doing today.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I could hardly aspire to be more critical of the Government than the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) has been. I will, however, endeavour not to be less so. Year after year, we vote enormous sums. The Government have spent £10,000 million, and one is always astounded in the end to


see how little in terms of power has been produced.
The hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth), speaking earlier in the debate, referred to his right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), who was our great wartime Prime Minister, as having said in 1950 that he did not believe that there were two brigade groups available for an emergency. The hon. and gallant Member hoped that the Minister would be able to tell us that they were available today. I should be delighted if he could, but it would test my credulity. With all this expenditure, as was demonstrated at Suez, it is doubtful whether there has ever been a time in the history of the country when we were in a less effective position to exert power anywhere.
Let us consider what has been happening this year concerning the present proposals. Again, it does not seem to me that the Government have applied their minds to the problem of why we want an Army. We are told about the brigade group and about standards of equipment. It would be all very nice and convenient for the Army if a homogeneous organisation and standard equipment would serve for all purposes. Unfortunately, the organisation and equipment required for fighting an atomic war in Europe, for hunting the Mau Mau in forest and swamp, for tracking E.O.K.A. in mountainous country or for landing on a beach in Korea, are totally and utterly different. It is no use imagining that we can have a standard organisation for these purposes, and yet that is the basis of these proposals.
I will try to consider what are the functions and the sort of forces we need for them. The picture today is tremendously different and embraces various distinct jobs. Our N.A.T.O. contribution has an important political function apart from anything else. Because we have troops in Europe, we have a say in what happens in Europe. Because we have divisions in Germany, we are in a position to stop the sort of silly decisions which might lead to a major war. Because we have divisions in Germany, we have a say in what happens if there is a rebellion in East Germany, such as we saw in Hungary. Those are the vital things. That is why it is so tremendously important that we should not welsh on our N.A.T.O. contribution.
Our N.A.T.O. forces, however, must be atomic forces equipped for atomic war. I can understand the view of those who suggest that we should have no Army at all. I can understand the pacifist point of view which says that we can survive Communism, convert it and come through, but that we cannot survive hydrogen disintegration. But as for the viewpoint which says that we should have an Army and should commit it against an atomic army whilst denying it atomic weapons, if it is not hypocritical all I can say is that it is not hypocritical because it could not pretend to a greater silliness than it possesses
Have we really thought about how an atomic war will be fought? Oddly enough, my feeling is that the main feature of the atomic battlefield will be that atomic weapons will not be used upon it. They will be used almost everywhere else, but the one place where atomic weapons will not he able to be used is on the battlefield, because intermingling will occur in a manner which will deny both sides any possible target without destroying their own people. That has been shown both in the exercises that were planned and in those which have been thought out.
If a commander was planning to attack a position held by N.A.T.O. forces committed to using tactical atomic weapons in their defence, what would he say to his troops? This, I venture to suggest, is what he would say: "The one way you can keep safe is by getting among the enemy." It will not be difficult to get among us, because we on our side will also be fearing the atomic attack. Therefore, we shall be denying the enemy targets. We shall be spread out and dispersed and, being dispersed, there will be any amount of gaps.
As I visualise this battle, should it ever come, there will be airborne drops, quick troop movements over small areas and both sides intermingling into each other to a depth of 100 or 150 miles. There will be a kind of diffused fighting with troops completely intermingled over a wide area within which—and, perhaps, within which alone—nobody can use an atomic weapon.

Mr. Arthur Holt: I have been following closely the hon. and learned Member's argument, because I am one of those who believe that


N.A.T.O. should not arm with atomic tactical weapons. Does not what the hon. and learned Member has said destroy his own argument that N.A.T.O. forces should be armed with tactical atomic weapons? If N.A.T.O. does not have atomic tactical weapons, she will go in amongst the Russian atomic tactical weapon troops in exactly the way that the hon. and learned Member has described. What is the point of having them if they cannot be used?

Mr. Paget: If the hon. Member would be a little more patient, I do not think I am so illogical that I open with an argument and then contradict it. As I have said, my conception is that the one place where the atomic weapon will not be used is the battlefield. Where it will be used, and must be used, if one is not prepared to accept complete defeat, is to seal the battlefield and prevent the enemy getting additional troops into it. It is a weapon against communications. It will be able to smash and close the communications. What is far more important is the knowledge by the enemy that it will be done, because the enemy will know in advance that he will suffer real damage, greater than anything he can gain.
I do not believe in the massive retribution against the sources of Russian power. If the Americans were to do that, it would cost them 8 million casualties, and I do not believe that the Americans will accept 8 million casualties for anything that happens in Europe.

Mr. Osborne: Why 8 million?

Mr. Paget: At least 8 million. These calculations have been given. That is the kind of measure. We should remember what the Russians were concerned with when they were threatening Turkey a few weeks ago. Then, the threat of massive retribution did not impress, but when the Americans said that they would wipe out the embarkation ports, that was real and the trouble stopped.
Let me consider what sort of troop organisation we should have for this sort of fighting. My conception is that if we get that intermingled fighting which, I believe, will be the leading feature of an atomic war, the important organisation will not be the brigade and not even the battalion. It will scarcely be even the

platoon. It will be the section. The man who wins is the man whose sections can right best alone. In other words, it is a personnel question and a question of getting real officer-quality leadership at section level. That, I believe, is what we have to aim at.
With the N.A.T.O. army in that kind of war, is there really a rôle for the heavy tank? Our anti-tank weapon has become very effective, even at the personal level. Can we hope to use the level of transport with which we are supplied? I do not know, but I believe that in the N.A.T.O. sphere we need a lot more exercises. Exercises cannot tell the whole story, but they can tell us something of how this sort of fighting works out. These should be exercises in which one is prepared to accept a far higher level of confusion than command will like to accept, because that is what an atom war would involve. A good deal of pressure should be directed in that direction in Germany.
The next function, as I see it, is fighting where necessary, but not against Russians. That seems to be the job of our mobile reserve. The first question we should ask ourselves about that is: A reserve to what? It is not a reserve to Europe. There is no point in having a reserve to Europe, because the one thing that the atom weapon can and will do is to make it impossible for us to move the reserves in.
Our mobile reserve is a reserve to our commitments in the rest of the world, and to that it should be directed. What do we want? We do not want the atom war sort of organisation, because the reserve has quite a different function. I submit that we do not want even the heavy level of equipment that was necessary in the last war to deal with the German divisions. We want something very much lighter. The important thing is not so much what the ultimate power is but what power we can get to the spot.
Here, mobility is vastly more important than armour or fire power. How are we to achieve that mobility? I would again follow the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing—indeed, I raised this matter also on the Navy Estimates—by saying that this reserve ought to be sea-borne. We have no hope of getting an adequate airlift. I should reckon that the very height of our ambition would be a fairly


attenuated brigade to be airborne. Incidentally, whilst on this subject, I understand that one of the great aircraft manufacturers has designed, or is designing, an aircraft capable of carrying a hundred people with vertical take-off and landing. Can we he told how that is getting on? A troop carrier that can do without airfields is obviously a tremendous answer, but it can move only very limited forces.
The major reserve must accept the lesser mobility of the sea; but that need not be too slow a mobility. We are about to scrap, according to the Navy Estimates, no fewer than five aircraft carriers capable of 35–38 knots. Those are ideal carrier ships. Why on earth do we not get them for our mobile reserve and so equip it for this sort of operation?
My next point concerns manpower. I hope that I am not over-pessimistic in saying that I do not think that, on the present scales, we shall get the manpower we want, but I believe that we can do without conscription provided that we are prepared to seek other sources of manpower which, for certain of the Army's operations, are perfectly all right. I do not know what the position is now, but I venture to say that in a modern army, probably not more than one man in fifteen or one man in twenty actually tights. The rest of an army is service, communications and all the other kinds of jobs.
On this aspect, I was very impressed when I examined the German set-up in the last war. The Germans then succeeded in putting in the field over 300 highly effective divisions. They did so only by using people of other nationality for the service jobs within the divisions. I am not here dealing with the morality of that. However, the ordinary German division in Russia, for instance, had Russians for at least 30 per cent. of its personnel. If the Germans could achieve that sort of efficiency, with that sort of proportion of people—in many instances they were probably actually unwilling—surely certain services in our Army could be performed by other people.
There are great fields of recruitment. There are the West Indies; Malta, where there is heavy unemployment; all our African Dominions and Colonies, where there is manpower longing for this type of job. If we went to that area of recruiting for particular kinds of jobs within the forces we could use our British

volunteer proper for the actual combatant jobs and the other jobs for which we require him. If we are to do away with conscription, that problem has to be thought out.
Following that, if we are to have what we call a reserve in Kenya, why in the world have it British? In Kenya we have a source of manpower that longs to serve in the Army. There are magnificent fighting tribes there. The African, built as he is, likes drill, likes military life, and it does him a lot of good. We would probably have lost Kenya had it not been for the ex-soldiers of the King's African Rifles. In the Wakamba country it was simply the ex-soldier that kept the Wakamba loyal. We could do a great service in this way to this undeveloped country.
Why on earth do we not build an African reserve? I used to urge this. The Financial Secretary used to urge it in the old days. We used to be told from the Front Bench "That would be lovely but, you know, we haven't the n.c.o.s." Now we are sacking the n.c.o.s and breaking their careers. At this very moment we are forcibly breaking faith with the officers and n.c.o.s who would be available for this African reserve, and are sending a British reserve to Kenya. Is this "Alice-in-Wonderland" or what? It is the craziest idea we have ever hit on, and I hope that, under pressure—from both sides, I trust—the War Office will realise that we do not want to see this endless expenditure for so little effect, but do want a little realistic thinking.

6.50 p.m.

Sir Eric Errington: I do not propose to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) into his glimpse into the future of tactical nuclear warfare, but it is probably correct that smaller sections of troops will be used than ever before. The point that he makes about the officering of them is one that will have to be carefully considered by the Government.
The Army should be congratulated upon the way in which it has accepted the very drastic changes that have been decided. One would not have believed it possible that The King's regiment, raised in Liverpool, and The Manchester regiment, raised, of course, in Manchester, would have been able to find complete happiness in combination under the name


of The King's regiment of both towns. But it is a good thing that generally in the country it has been accepted that they could co-operate. Few people have felt otherwise.
The acceptance by the Army of the various rôles which have to be fulfilled is also something of which we ought to be very proud. Besides the ordinary conventional service, there are soldiers who have the rôle of policemen and also a rôle to carry out in atomic warfare. I believe that that is an immense step forward by the Services.
I am not, however, entirely convinced that the new scale of pay entirely satisfies the Service. It is important to examine for a minute or two the effect on recruiting of certain things that may seem to be small details, but which in many ways affect people's minds much more than merely the straight increase in pay. I do not know who is responsible for these matters, but it is suitable to discuss them in this debate.
First, in many cases rapid changes of station are made, and officers and men have to be moved very often with their families. There is a flat rate of disturbance allowance, which in most cases is inadequate to meet the cost. I do not know what the figure is exactly, but I think it is about £40; but the cost of the move, for instance, may be as much as £60 or £70. Surely there can be no reason, if Service conditions demand it, why the cost of removal and disturbance should not be met in whole and not only in part.
The second matter to which I should like to refer is the very unsatisfactory position about what are called non-attributable widows' pensions. These are pensions paid to widows of Service men who have died, not on active service, but as serving officers. The anomaly arises from the fact that few serving soldiers paid retirement pensions contributions before 1947. A widow of a lieutenant-colonel who does not receive a National Insurance payment receives £189, and a widow of a warrant officer (Second class) receives a pension of £40 10s. That is inadequate.
Widows of officers and men who have paid National Health Insurance contributions are in a very much better position. The widow of a lieutenant-colonel in that case would receive £319 a year and the widow of a warrant officer (2nd class) £170. Before 1947, it was the exception for any officer to pay National Health Insurance contributions. After 1947, provided he paid his 156 contributions, the benefit of the National Health Insurance Scheme applied to him and his widow.
Therefore, we have the highly unsatisfactory position of the widows of these men, because their husbands had not the opportunity to make National Health Service contributions, being inadequately looked after. I was disappointed to see in the last paragraph of the Service Pay and Allowances White Paper that no changes would be made about those widows. After all, it is through no fault of their own that they are not in a position to look after themselves. I know many cases where they are suffering considerable hardship.
I would now refer to holders of the Victoria Cross. They are in a most unfortunate position at the moment. The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) and an hon. Member from Northern Ireland have previously raised this matter. When the subject was raised on 21st May last, the Prime Minister replied to the effect that there is now provision whereby the normal V.C. annuity of £10 may in a case of need be increased to £75. Then Questions were asked about the matter. I will read the last lines of the Answer given by the Prime Minister on 14th November:
As for the Answer which I gave on 21st May, I should like to point out that the provision of the old normal annuity of £10 can now be increased to £75."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th November, 1957; Vol. 577, c. 1143.]
When the matter was looked into further, it was found that it was governed by Article 660 of the Pay Warrant, 1940. It was there stated:
An officer who … is unable, in consequence of age or infirmity occasioned by causes beyond his own control, to earn a livelihood may, at the discretion of Our Army Council, be granted an annuity …"—

It being Seven o'clock, The DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN left the Chair, further Proceeding standing postponed until after the Proceedings on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House standing over under Standing Order No. 9 (Adjournment on definite matter of urgent public importance.)

[Mr. SPEAKER resumed the Chair]

JOAQUIM PEREZ-SELLES (DEPORTATION)

7.0 p.m.

Mr. John Dugdale: I rise so that we may have an opportunity of discussing the case of Joaquim Perez-Selles, now awaiting deportation to Spain. At what time he is to be deported, nobody knows, including, so we gather, the Home Secretary himself, but it appears that his deportation is imminent and it is for that reason that we on this side of the House are raising this matter as one of urgency.
This afternoon, the Home Secretary disturbed many of us, certainly on this side of the House, by two things that he did. In the first place, it would appear that he disclaimed responsibility for the fact that this man is to be deported. He did not actually disclaim it in so many words, but he could very easily have risen and relieved you, Mr. Speaker, of some anxiety when you were uncertain, I think, for a moment, whether the Home Secretary had the responsibility, or whether it was a judicial matter in which the House should not interfere. In fact, by not standing up and saying that he had responsibility, the Home Secretary can be said virtually to have disclaimed responsibility this afternoon.
The second thing that the right hon. Gentleman did which disturbed us considerably was to refuse even to postpone the order for deportation. If he had said, "I do not know about this. I am not very certain"—and he did not appear to be certain; for instance, he said that he was taken unawares and that the matter had been raised very suddenly and that he should have been given notice of it, which is as may be—that would have been a very strong reason for having postponed the decision, as he was asked to do. Having postponed it maybe only until next week, the House could have

discussed it. In fact, he did no such thing and, as far as we can make out, it was highly probable that this man would be deported by the end of this week.
During the course of the interchange of questions this afternoon, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) raised a very pertinent point. He asked whether the treatment would have been the same if this man had been due to go behind the Iron Curtain. There was no reply about that.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I deliberately did answer that point, saying that the treatment was exactly the same. As the right hon. Gentleman has now misrepresented me in two respects, namely, saying that I disclaimed responsibility and that the treatment would not have been the same. I want to say quite clearly that I accepted responsibility and that I did say that the treatment was the same.

Hon. Members: Withdraw.

Mr. Dugdale: Oh, no. I said that the right hon. Gentleman did not actually disclaim responsibility, but could have risen very much earlier and said clearly that he was responsible, and thus have relieved you, Mr. Speaker, of a very difficult situation. I stick to that.
It may be that the right hon. Gentleman says that there is the same treatment in the case of people who are liable to go behind the Iron Curtain. If that is so, what was the reason for the treatment of Sergeant Ponomarenko quite recently? Sergeant Ponomarenko, so I understand, deserted—

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that this is the man about whom we were talking earlier.

Mr. Dugdale: With the very greatest respect, Sir, I think that I should be allowed to develop a parallel case to show that there is different treatment in one case from what there is in the other. That is all I want to do and I will be brief about it.
Sergeant Ponomarenko, so I understand, deserted after having been said—I will not say more—to have shot another soldier during a drinking bout and then having gone to Berlin. Whether those facts are correct, I do not know,


but that was the accusation. It was an accusation of desertion coupled with shooting, a fairly serious accusation. He was allowed refuge in Berlin and, what is more, has been flown to this country, where he is still given refuge. It may be perfectly right that he should be given refuge. I will not argue about the merits of that case. I merely say that this is treatment quite different from what has been given to the man about whom we are talking today.
Many of us on this side of the House feel quite as strongly about Spanish injustice and Spanish tyranny as hon. Members on both sides of the House feel about Russian injustice and Russian tyranny. I do not think that that can be said of hon. Members opposite.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Before my right hon. Friend leaves his very valid point about the parallel case, will he bear in mind that there are many cases where political asylum has been given on what seemed to be rather tenuous grounds in the case of desertion by Polish merchant seamen from ships which happened to come to this country, a matter which seems very much to the point?

Mr. Dugdale: I am very glad that my hon. Friend has added those cases. I do not have a long list of cases. I have not come prepared with a long list, but I quoted a case which I thought to be relevant to the present discussion. No doubt if my hon. Friend catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, he will be able to add other cases, as will other hon. Members.
It is quite clear that we on this side of the House are not concerned with this man's character. I have never met him and I do not know him. For all I know, he may be a most undesirable and unpleasant character, although I have no idea. All I know is that he is accused of having deserted the Spanish Army.
I ask the Home Secretary whether desertion is an extraditable offence. I do not know whether we have relations with Spain which say that desertion is an extraditable offence. If that is so, I presume that this man has been to court and that the police have asked for an extradition warrant.
If that is not so, under what powers

is the right hon. Gentleman acting? That is something which we hope he will tell us tonight. I have no doubt that hon. and learned Members can advise me on this matter, because I do not profess to be learned in these things, but I understand that the Government perhaps have—and only perhaps—power to deport without notice. I believe that that power was called into question as long ago as 1905, in the case of a certain French duke—I think the Duke of Chateau-Thierry, whose case brought into doubt the Government's powers to send a man out of the country without giving a reason and without an extradition warrant. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman is acting on those supposed powers or not, so perhaps he will tell us about them.
Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us why it is that only France was requested to receive this man? I understand that he was given refuge by the French Government on a previous occasion. The French Government, in this case, acted very differently from us and very differently indeed from the Americans, who did what the right hon. Gentleman today is proposing to do, sent him back to Spain where he was imprisoned. I suggest that we might have followed the example of the French rather than the Americans in this matter.
Be that as it may, we ask the right hon. Gentleman to ask not only the French Government, but other Governments whether they would give this man refuge. I suggest that the Mexican Government, who have given refuge to many Spaniards, might be approached and might well give him refuge. We should ask any Government before sending this man back to Spain. This man's freedom may depend on the Home Secretary's action tonight, but something much more important than his freedom is concerned and that is the reputation of this country as an asylum for all who flee from tyranny and injustice. That reputation depends on the Home Secretary tonight.

Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman has not moved the Adjournment of the House.

Mr. Dugdale: I beg to move, That this House do now adjourn.

7.11 p.m.

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: I make no apology for having, with others, sought this debate. It is one of the great traditions of the House that even where one man's liberty and perhaps life are concerned the House will put aside other business in order to deal with such an issue. I am perfectly sure that there are many hon. Members opposite who wish to learn the facts of this case and who will reach a decision on those facts, just as there are hon. Members on this side of the House who will do likewise.
I propose to begin by stating the facts as they are known to me. A week ago last Friday, the London representative of the National Confederation of Labour in Spain drew my attention to the fact that Joaquim Perez-Selles was in Brixton Prison awaiting deportation. Perhaps I may say a few words about the National Confederation of Labour. Before the period of Franco it was the largest trade union organisation in Spain. It was unique in one way in that it was a syndicalist organisation. It was not associated with the general trade union movement, but one effect of its philosophy was that it was very strongly anti-Communist.
Perhaps I may be allowed to recite an episode from my personal history. I went to Spain during the Civil War to save members of the Independent Labour Party, not from Franco but from the Communists, and I cannot forget the fact that the grandson of our grand old leader, Robert Smillie, died in a Spanish prison under the Communists during that war. Therefore, I hope that no one will assume this evening that I am putting this case from any sympathy at all towards the Communist opposition to the Franco régime. That is not our ground of opposition. Our ground of opposition to the Franco régime is the same as our opposition to the Communist régimes. It is that it denies personal and political liberty.
Following the approach which was made to me by the London representative of the Confederation of Labour in Spain, I had a communication from its headquarters at Toulouse and the facts which I will give to the House are based on information which has been provided for me in that way. Perez-Selles is only

24 years of age. His opposition to the Franco régime began in the years before he had reached adult manhood. Way back in 1950, when he was called for military service, he first became a stowaway on a boat, because he was not prepared to undertake military service for a Fascist régime to which he was opposed.
He went as a stowaway on a Swedish boat and he reached Rouen in France and there was arrested by the French police. He was detained for fourteen days. He came before the court at Rouen. The court recognised the sincerity of his refusal to serve in the navy of a Fascist Government and it liberated him. He was by profession a sailor and he got a job on a Scandinavian line.
I have had the opportunity of discussing this story with the Home Secretary and there was only one discrepancy in this part of it. The Home Secretary's information was that Perez-Selles first went on a Norwegian boat and subsequently went on a Swedish boat. The facts as given to me were that he went on a Norwegian boat and that that Norwegian boat broke down off the north coast of Spain, that it had to go into the Spanish port of Pasages for repairs and, whilst the boat was in that port, he was picked up by the Spanish police. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for two years. He underwent that term of imprisonment in a Spanish prison.
At the end of that period he was taken into the navy. Again he deserted at the first opportunity. The boat put in at New York and he deserted there. He was handed over by the American authorities to the Spanish authorities and returned by them to Spain. He was then sentenced to two years, six months and one day's imprisonment. The one day was added so that he should not be allowed remission on the two years and six months' sentence.
When he had completed that sentence he was again handed over to the navy and he was placed in the naval disciplinary battalion. It was from that battalion that he deserted last October and stowed away in the ship "Velazquez" of the MacAndrew Line. He arrived in this country at the end of October. He was then applying for


a visa to go to France. He was picked up by the British police and he has been detained in Brixton Prison ever since.
On the Wednesday before I saw the representative of the Confederation of Labour, Perez-Selles had been taken from Brixton Prison and placed on board a ship of the MacAndrew line once more in the Port of London. He himself said that he understood the ship was to call at a French port before it reached Spain. I say at once that I accept the statement of the Home Secretary that he was not by intention given that information, but one has to remember that he is a Spaniard and does not know the English language, so there may easily have been a misunderstanding on that matter.
In any case, when he reached that boat and found that it was going to Bilbao, where he would again be handed over to the Spanish authorities, he panicked. In that panic he said, "If this boat goes out to sea, I will throw myself overboard rather than return to Spain." He came into conflict with the police, there was a scuffle, and the Home Office asserts that there was an assault. In those circumstances the captain of the ship said that he would not take responsibility for returning the boy to Spain because of his threat to throw himself overboard, and the police had to take him back to Brixton Prison.
Those are the facts so far as I have been able to learn them.

Mr. Graham Page: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to interrupt before he leaves the facts? Can he say on the two issues for which the man was imprisoned—the two years' sentence after the Rouen incident and the two years six months and one day sentence after the New York incident—whether he was imprisoned because of desertion from the navy in both cases, or because of any kind of political offence?

Mr. Brockway: In one instance it was desertion from the army, and in the other it was desertion from the navy.
The case I am putting to the House is—and I shall be able to give parallels later—that desertion was not on pacifist grounds or on conscientious grounds as we know the refusal of National Service in this country. It was on the ground

that he was opposed to the Fascist régime, and in that sense it was a reflection of his political views.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to interrupt?

Mr. Brockway: No, I do not think I will.

Hon. Members: Give way.

Mr. Brockway: No.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Brockway.

Mr. Brockway: Mr. Speaker, I have given way to one intervention. I am anxious to speak in a way which will state the case to the House. My own experience—and it may be my own infirmity—is that when I am interrupted I tend to lose the case which I am trying to put to the House. I assure the hon. Gentleman that I do not desire to shirk any facts, and it is very likely that as I develop my case I shall be able to answer the point he has in mind.
Immediately I heard of this case I communicated with the Home Secretary. Because I believe it deals with the heart of the matter, I will read to the House the excuse which the right hon. Gentleman gave for not regarding this man as a political refugee. A paragraph from his letter reads as follows:
From our inquiries into this case it seems quite clear that any serious troubles PerezSelles has run into in his own country in the past have been associated not with any personal political background, but with his stowing away to various countries and with his refusal to comply with the normal Spanish obligation for national service. It would be quite inappropriate to regard a foreigner who sought permission to remain in this country in order to avoid such an obligation as thereby qualifying for the status of a refugee.
On that paragraph I want to make two comments. The first is that the Home Office has not been able to find any political background. This boy is 24 years old. Spain has a dictatorship. No expression of opposition to that régime is allowed. If any expression of opposition were made, the boy would be sentenced to prison, and perhaps worse, immediately.
I have heard it said that there was only one occasion when he expressed opposition to the Franco régime and that was when he was under the influence of drink. If this charge be true. I would


say that under the influence of drink his mind would become uninhibited and he might well express an opposition to Fascism and the Franco régime which no man in Spain today can openly express without suffering imprisonment. Knowing the right hon. Gentleman, I am surprised that he should give as one of his reasons for refusing politcal asylum to this young man the fact that under these conditions in Spain there was no evidence of a political background.
The other ground is that he has not fulfilled the normal Spanish obligation for national service. I hope I have made it clear that his refusal of national service was on the ground of his political convictions. I referred earlier to the philosophy of the C.N.T. It is the anarchist syndicalist philosophy. I hope it is not necessary to say that when I speak of an anarchist philosophy I am not dealing with the popular idea that anarchism is bomb throwing and terrorism. It is exactly the opposite. I have had the good fortune to visit some of these anarchist C.N.T. villages in the fishing towns of Spain where the whole population live in equality and where the entire catch is divided equally among them. Except in Israel, I doubt very much whether there are any communities in the world which express the spirit of cooperation and of equality in the same manner as did these villages I saw in Spain.
When a young man is unable by public speech to express his opposition to the régime, quite naturally that philosophy finds expression in refusal to serve in the armed forces of a Fascist country, and Perez-Selles—in evidence the right hon. Gentleman refers to him as a persistent stowaway—has tried continually to get away from that Fascist régime.
Apart from that, I will give the right hon. Gentleman two precedents where men who have refused normal national service in the armed forces have been permitted to come to this country as political refugees. The first also came from Spain. His name was Octavio. In 1948, Octavio was given political asylum in this country for refusing service in the armed forces of Spain. I want to be fair to the Home Secretary. I have a letter from Sir Alexander Maxwell, who said that the case must not be accepted as a precedent. If, however, there was reason to give Octavio asylum in this country in

1948, during the time of the same Fascist and Franco régime as exists today, on the case I have stated there is far more reason why this boy should have asylum now.
Let me give another instance, for which the Home Secretary himself is responsible. I refer to the case of the Russian whom my right hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich has mentioned. Does the Home Secretary have opportunities of viewing television? Did he last week listen to that Russian broadcasting to this country as a political refugee because he had deserted from the Russian Army? My right hon. Friend may complain of the violence of Selles when, in panic on the boat, he became engaged in fisticuffs with some of the police. The Russian, however, before coming here had been charged with shooting and killing a man in the national forces of Russia.
The right hon. Gentleman cannot get away from the charge that when a man deserts from the armed forces of Russia or another Communist country, he is welcome here as a political refugee, but that if for political reasons he deserts from the armed forces of Spain, he must be returned to face, at best, a long term of imprisonment, or the possibility of being shot as a deserter.
During the exchanges which followed Question Time today, I said that there was a danger of this man being deported either tomorrow or on Tuesday. My basis for that statement is that he came to this country as a stowaway on the Mac-Andrew Line. It is the custom to send stowaways back by a boat of the same line. The same boat, the "Velazquez" leaves the Port of London tomorrow and a second boat, the "Palacies," leaves the Port of London next Tuesday. After a decision of deportation has been made, it is the custom of the Home Office to send back a stowaway on the first available boat. There were, therefore, justifiable grounds for the fear that Selles would be returned either tomorrow or next Tuesday, as I suggested.
I conclude with this appeal, The right hon. Gentleman has close personal knowledge that I am not interested in this case only because it concerns a Fascist régime, but that I have acted in a similar manner concerning people from the Communist countries. This country believes in liberty and democracy and has a concern for the


rights of a person who, because of liberal and democratic views, is driven away from his own territory or who seeks escape from his own country. That is a great tradition, of which we ought to be proud. I beg the right hon. Gentleman, despite the decision which he has announced today, to reconsider his attitude. In many ways we have thought him a progressive Home Secretary. If he pursues this course, that reputation will be denied and lost.

Mr. E. Partridge: During his recital of the facts, the hon. Member told us that the man was on a ship which broke down and had to put into a Spanish port. Under what circumstances did the police pick him up? Did they come on to the boat to fetch him off or did he land?

Mr. Brockway: I am not familiar with all those details. As, however, the hon. Member probably knows, it is the custom of the police on those occasions, particularly in either Communist or Fascist countries, to go on board and demand to see the list of those aboard.

7.37 p.m.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I certainly agree with the concluding remarks of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway). It has always been the tradition of the Home Secretary, irrespective of party, to interpret his duties in the light of preserving liberty in this country and of affording asylum to foreigners. I do not think that anything either in the period of Administration of this Government or in my own personal administration, or that of those who assist me, has done violence to that principle, nor do I intend that it shall. Nor would any of my predecessors support me if I took any different line, nor, I think, do they believe that I have done anything of the sort.
In answering the sincere arguments of the hon. Member, I should like to acknowledge that in several cases which have come to my attention he has defended those who are in need of defence and he has looked to the oppressed and has exercised his right as Member of Parliament to raise their cases in Parliament. I have already answered the initial points made by the right hon.

Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) and I shall be dealing almost immediately with his main point of whether we adopt the same standards in dealing with countries behind the Iron Curtain as we do in dealing with Spain.
I was asked by the right hon. Gentleman what powers we had used in the present case. I am answering the right, hon. Gentleman before I come to the main burden of my speech. There is no question of extradition. The man is a stowaway. He was refused leave to land and he is being deported to the country to which he belongs. Therefore, he was not a regular visitor to this country or anything like that. He was actually refused leave to land. The power we exercise is under the Aliens Order. Deportation is effected under powers conferred by paragraph 2 (b) of Article 20 of the Aliens Order, 1953, and it is under that Instrument that I have decided that it was necessary for me to act in this case.
Before I consider the case in detail—I speak now so that the House may have the facts before it—I want to refer in general to the question of asylum. The right of asylum is the right of a sovereign State to grant it; there is no right to claim it. Each State interprets its rights in its own way. After seeing the hon. Member for Eton and Slough and the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), who came to see me, I studied again the precedents on the subject of political asylum, which are available in my Department, and which are at the service of any Government.
These accord, in fact, with the Geneva Convention, 1951, and, in order to put this serious point at the beginning, I will define the principle in the terms used by my predecessor, the present Lord Chancellor, in this House on 1st July, 1954. I think we must examine the principle, and then I will examine the case against the principle to see how my judgment was arrived at. He said this:
I would point out, with regard to political asylum, that what I stated to be the principle has not only been the principle acted upon in this country throughout the past years, but it is enshrined in the latest Convention that deals with the subject,…
that is, the Convention of 1951—
namely, that political asylum is given where the national of a country is in danger in regard' to his life and liberty from political persecution, among other forms of persecution, in that


country. That is the principle that has been applied and is applied and what I pointed out was that f have no grounds for believing that it was not applied in this case."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st July, 1954; Vol. 529, c. 1508.]
That is the principle on which we work, and that is the principle which I attempted to apply in this case.
I go on from there to pick up the other main general point, which was also a point of principle, raised by the right hon. Gentleman who introduced this debate, and that was the question whether there was any slant against any particular country. I should like to say here to the House that it would be a tragedy if the impression were to gain currency that the granting or refusal of political asylum is governed by any political or ideological prepossession. It is not true that there is any bias at all in favour of nationals of Iron Curtain countries, except in so far as the systems and actions of those countries may create the facts which would justify the grant of political asylum.
During 1957 about 12,000 Poles came to this country, and large numbers of them, having the desire to stay here permanently, claimed political asylum. The vast majority of those claims, being unsupported by facts, have been resolutely rejected, and I have not hesitated, if necessary, to enforce the return of these nationals of Iron Curtain countries by the ultimate sanction of deportation. Again, I have had many claims from Yugoslavs, who came here either as visitors or students, but who were unwilling to return to their own country. These claims have been rigorously sifted, and are not accepted, except on the most compelling evidence.
As for Hungarian refugees, I presume that everyone would regard, prima facie, the case of Hungarian refugees to be given asylum as being very well worth the closest possible consideration. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, we have sifted the evidence. We have been obliged to return many nationals to their own countries, and I must say to the House quite firmly that the only way to interpret this principle of asylum is to examine each case impartially, as we have done those from the Iron Curtain countries, and those from Spain, and as I have done in the case of Perez-Selles, particulars of whom I will now give to the House.

Mr. Dugdale: Will the right hon. Gentleman refer to the case, which I did, in fact, mention, and which does seem somewhat similar—the case of Sergeant Ponomarenko?

Mr. Butler: I was aware of the case of Sergeant Ponomarenko, but in that case we decided that there should be political asylum and he could be accepted. I cannot go into the details, though the right hon. Gentleman referred to it, because it is not on all-fours with this case, for reasons which I propose to give.
This man Perez-Selles first came to notice in 1950, when he arrived as a stowaway on an Egyptian ship from Valencia, and was refused leave to land. He repeated this the following year on a Honduran ship, and was again refused leave to land. In 1952, he came back as a stowaway, with a record of desertion from national service, and was again refused leave to land, but he had to be retained in prison for a while because of his violence, until he could be returned upon the same ship.
On 28th December last, he gave himself up to the police in Rochester, Kent, claiming to have come here on a Norwegian ship. This statement was untrue. He then said that he had stowed away on a Dutch vessel and landed at Hull. In fact, he had stowed away on a ship leaving Valencia for London, and his papers were falsified in the name of Perez Arlandis. It was only after several interrogations that he was identified as Perez-Selles. He was refused leave to land on 31st December.
Arrangements were made for his return to Spain from Glasgow on 5th February last. He was taken to Glasgow on 1st February, but the ship required some repairs, which were likely to take some time, and so Perez-Selles was brought back to London, and the shipping company in whose ship he had stowed away undertook to return him by the first available ship. Arrangements were made to send him away on 10th February. He was taken to the boat, and he then went berserk, and, as the hon. Member for Eton and Slough will be aware, a policeman suffered considerable injuries as a result of his actions and had to go into hospital. The captain refused to take him because he said he had no suitable accommodation in which to keep so


violent a prisoner under control, and he was therefore brought back.
Arrangements were then made to send him on 25th February, and on this occasion the departure was postponed in view of representations made by the hon. Member for Eton and Slough. I then saw the hon. Member for Eton and Slough and the right hon. Member for Smethwick and I told them the gist of what I have just told the House, which I think they will realise is the same as I told them before. I said I could not regard this case as covered by those normally included in the category of political refugees, or as one in which asylum should be granted. They asked me to see whether Perez-Selles could go to France; the right hon. Member for West Bromwich and the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), who spoke after Questions today, asked, "Why not to France?" I was asked particularly to investigate whether France was a possibility, and I looked up this man's record in France.
He claimed to be a resident in France and said he had been living in Avignon, but according to his further statements, this is also untrue. His only residence in France was for nine months in 1953 after he had deserted a ship in dock at Rouen. He served three months in a French prison and remained in France to work. He then of his own accord resumed sea employment, and after serving in a Norwegian ship, from which he was paid off in Dunkirk, he served on a Swedish ship which, in due course, took him back to Spain.
These are the facts of the case. Despite his small association with France, I caused the French Consul in London to be approached, at the request of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The Consul's view was that, on all the information before him, which I have no reason to believe is inaccurate, he would not feel able to grant or recommend a visa for this man. I do not myself think that it would have been possible for our officers to find him any alternative country which he could enter. I did what I was asked to do, namely, to find out whether he would be accepted in France, and that I believe to be impossible.

Mr. Brockway: Did not my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) himself make the suggestion that, when we make deportation orders to Spain, those deportation orders should be fulfilled through France? We made no other suggestion. Is not it a fact that, in the case of deportation orders to distant places, the Home Office frequently provides them in that kind of way, and that on many of these occasions the refugees do not have to face the persecution which they would otherwise have to face?

Mr. Butler: I am afraid that it has not been possible to get him a visa for France, and therefore I must say that it is not possible to carry out in this case the course suggested by the hon. Member.

Mr. Dugdale: I do not want to do anything in the way of scoring a point; I simply want to ask a question for the future. It is quite correct that the right hon. Gentleman asked France first, for the reasons he has given, but, having regard to the publicity which has been raised by this debate, can he now say that any country which applies to have this man, or says that it is willing to have him, will be allowed to have him, and that he will be sent there?

Mr. Butler: I do not anticipate that it will be easy for him to obtain a visa for any country. I have no alternative but to take the action that I have taken.
Before coming to my decision about a deportation order—and I think this will interest the House—against the background of the definition of political asylum which I have given, I went thoroughly through all the arguments in favour of giving Perez-Selles permission to stay here and granting him political asylum. I examined his past history very carefully. I have here his statements, made on more than one occasion, upon which we have to place some reliance; at any rate they provide the best evidence that I can get.
According to his last statement to the immigration officer, Perez-Selles had no history of political trouble in Spain—that is his own admission—apart from three months' imprisonment in 1950 for criticising the Franco Government when, as the hon. Member for Eton and Slough said, he was drunk. He was interrogated


on 7th January and he denied that he had ever been involved in politics. He said that he did not wish to return to Spain because, as a naval deserter, he might expect to be given a long prison sentence.
It is true that on more than one occasion this man has deserted from the navy, and according to the report of the interview which I have mentioned he says that he fears further terms of imprisonment if he goes back. He fears this because on the last occasion that he deserted it was from a disciplinary battalion, and this was coupled with the falsification of his own documents. He had already served three years for desertion, being released in 1957 for a period of service with that particular disciplinary battalion.
In interpreting this man's case I had to look at his application for political asylum. I do not find in his history anything remarkable except the fact that he has refused to carry out military service in his own country. Therefore. I do not accept that there are any grounds for allowing him to remain here as a political refugee. I look back to the case of a Dr. Cort, which was debated in 1954 in this House, and there I find an exact analogy. The Under-Secretary of that day, in defending the Government's decision, said:
I quite agree that Dr. Cort may be liable to imprisonment for refusing to comply with the call-up notice. That may very well be true, but it is certainly not a ground for claiming political asylum."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 967.]
That is what we claim in this case.

Mr. Leslie Hale: He came from the United States.

Mr. Butler: In this case the man is a persistent stowaway and a deserter from Franco's forces. I do not believe, in the light of his history, that that is a reason for granting him political asylum.

Mr. Frank Beswick: Does the right hon. Gentleman intend to deal with the point which my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) raised when he quoted the letter from the Home Secretary, namely, that in that letter the Home Secretary said that the man was deserting from his normal military service? Is the Home Secretary asserting that there is no

difference at all between being required to serve in the forces of Spain and being required to serve in the forces of a democratic country like ours?

Mr. Butler: There is certainly a difference. Just as there is a difference between the constitutions of the two countries there is a difference in their forms of service. What is quite clear is that it would not be possible to administer our policy regarding political asylum if we were to take men who deliberately deserted from service in their own countries and who, as far as we can see, are not political victims in their countries. It would be quite wrong to administer our law in the sense of granting political asylum in cases of that sort.
Those are the reasons why I did not find it possible, after examining the case, to grant political asylum to this man. I do not think that we can possibly maintain our reputation for granting political asylum if we grant it in cases of this sort. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the deportation order must be made. In answer to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough I would say that I have ascertained that the first ship in which the man can sail in fact leaves on Monday next.
The final question arises as to the position of Parliament, with which I am naturally very much concerned as Leader of the House. I saw the hon. Member for Eton and Slough and the right hon. Member for Smethwick and told them my mind. I undertook to investigate the possibility of Perez-Selles going to France. I then prepared letters to send to the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend and those letters would have been sent had it not been for the interchanges earlier today. They would have received the letters this afternoon.
I also had ready an Answer to a Question by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher). I did not know at the time of the business statement that he had deferred that Question. I also answered a Question from the hon. Member for Eton and Slough, which was left on the Order Paper and not withdrawn, on the subject of political asylum. I therefore felt that I had done my utmost to inform Parliament of my decision.
I have examined all the precedents, and I certainly do not want to go into them tonight. That is a matter for the Chair to decide for itself, and to give us any further rulings it cares to in the future. It is for us to accept the rulings by the Chair. But on examining the precedents I found that it had previously been acknowledged that there is a right of the Executive to take administrative action of this sort. It is not exactly like the prerogative which arises in foreign matters, but it is definitely a duty of the Executive to continue with the administration, and normally in the past these questions have not been regarded as questions which can be raised under Standing Order Number 9. But that does not matter; it is a question for the Chair.
What I must make clear is that I attempted to give answers to my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite as best I could and to administer the law of the country as it falls to me to do. We have had this opportunity to express my reasons for the decision I took. I took the decision because I did not think this man was a proper candidate for political asylum. I do not think that we can administer the policy if we include cases of this sort. I give an undertaking that I shall handle all future cases with the utmost discretion, but I must ask the House to support the decision that I have taken. I would ask hon. Members in future, in cases of this kind to give me as much notice as possible so that we may have a more rational debate, and perhaps not such a hurried one. Certainly, however, I shall endeavour to comply with their wishes and state my reasons to the best of my ability. Government has to be conducted, and administration has to go on. The House of Commons expects this. It has a right to censure the Government of the day on any action, but I maintain that the action that I took was right, and I stand by it.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. Gordon Walker: It is, of course, a little difficult to have a rational and leisurely debate when dealing with something which is to happen next Monday. Because of that, we have had to take quick and speedy action.
These problems of political asylum raise very difficult questions of judgment. They raise principles that go beyond

party, principles of political liberty and of our liberal tradition. Of course, every case must be treated on its merits; that is necessary in the whole nature of things. There seems to us to be one guiding principle which the Home Secretary has not clearly grasped. He defined his idea of what these principles should be in the application of the grant of political asylum. But surely there is one clear principle, that the grant of asylum must not be regarded in absolute undifferentiated terms.
One must make the distinction between democracy and dictatorship, one cannot avoid that. There will be cases, of course, where it is proper to grant asylum to a man coming from a democracy; but when one is judging this matter somewhat different standards must be applied to people coming from dictatorships. In an otherwise identical case it might be right to send a man back to the United States, or to France, and wrong to send him to Russia, Hungary, or to Nazi Germany in the past, or to Spain today.
The right hon. Gentleman said that there was an exact analogy between the case of Dr. Cort and this case of Joaquim Perez-Selles, but there really is not. Dr. Cort came from a democracy and Perez-Selles comes from a dictatorship. There is not an exact analogy. It seems to me that the nature of the regime from which a man comes is inherent in the very concept of political asylum. This is what guided us after 1933 in admitting all sorts of people from Nazi Germany. It guided us after the last war in admitting all sorts of people from Communist countries, people who certainly would not have been admitted had they come from democracies. We cannot avoid making a distinction between the different sorts of regime and countries from which people come.
The Home Secretary made a good deal of this man's behaviour, his record, his personal political background. I submit that these are the very things which we cannot separate from a consideration of the difference between dictatorship and democracy. As was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) how do you, at the age of this man, express political opposition in a dictatorship? I thought that the right hon. Gentleman was rather easily satisfied with the evidence that allowed


him to come to the conclusion he has about this man's record. After all, the evidence given by a young political refugee to an immigration officer is not likely to be exhaustive. It is not necessarily likely to be true; people of this kind are frightened of immigration officers. Of course they sometimes tell lies and suppress the truth; it is inevitable.
When the right hon. Gentleman says that Perez-Selles spent three months in prison for an act he committed when he was drunk, surely that is not a fair point. Not even in Franco Spain does one go to prison for three months for being drunk. There must have been a political content to this offence for him to have been sent to prison for three months. Is it really such a terrible thing to falsify documents if you live under a dictatorship? Is it not a sign of being a desirable and worthy sort of character? After all to refuse to do national service, which, in a democracy, may be a crime, is, in a dictatorship, a political action in itself: not because of what inheres in the act, but what inheres in the regime. To refuse to do national service in a dictatorship is in itself a political act.
When the Home Secretary says that the man was violent and went berserk, surely that shows the horror which possessed him at the very thought of going back to his own country.
It seems to me that the Home Secretary himself admitted that there is a political element in this case when he approached the French consul about the possibility of this man going to or via France. This suggestion was made by me and by my hon. Friend to the Home Secretary in the course of an interview with the right hon. Gentleman. I am grateful that he took it up, but after all, he did not have to take it up. The right hon. Gentleman could have come to a decision that it was a case where it was absolutely proper not to take into account any political considerations whatever. But the Home Secretary took the rather unusual step of approaching France, at our suggestion, for which we are grateful.
The only reason for this could be that the right hon. Gentleman thought there were some political factors in this case. This shows that the Home Secretary himself admits the basis of our case, namely, that this is not just the ordinary case of

a stowaway with no political content to it. There is a political factor and element in this case of the kind we submit, that, at any rate, might be taken into account in deciding whether to grant political asylum. I beg the Home Secretary to try other countries, to try Mexico. He said there was an exact analogy between the case of Dr. Cort and this case. Dr. Cort went to Czechoslovakia, he did not go back to the United States. Another country was found—

Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: Dr. Cort took himself to Czechoslovakia; he did not go on the initiative of the Home Secretary.

Mr. Gordon Walker: If Mexico or some other country gives this man asylum and allows him in, I have no doubt that he will get himself there, or his friends will get him there. The essential thing is that Dr. Cort was not sent back to the United States, to his own country, but was allowed to go to another country.
I ask the Home Secretary not to rest on having tried France, but to try other countries. If he has tried France, he cannot refuse to try other countries. The very principle which led him to try France, must, I suggest, lead him to try other countries to see whether there are other countries where there is a reasonable chance that this man will be accepted. Our basic reason for raising this matter is that the Home Secretary has not properly drawn the distinction between a dictatorship and a democracy according to the traditions established by our practice; that his whole premise and whole approach is wrong. In this matter, the right hon. Gentleman is treating a Fascist country as if it had democratic procedures. That is the burden of our case in this matter.
The Home Secretary said that there was no difference in his treatment of this case—there would have been no difference—had this man come from Russia or Hungary or a Communist country. The only way to test that is by precedent. These standards are, in fact, established by precedent. Every Home Secretary works on standards which have grown from the precedents set by himself and by his predecessors. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough mentioned the closely parallel case of Octavio, which the Home Secretary did not deal with. Another rather closely related


case was mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale), that of the Soviet sergeant, which was reported briefly in The Times of 16th January this year. I will read the essential part:
Britain today told the Russian military authorities in east Berlin that a Soviet Army sergeant who recently crossed into West Berlin had been granted asylum in Britain … Colonel Kotsiuba, Soviety Deputy Commander in east Berlin, said today that sergeant"—
and then his name is given—
deserted on 29th December after he had shot and wounded a comrade during a drinking bout.
It would have been easy to have said, as is being said in this case, that this was only a matter of deserting, that it was only an act of refusing to fulfil and accept the normal obligations of Soviet military law. It could even have been said that the man was involved in a drunken brawl. All these things are said in the case of Perez-Selles. They might have been said in the case of the Russian sergeant. It was right to decide in the case of the Russian sergeant not to take these matters into account, but to give him political asylum; and for the same reasons I think it would be right and proper, and according to this very precedent, to give the same treatment to Perez-Selles.
Then there is the great and proud case of Anthoni Klimowicz, who was taken ashore from a Polish ship in the Thames Estuary in a very dramatic manner by 200 Thames river police and, one or two days later, was given permission to stay in Britain. There are differences; there always are differences between these cases. A writ of habeas corpus had been issued in this case. But the essential thing was that the Home Secretary took bold administrative action to rescue this man and did not worry to make detailed inquiries about behaviour, political background and all the rest of it. The right hon. Gentleman's predecessor rightly thought that this was a case where he must act boldly.
The essential point in the case of Klimowicz was made by Dr. van Dal, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, on 24th August last year, which was quoted in The Times. He said:

The case of Klimowicz has already become a classical instance of an unimportant man who wanted freedom and who was helped by the noble tradition of British justice.
The day when Klimowicz was taken off that ship was one that Britain can be proud of, and Britain was proud of it, regardless of party. We are glad that on that day a new precedent of very great importance was created.
I beg the Home Secretary to make the case of Perez-Selles, who is another unimportant man, one of which we can also be proud, as being in accordance with our traditions. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to show that our traditions of political asylum are as strong, as inflexible and as bold in regard to a Fascist State as they are to a Communist State.

8.12 p.m.

Mr. John Foster: My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, when he was defining political asylum, pointed out that it would be difficult, in this case, to grant the right of political asylum. I agree with him, but I would like to bring to his notice a precedent for a middle course. The definition of political asylum by Governments of this country has been too narrow. Even if it were made larger I do not think that it would apply to this case. We can all be disturbed by the action of the Home Office when it sent people back to Hungary, for instance. The mere fact that a person from a Communist country has claimed political asylum makes him a political refugee.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: Would not the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that precisely the same is true of a person who claims political asylum from a Fascist country?

Mr. Foster: The precedent is that when somebody is not guilty of an extraditable offence he is in a different category in the matter of being sent back to his own country. If he commits a crime, which is regarded by the extradition treaty between this country and the country from which he came, there is procedure for extraditing him back to that country.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Would that not apply in the case of the Russian sergeant who shot someone in a drunken brawl?

Mr. Foster: No. That is extraditable, but in the provision for extraditable offences there is a tradition that if he seeks political asylum and comes within the definition he is not extraditable. In those cases where it can be apprehended that the offence which the person has committed in his own country is likely to be treated as a political offence when he gets back, though it does not come within the definition of political asylum, it has been the humane practice of the Home Office to let him go to another country. We can be proud that we have applied this principle not only to democrats who have taken refuge from Communist countries and to Liberals who have taken refuge from Fascist countries, but to Nazis who have taken refuge from a Liberal country. We should treat everybody the same way on this principle.
The Home Office has had particulars of cases in which I have been concerned and has always been very helpful in granting a slight delay so that a country can be found by the friends of the person concerned to which the person can go. I was engaged in one of these cases which may or may not have been desirable in themselves, but I thought it right that this should be our action, through the Home Office. While this case does not come within the definition of political asylum, as the Home Office and Governments interpret it, under my extended defintion it would be right, in these cases, to grant a slight delay in order to find a country that will take the person concerned

8.18 p.m.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: Something that the Home Secretary said towards the end of his remarks ought not, I think, to pass unnoticed. He seemed to suggest that it would be a matter hereafter for the Chair to decide in any particular case whether or not it was competent for this House to consider and perhaps censure the action of the Home Secretary in dealing with individual matters of this kind.
I believe the whole House will feel it very fortunate that we have this opportunity of discussing this matter this evening. No one disputes the principle laid down by the Home Secretary or the quotation which he gave from the present Lord Chancellor. I would be the first to recognise that there must be borderline

cases in which any Home Secretary will have difficulty in deciding whether the decision should fall on one side or on the other. Our criticism of the Home Secretary this evening is that he has made an error of judgment in this particular case. I hope that it is not too late for the right hon. Gentleman to be influenced by the debate which is taking place.
There is always difficulty in persuading the Minister to change his mind, but the present Home Secretary is always responsive to arguments and to humane considerations that are put before him. However strongly he may have felt the rightness and correctness of the decision which he came to a few days ago, I urge him to bear in mind that the case has now assumed greater importance by the very fact that we have had this debate, and that considerable publicity will now be given to this case, not only here but in Spain and elsewhere. This must considerably increase the hazards which this man will face if he is sent back to Spain
I urge these further considerations upon the Home Secretary. Whatever else may. be said, it is clear that Perez-Selles, since the age of 16 or 17 has made every possible effort to escape from the clutches of the Franco régime. He left Spain as long ago as 1950, eight years ago, and even now he is only 24. Therefore, it is hardly open to the Home Secretary to say that the man has not given any evidence of political anti-Franco activity. How could he when he left Spain at the age of 16? On the two occasions when he has been back there, he spent on the first occasion two years in prison, and then subsequently another two years and six months in prison. The greatest evidence that this man is a refugee on political grounds is the consistency of the efforts he has made since the age of 16 to leave what he regards as the terror régime to which he is politically opposed.
Yet if further evidence is required it is available. After all, all we are concerned to do tonight is to urge upon the Home Secretary those considerations which should turn the scales in favour of a humane decision rather than a harsh and inhuman one.
Will the Home Secretary bear in mind what happened when this man escaped to France? France is a liberal-minded country. When Perez-Selles escaped to


France in 1952 it was his second attempt to escape from Spain and he was then only 18. We do not want to be behind the French in our attitude of asylum to political refugees. According to my information, he came before a French court on the technical charge of being in France without permission to land. For that technical offence he was given a short sentence of imprisonment and, mark this, not deported from France, but given permission to remain in France as a political refugee. As long ago as 1952 the French authorities were prepared to recognise his claim to asylum. That surely must be a fact which ought to weigh with the Home Secretary.
The occupation of this man is that of a sailor. He returned to that occupation and found accommodation on a Scandinavian boat. I do not think it matters whether it was a Norwegian or a Swedish boat. He was going to ply his trade as a sailor. It was a pure mischance that the boat in which he happened to be working as a member of the crew, contrary to anything he might have foreseen, but as a result of some mischance of navigation or engine trouble, had to put in to a Spanish port for repairs. It was pure bad luck that Perez-Selles again fell into the clutches of the Spanish authorities, was tried by those authorities, and subjected to a term of imprisonment.
If it had not been for that mischance this young man would have enjoyed his right to reside as long as he wanted in France. He would have had the right to practice the profession of a sailor and, when he was not on the high seas, to go back to France as often as he wished, and stay there, as long as he liked because, in the eyes of the French authorities, he had acquired the status of a political refugee from Spain. Surely those are reasons which ought to weigh with the Home Secretary.
There is another thing which ought to be said. I want to paraphrase what the Home Secretary said in seeking to justify his decision. I do not think he gave this young man a very high character. I think that is completely irrelevant. If a person is entitled to political asylum, character is completely irrelevant, whether he be of good character, bad character or doubtful character. I hope the Home Secre-

tary will agree that as a matter of principle, whatever his failings may have been, if it can be established that a man is a refugee from a Power whom he has good reason to believe would persecute him for political opinions, perhaps to the extent of his losing his life and certainly to the extent of his being sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, his character is irrelevant.
It is irrelevant whether he was engaged in a drunken brawl, whether he got into trouble with the French authorities or the American authorities, or whether he has not told the complete truth to immigration officers in this country. I believe all those questions which go to character are irrelevant once it is fully established that this young man from the age of 16 onwards has evinced on political grounds a determined opposition to the Franco régime and because of that he is in terror of what may happen to him if he returns to that country.
Those seem to be the fundamental facts. The Home Secretary would be acting contrary to the principles of which this country is rightly proud if he adhered to his decision. I believe this House would be acting contrary to the liberal principles we have established and cherished if we did not make the most of this opportunity or urging on the Home Secretary the desirability—nay more, the necessity—of his changing his mind.
There is very good justification for doing so, first, because the case has now assumed a different aspect of greater importance and therefore greater seriousness to this man and, secondly, because, as the hon. and learned Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster) pointed out, it is not the case that the Home Secretary must decide either to allow Perez-Selles to remain in this country or send him back to Spain. There are other courses open to him, which he can pursue consistent with his own dignity and with the requirements of justice and humanity.
I am quite convinced that if time were allowed for communications to take place, with Mexico and perhaps with other countries ways would be found whereby this man would be given the asylum and freedom which he certainly would not get in Spain and which the Home Secretary is unwilling to give him in this country. I therefore urge the Home Secretary not to treat the matter as concluded by what


he has said tonight, but to take into account the views expressed on both sides of the House.

8.26 p.m.

Mr. W. F. Deedes: It is obvious that the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) knows more about the close details of this case than any of us has yet had a chance to collect. But from my experience I know more than some hon. Members about the close, assiduous and, if I may say so, very fair manner in which the hon. Member pursues cases of this kind. I should like to begin by putting that on record.
No one with any experience of the Home Office or its workings in this field can fail to know that these cases lie among the most difficult and most explosive that may fall to the Home Secretary. That applies, as I think will be acknowledged by hon. Members who have had any experience of it, not to this side of the House only, but to both sides, since both sides have from time to time to provide the Home Secretary.
This is a field in which persons such as the individual about whom we are speaking, person of perhaps humble and unknown origins, may suddenly raise great principles. There is no harder task for the Home Secretary than to reconcile the law which Parliament has imposed on him—that is a point on which one should lay some stress—with the invaluable sense of this House for the liberty of the individual, a liberty which may sometimes mean the life of the individual. I am glad to acknowledge at once that it is a field in which the Opposition will always play a most valuable part. That lies deep in the purpose of this House. A great many cases, however, as the hon. Member for Eton and Slough knows, never reach the House at all. They are cases in which the Home Secretary's ear, as in this case, is continually available to representations from hon. Members.
In the light of what the hon. Member for Eton and Slough said, I think it is fair to comment that it is the place more than the case which arouses emotion in this instance. There are many cases in which deportation has most delicately to be balanced, and I am thinking of those which genuinely involve political asylum. A good deal has already been said in the debate about the part which political asylum plays. I should like to

be a little clearer about the definition which has been given, because in my mind I associate political asylum with the political character of the individual himself perhaps more than that of the country from which he has come. That, I believe, is a fair definition.

Mr. John Hynd: Could the hon. Member quote me a single case in which a Polish or Russian seaman who has jumped overboard from his ship and has sought political asylum in this country has had the genuinness of his political convictions tested? Is it not correct that in every one of those cases such an individual has been given political asylum?

Mr. Deedes: I was stressing that the known political character of the individual is involved. The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) said that a good or bad character should not be taken into account. I entirely agree with him, and certainly from my own experience I would say that whether a man is a good man or a bad man does not enter into decisions of this kind; but the political character which he is known to possess in the country of origin and the consequence of his returning to that country of origin are the real elements involved. It is the political character of the man as well as the political character of the country which the Home Secretary is entitled to weigh in cases of this kind.
The Opposition are perhaps hardly doing themselves justice, because I question whether a Socialist Home Secretary who had to weigh cases of this kind would give his decision solely in the light of the political ideology of the country without taking into account the political character of the individual and the consequences of his returning to that political régime.

Mr. Gordon Walker: I agree that it would not be solely on that consideration, but the Home Secretary said that one must do it regardless of such consideration. We cannot leave that factor out. Certainly it is not the sole condition which would determine one's judgment, but one could not leave it out.

Mr. Deedes: The political régime of the country would be weighed by a Home Secretary from either side of the House.


The political character of the individual would also have to be weighed. That is what I want to stress. If we accept the facts which have been given from both sides of the House, which I think are not in dispute, this man's crime is not a political crime against the régime of Spain but the fact that he has been a deserter once, twice or three times and in addition has been a stowaway once, twice or three times.

Mr. Beswick: Can the hon. Member give any explanation of the series of desertions other than a deep-felt political conviction?

Mr. Deedes: All countries have their conscientious objectors to national service, and the reasons which lie behind their conscientious objection are too deep for me to enter into now. I place this case in the class of conscientious objection.

Mr. Beswick: Why?

Mr. Deedes: I think that has been made clear by the testimony of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough.
Personally, I make all allowance for the deep feelings which the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) referred to in relation to Spain. I also remember the mood and affairs in the House 20 years ago when that frightful Spanish Civil War and the question of non-intervention were debated here day after day. My right hon. Friend was then answerable to the Government as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I do not underrate the emotions which are aroused. What I doubt is whether they should be allowed to weigh unduly in dealing with this case.
I suggest that the Home Secretary has not only national obligations and responsibilities to Parliament which has imposed certain duties upon him but certain international responsibilities, too, which he cannot shirk. If he were to shirk them it would be not only a failure of duty but a disservice to Governments of either side of the House who have these obligations to fulfil.
I have said that I think that it is the case less than the place which arouses deep emotions here. That is not a very good basis on which a Home Secretary should reach a decision of this kind. There are aspects of aliens policy which

deeply divide us and whole sections of it which hon. Members opposite would like to change because they consider that we should be more liberal. That is disputable. There are also fields in which I think it is doing no service to either side to suggest that fundamental issues lie where, in fact, they do not; where the issue is simply whether or not the Home Secretary is to carry out the law which Parliament has approved, thereby laying a duty upon him, and to fulfil national and international responsibilities which, I think, neither side can afford lightly to cast aside.

8.35 p.m.

Mr. Leslie Hale: I had not intended to intervene in this debate until I heard the speech of the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes). I am sure that he was speaking perfectly seriously, and was trying to put forward propositions in which he believed. Unfortunately, he did not put forward propositions in which I believed. The right of political asylum is not a matter of Parliamentary approval or of law. It is a prerogative acquired by history, by experience and by practice.
The right of political asylum was one of the lights that shone from this country on a fairly dark world in the nineteenth century. We did not stick up Statues of Liberty with inscriptions on them, but it was our claim that, whatever the nature of the political persecution, whatever the nature of the political opinion that was being suppressed, here at least was a place where refugees from political asylum could find a home.
We did not examine them with a microscope. We did not ask "Is this particular opinion valid? Does this come within a limited category of opinions or not?" As a matter of fact, Kossuth, who stimulated the imagination of Europe in his battle for Hungarian freedom, is now castigated by modern historians as a pathological liar himself. He probably was, but Kossuth became a figure of passion, a figure of emotion, and a figure which now goes down as part of our own history in the nineteenth century.
Under Gladstone and others we carried the right to a very great extreme. The Russian revolution was being forged in this country by refugees, the Amazons of the 1906 revolution. The Tschaikovskyites


came here and lived openly in London under their ordinary names, communicating with the Russian refugees in Switzerland and actually fomenting revolution.
If I could translate the Home Secretary's reasoning in terms of a somewhat earlier period and apply it to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the Home Secretary would say "Look at Louis Napoleon. He not only fomented a revolution, but twice broke undertakings and landed in France. He was put in courteous confinement and got away by subterfuge. Someone was put into his bed to deceive the kindly governor. He forced his way out of prison and the country and came to England."
Why did we keep Louis Napoleon here? We did so because we were a monarchist country and France was not, and he finally went back to become Emperor of France and found the most decadent monarchy in Europe—

Mr. Peter Kirk: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but that is not the fact. France was a monarchist country at the time that Louis Napoleon escaped from Hamm. Louis Philippe was on the throne.

Mr. Hale: In 1848?

Mr. Kirk: In 1844.

Mr. Hale: That is true, and I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. The essence of it was that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was a supporter of the empire, and a member of the Imperial family. But I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for that correction.
Now we live in a different time, and, with great respect to the Home Secretary, we should look back. Hon. Members opposite ought to look back with shame to one thing that happened before the war, and we, on this side, should look back with shame on one thing that happened after the war. All of us have a guilt complex about the treatment of Jewish refugees, who came here in the years from 1929 to 1939 as stowaways, jumping on boats, trying to find a home. They could not establish a political character and they had no papers. They could only say, "If we go back, we go back to persecution, to hatred, to extermination, to the gas chamber." It was then that we should have lit again the light of liberty. We, on this side, have

done all too little for those who fought for the Socialist cause in Spain. In our comfort, we have sat aside and watched those comrades marching in chains across North Africa.
I believe this is a relevant fact. North Africa is not a happy place to live in today. Most observers say that Spanish Morocco is that little bit better than French Morocco. Spanish Morocco has a fairly good colonial record—by comparison only. I am not extolling what happens there. Most people who have been to both places would agree with this. Day after day Spanish refugees pour into French Morocco, partly for geographical reasons, partly because as refugees from Spain the same persecution would follow them in a Spanish colony, and so they are prepared to go to French Morocco to escape from the régime. There cannot be clearer evidence of politics than that. There cannot be any clearer evidence of the possibility of persecution than that.
The right hon. Gentleman said that this case is not strong. None of us knows much about the facts. That is one of the tragedies of a debate of this kind. I would say one thing to the right hon. Gentleman with great sincerity. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about a letter on the board for my hon. Friend. I know that the right hon. Gentleman always receives us with great courtesy and great consideration. I do not think I have ever been to the Home Office without at least feeling that I have been met with every possible consideration and fairness. But what is the good of a letter on the board to an M.P. at 4 o'clock on the Thursday afternoon when the chap is to be deported on Monday? Let us face that single fact to start with. What could my hon. Friend have done if he had not asked for the Adjournment tonight? What possible step could he have taken?

Mr. R. A. Butler: When the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), accompanied by the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), came to see me, I then informed them that my mind was as it has now proved to be, with the exception that I undertook at their request to make some inquiries from the French. My failure with France, of which I was planning to inform them, was the only alteration in the situation. When they saw me, therefore, they were aware of what was in my mind.

Mr. Hale: I am obliged. I gather that the right hon. Gentleman was saying that they had been too precipitate, or something like that. Ministers generally realise that the position of a back bencher is fairly helpless. We have not organisations behind us. We have not research secretaries behind us. I have been in the position for the last few weeks of not knowing when an execution was to take place, of being anxious to do what I could to stop it and being afraid that if I did not act quickly I should be too late. This is the dilemma that confronts us in matters of individual liberty or in the infliction of punishment.
I say to the right hon. Gentleman with complete sincerity that I do not care whether this is a strong case or not. We have had many refugees from Hungary, and when the right hon. Gentleman said that he had examined them carefully afterwards I was almost a little critical about that. Of course, I know that one must do that and one must have the facts, otherwise Hungarians, possibly with Communist spies, would infiltrate and so on. Yet, as he said it, one hoped that that examination was not for the purpose of sending people back to persecution. That is the test.
The law of extradition was fought for a very long time. It was fought because of the diversity of criminal systems throughout the world. It was fought because the normal exercise of justice, according to the laws of another country, would appear to be very harsh and unconscionable according to our laws. Therefore, it was our opinion that we were being called upon to send people to what appeared to us to be a very heavy punishment for a small offence.
In a sense, asylum is the answer to both these things. It is a question of whether a man is going back to persecution or not. Would anyone say, in the light of this, that this man is not going back to persecution? Will anyone put his hand on his heart and say that he believes the man we are discussing will go back to be tried according to the laws of Spain, with complete fairness and impartiality and with mercy administered as part of the system of justice? Does anyone really believe it? If not, would it not be possible for the right hon. Gentleman to consider this?
The right hon. Gentleman demonstrated a great principle a week or two ago. This is not a question of dignity, and I know that he does not think that way. He intervened for the miserable Hungarians, for whom not very much could be said except that they were desperately suffering, that they had crossed the South Atlantic in winter and that they had nowhere to go and no home to be found. They were stowaways, too. When the right hon. Gentleman intervened for the woman who was with child and for that family, his action was greeted with approval throughout the country. I do not recollect a word of criticism being made.
If the right hon. Gentleman tonight said, "I remain unconvinced, but so clear has been the expression of views of Members of Parliament who have spoken that in the circumstances I will withdraw this order for a period, for a fuller investigation, until we can have the facts sifted and examined, and I will withdraw the order, too, in the hope that some other country may have the opportunity of offering to give asylum to this man", nobody would claim to have won a political victory. Everyone would say, "Here is not merely a wise man, but a generous man, a man so big that he never minds altering his decision when he has listened to other arguments." The right hon. Gentleman's stature stands as high in this House at the moment as, I think, it ever has done. It would stand higher in an hour and a quarter or so if he thought it possible to take that view.

8.47 p.m.

Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes), I, too, would like to pay tribute to the tenacity and fairness with which the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) pursues cases of this kind. I do not think that there is anybody in this House who has more experience of those qualities than myself, and I sincerely acknowledge them.
It is, however, fair also to point out that the hon. Member really objects in principle to any restriction on the entry of aliens into this country. I am sorry that the hon. Member is not at the moment in his place, but that has been his attitude throughout. I do not say


that it detracts in any way from the fairness with which he pursues individual cases, but his guiding principle is that it is wrong that we should prevent people coming into this country altogether.
Indeed, in the course of his remarks today, the hon. Member said that the ground of our opposition to the Franco régime is the same as our opposition to the Communist régime in that both deny personal liberty. We are not here discussing opposition to régimes. We are discussing the treatment of an individual. That is the question at issue before the House.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: As my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) is not present, may I put this to the hon. Baronet? It may well be true that my hon. Friend does, in general, believe in a liberalisation of the immigration laws and that he presses the Home Office from time to time about these matters. I am, however, sure that the hon. Member will agree that the burden of my hon. Friend's speech tonight was that the merits of this case, the history of this man and the dangers that he would run if he were returned to Spain, made a powerful case for the Home Secretary to show a little clemency. It is not true to say that my hon. Friend tonight was making a general speech about relaxation of the immigration laws. He was talking about the very sad predicament of the man whom we are discussing.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I do not disagree with what the hon. Member says, but the point I was about to make was that the attitude of the hon. Member for Eton and Slough in this matter is coloured by that wider consideration. My point is that this case has to be considered from a narrower standpoint. Although all of us in the House may sympathise very sincerely with the basic emotion which the hon. Member for Eton and Slough has put across, nevertheless we must reject that from our minds in considering individual cases. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I hope that I may be allowed to develop my remarks.
Some restrictions and some rules are essential and I think that that would be agreed by the great majority of hon. Members. There are exceptions and I think that the hon. Member for Oldham,

West (Mr. Hale) is one. I think he is on record as having said that he would allow completely free entry, and that was the gist of his speech this evening. That is why I do not follow him in his remarks, because in that he and I differ fundamentally. I am not sure that the hon. Member is not in a minority of one in this connection.

Mr. Hale: What I said was that as we had already decided that suffering refugees from Iron Curtain countries who came here should be admitted, and as we ought to have admitted the Jews whom we turned back to he murdered before the war, we might apply that to dictatorship countries, too.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: The hon. Member's basis is that he would allow all aliens to enter this country.

Mr. Hale: From Egypt, from any country in the world, from China? It really is nonsense to make a travesty of my remarks like this. I spoke off the cuff, but I said that I would admit political refugees or refugees from persecution.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I do not want to carry this any further with the hon. Member, but I think that he is on record as having said that he was against all these restrictions. If he says that this is limited to the cases which he has mentioned, I am quite willing to believe that. Indeed, I am glad to do so.
But we are here dealing necessarily with an exception from the general principle. In other words, the general principle is that of restriction, and if we are to make an exception to that principle we must satisfy ourselves that the case falls properly within that exception. In this case, the only basis for making an exception that has been put forward in any part of the House is that here there is a claim to asylum and it is one which ought to be granted.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has mentioned the Refugees Convention of 1951, and the definition of political asylum contained in that Convention. The test is that the applicant's life or liberty would be in danger on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular political group, or political opinion. If this case is to be brought within the principle of


asylum it will have to be shown that the individual is in danger either of life or liberty on account of his political opinion. That is the whole issue that is before the House.
The difficulty is to apply that principle. The hon. Member for Oldham, West has said that he would apply it in the case of anyone coming here on political grounds from countries which we acknowledge are not free. But if we were to accept them we would have to accept the fact that anyone coming here from any of those countries would be free to remain, because all he would have to do when he got here would be to state, publicly or otherwise, that he disagreed with his own régime and that, therefore, he was entitled to remain here as a political refugee.
That is the difficulty we come across at once. Indeed, as the House knows, there have been a number of such cases. People have come here from countries behind the Iron Curtain, they have come here perfectly regularly, perhaps to take up employment of a temporary character and, when they have got here, they have, so to speak, cocked a snook at the régime they have left behind and have said, "I am a political refugee and I am entitled to remain here."

Mr. Brockway: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that persistent efforts have been made by Perez-Selles since 1950 to escape from the Fascist régime, and to express opposition to it by the refusal of service in its armed forces? This has been persistently continuous.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: That is exactly the point I am now coming to. If a man merely says that he disagrees with his régime, it does not make him a refugee. He has to show something more than that. In this case what has happened is that a man has deserted from national service in Spain on several occasions. It has been argued indeed—that was the point of the hon. Gentleman's question—that the mere fact of desertion from the armed forces implies the motive of hostility to the régime. That is the effect of his argument, because no one in my hearing this evening has suggested that there is anything more political in the man's motive than that—

Mr. Brockway: Yes.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I agree that he has deserted, and I am willing to accept the suggestion that he has done so because he does not like the purpose for which he might have to work or fight if he remained in Spain, but I think that a motive of this kind is nothing like sufficient to constitute a man a refugee because, if we accept that motive, we have to accept anyone coming from Spain, Poland, perhaps Yugoslavia and many other countries today.

Mr. Hugh Delargy: May I ask a question, since the hon. Gentleman is on this point? He will recollect the case of the Polish stowaway at the end of July, 1954, which I drew to his attention when he held the office of Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the day the House rose for the Summer Recess. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman had his hat on, had his briefcase in his hand, and was about to go on holiday. All I knew about the case was that what two Polish men told me.
That very night the hon. Gentleman behaved very well. Two warships were sent into the Thames, the man was taken off the ship and we granted him political asylum. I was very pleased with that action. I applauded it. In that case no one asked what was the man's political background. He had never been a member of a political party, he had not actively participated in politics in Poland. We took his word for it and granted him political asylum. Surely that policy ought to be applied to this man.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: That was a special case. [Laughter.] All these are special cases. The only way to deal with them is to treat them as special cases. Unless we adopt that principle, we have to adopt the principle denied by the hon. Gentleman, of letting them all in. And if we deal with them as special cases we must look at the facts of the individual case. I am trying to look at the facts of this individual case, and I am saying that the only fact which has been produced so far which is relevant is that this man has deserted from the Spanish Army or Navy on several occasions—

Mr. Brockway: And is anti-Fascist.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: —and it is argued that that is the reason for saying that he is a political refugee.

Mr. Brockway: I emphasised that the reason for his desertion was his opposition to the Fascist dictatorial régime and that when he could not express it in words the only way to express his opposition was to refuse to do military service. I am reminded that on one occasion he did express it in words and got three months' imprisonment.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I have no knowledge of this case, but I am saying that mere dislike of a régime, accompanied by desertion, does not to my mind—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—amount to anything like the test which is laid down by the Geneva Convention. I do not believe that that test is accepted by any country, or would be accepted by any Government from either party in the House.

Mr. E. Fletcher: It was accepted by France.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I do not know what the particular circumstances were, nor do I think that the hon. Member does, but so far as we can tell France does not wish to have him now, and there is an end to the matter.
The test would be if it could be shown that there were any reason to say that when the man got back to Spain he would be treated not in respect of his desertion, but in respect of his political views, and in a way different from that accorded to any other deserter. Then, maybe, we would be looking at the matter in an altogether different way.

Mr. John Diamond: Mr. John Diamond (Gloucester) rose—

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I have given way a good deal and I cannot take up too much of the time of the House.
If evidence of that had been produced, I should have been willing to look at the matter in another way. I am not saying that a man who deserts from the Spanish Army may not be in for a very rough time, but that is true of anyone who deserts from the Spanish Army; and I do not see that there is any evidence whatever to show that this man will be treated in respect of the political views which he is said to hold any differently from any other deserter from the Spanish Army.

Mr. Brockway: Would the hon. Member say that of a Communist country?

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I would say exactly the same of Communist countries.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster) made a suggestion to which I want to refer. He mentioned a case in which he had been personally concerned and in which there had been delay in carrying out a deportation order so as to allow the individual concerned time to take himself where he wished. I can think of several cases where that has occurred. If my hon. and learned Friend will study those cases, he will see that they were all cases in which the alien concerned started in a free capacity, and that is not so in this case. In the ordinary way, a deportation order is made when the individual has been warned that he must go or take the consequences and he is then free and, more often than not, I agree, he goes.
In this case, the man was a stowaway and entirely different considerations apply. Nothing has been said to show that that treatment could be applied in the case of a stowaway.

Mr. James Callaghan: Does it not affect the hon. Member's consideration that this man has made four attempts to get to Britain and seek shelter here? In those circumstances, does he wish to put him on the first ship and send him back to the place from which he is struggling to escape?

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: He has not made attempts to get to this country.

Mr. Callaghan: Yes, he has.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: He has deserted and gone elsewhere, but not always come here. It is not the desire to come here, laudable though that may be, which constitutes political asylum. There are millions of people in the world who desire to live in this country, and if we were to apply that as the test, obviously our whole system of dealing with aliens would break down.
For the reasons I have given, I think that the Home Secretary has dealt with this case rightly and I am certain that any Home Secretary of whatever party would have dealt with it in a similar way.

Mr. Delargy: The hon. Member has said that if he had evidence before him that on this man's return to Spain he will be treated not as a deserter, but as a political figure, he might reconsider his position.
I put to him, and to his right hon. and hon. Friends, this question. Even supposing that until now this man has not been a political figure, does he think that, after three hours' debate in the House of Commons, Perez-Selles will no longer be considered not to be a political figure on returning to Spain? We have made him a political figure, even if he was not one before. He is bound to be treated as a political figure if he returns to Spain.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: I would not regard that as a valid argument, for obvious reasons, but, on the other hand, I am inclined to think that, although he may be regarded as a political figure in one sense, that will not necessarily be to his detriment on his return.

9.6 p.m.

Mr. Frank Beswick: The hon. Member for Hendon, South (Sir H. Lucas-Tooth) speaks with great sincerity, but I think that he is deceiving himself. I cannot believe, despite everything that the Home Secretary has said, that we do not apply a double standard in these cases.
We have spent many millions of pounds on the maintenance of Poles and other foreigners in this country, and, having had some knowledge of these people, and having been privileged to fight for them in the past, I do not disagree with enabling them to build their lives afresh in this country and elsewhere. But I also remember the policy adopted toward the Spanish refugees after the Spanish Civil War, and that was completely different.
I should like to ask the hon. Member for Hendon, South, who has such a large experience in these matters, whether he knows of a single case of a Russian deserter coming over to this country who has said, "I am deserting from the Russian Army," who has been handed back to the Russian authorities. Does he know a single case? As a matter of fact, we have heard about what we can only regard in this matter as very strange behaviour. There was the case

which was mentioned by a former Member, Mr. Geoffrey Bing, on one occasion, when we discovered that a person was, for political reasons, being brought over here, at the height of the most difficult housing conditions, and provided with a flat in Kensington. The case was raised in some detail by Mr. Bing.
I put it to the hon. Gentleman that we are in danger of being accused, and rightly accused, of humbug, because we are contriving to apply one set of rules in one case of people coming from one country, and another set of rules in the case of people coming from Spain. We have heard two most remarkable speeches. I think that even the Home Secretary would agree that anyone listening to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) would have been greatly moved and would have said, "Here is a case about which we must do something, a man for whom we must find asylum." Anyone coming into the House, not having heard the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough, but having heard the Home Secretary, would have said, "Here was a man of bad character, who had reason to get out of Spain, who had a bad record and"—

Mr. F. Noel-Baker: No, "might".

Mr. Beswick: I think he would. He would have said that on the speech of the Home Secretary, but, matching up these two speeches, there is not a single case quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough which is in any way controverted by the facts stated by the Home Secretary.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Mr. Noel-Baker rose—

Mr. Beswick: No, I cannot give way.
I ask the Home Secretary to look at the language he used. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough said that the man, when taken to the ship, was desperate and struggled and said that he would throw himself into the sea. This incident, in the Home Secretary's words, is described as "The man went berserk".
There was another rather revealing incident which my hon. Friend gave in some detail. This unfortunate person got a job on a Norwegian boat which had to go into a Spanish port of repairs. It was on that occasion that he was taken


back into Spain. When the Home Secretary referred to the same incident he dismissed it in a few words. He said, "He then got another job on a Swedish boat which took him back to Spain." He said not a single word about the circumstances in which that boat went back to Spain, or how the young man was taken off the boat and got into the hands of the Spanish authorities again.
Does the Home Secretary say that there is anything in the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough which he does not accept? Is there a single thing about that most powerful case which the right hon. Gentleman does not accept?—because there is nothing in his own statement of the history of this man which controverts my hon. Friend's case.
Someone has said—I think that this was the burden of the argument of the hon. Member for Hendon, South—that this is a question of interpreting a principle which had been laid down in relation to political refugees. I do not think that that was the difficulty which faced the Home Secretary; his difficulty was not one of interpreting that principle, but of interpreting the political character of the Spanish Government. That fact came out very clearly in a paragraph towards the end of the letter from the Home Secretary to my hon. Friend. It seemed quite clear to the Home Secretary that there was absolutely no reason why this young man should not fulfil his national service obligations in Spain.
I say this very forcibly: if I thought that anyone was coming into this country to escape his national service obligations elsewhere I should have him sent back straight away. Unless a person can prove that he has conscientious scruples in this matter—and even then he should accept the alternative to national service which is usually provided in various countries—we should have no truck with him. If anyone comes from a democratic country, such as the United States, to escape his national service obligations we should send him back. But does the Home Secretary really think that the successive attempts which this young man has made to get out of the Spanish Army are consistent wth the action of a shirker or a lead-swinger, who wants only to get out of a tough job with the Spanish Army, as one hon. Member opposite said?
My mind goes back to before the war when a young man came before me when I was a member of a public assistance committee. Because he had a very long record of unemployment, and had been losing jobs, it was said that he was a shirker and did not want to work. He showed me his bare feet under the uppers of his shoes and said, "Sir, do you really think that I would rather not have a hard job of work to do than this traipsing about looking for work?" Similarly, does anyone believe that it would not be much easier for this young man to put in two or three years with the Spanish Army rather than suffer these privations? What reason can there be for his escaping like this, unless he has some strong political conviction?
I come now to the plea made by the hon. and learned Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster). It would seem to be absolutely incredible that the Home Secretary should not listen to that plea, made from the benches behind him. I ask him to enhance his reputation and heed what has been said. I am sure that it would show that he is a really great man if he accepted the pleas made to him.
The right hon. Gentleman has said that he applied to the French authorities to see whether they would take this man. Why did he do that if all that he is saying is true? Why did he try to get this man out of his obligations to the Spanish authorities and into France? If it was right for him to go to France, it would be equally right for him to go to Mexico. There is reason to believe that he would have been accepted in Mexico. At least, let us have a chance to see whether we can find a home for this young men in some other country. I beg the right hon. Gentleman to listen sympathetically to the plea which is being made to him tonight.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Maurice Macmillan: I intervene in this debate not only because of my sympathy with the case but because I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster) that the definition of political asylum is in this country still too narrow. I agree with him, too, in accepting that even his extended definition cannot cover this case. Thirdly, I agree with him and with hon. Gentlemen opposite who have


made the point that the debate will endanger this young man's freedom and liberty and possibly his life. It is true not only in this case, but in other cases in other countries where attempts to obtain political asylum have been made by a trick, that when the subject returns to his own country he returns to danger.
I must join issue with the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) on the question of the part that the country played in this case. I am trying to arrange for a refugee from Yugoslavia to remain in this country after coming here on a visit on a permit in which he falsely declared that he wished to visit his father. In fact, it was his intention to stay here and I am arguing with the Home Office on the same lines as hon. Gentlemen opposite have been arguing in this debate. I should like to read out part of a letter written to me by this young man's sponsors in this country. I will not give the name of this man, because it may be that he will have eventually to return to Yugoslavia. The letter states:
It must be surely clear to the authorities that life in a Communist country is not honest, straightforward and open as it is in this country. It is not possible for a young person who is not friendly to the Communist organisation to leave the country permanently and it is very difficult for such a person to leave even temporarily. Thus it is essential for such a man, if he wants to get out alive, to lie, which, as you know, he did. For the same reason his father felt that he dare not risk telling the truth in this country for fear of the facts being transmitted to the Embassy in Belgrade and the Yugoslav authorities getting to know.
I agree with that and think that the same would probably apply in the case of the Spanish authorities.
I have another case from Yugoslavia in which a young man was not allowed to come to this country. The facts are similar to the present case. The reason given was that he had already found sanctuary in Austria. The Austrian authorities had intended to deport him, but, so far as I know, they have not done so yet. I can only hope that this country will be at least as generous as Austria.
A right hon. Gentleman opposite made the point that there was a difference in offences committed in democratic countries and in dictatorships. I am not sure how much I can accept that, except that in this case the offence that this man has

committed is that of desertion. The question of political asylum turns on whether desertion is a criminal, a civil or a political offence. In certain circumstances, I can agree that it must be a political offence. Whether it is or not in this case, I suggest most sincerely that there is a possibility of reaching some compromise.
Whatever sort of offence it is, there is not, under the law of any country that I know, any possibility of its being an extraditable offence. If the man had committed an extraditable offence, he would have been returned through the police authorities to stand trial in his own country. This is a question of his deportation. I would like to follow the suggestion made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich, not necessarily that we cannot extend our tradition of political asylum to give this man sanctuary, but that we should grant a stay of execution which will allow him to remain here long enough to give his friends a chance to find him a safe place.

9.21 p.m.

Mr. Elwyn Jones: I feel that the whole House will wholeheartedly welcome the speech which we have just heard from the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Maurice Macmillan) and will equally heartily endorse what he said.

Mr. Brockway: It was a very courageous speech.

Mr. Jones: It was a speech of a courageous character in the circumstances, a speech which will greatly enhance the reputation of the hon. Member and add to the great reputation of his family name.
The tradition of political asylum is a noble one. It is a civilised tradition, and we act against it at our peril as a civilisation and as a democracy. The Home Secretary unfortunately is not present at the moment. I hope he has gone away to sit in silence to contemplate the course of this debate. There have been four speeches from the Government side. In regard to one of them I was not very clear on which side the spokesman was on this issue; but we have had two very clear appeals from the Government side of the House to the Home Office which I beg the Government to act upon.
First, there was the contribution of the hon. and learned Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster), whose activities on behalf of those who suffer oppression anywhere in the world are well known to me personally and to others in this House. He has acted in accordance with his own traditions and the best traditions of this House by his speech here tonight.
I venture to ask this question of the Home Office. If the offences which this young Spaniard committed—and admittedly committed—had been extraditable offences, can anyone doubt that if the matter had come before the average metropolitan magistrate in London he would have had great difficulty in saying that the offences were not of a political character? In this matter, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the one who is liable to be persecuted and to suffer.
I do not want to re-cover the whole ground, but the evidence of there being present a political explanation of this Spaniard's conduct is overwhelming. There is the record of persistent acts of desertion by a young man whose character shows no sign of cowardice. Whatever may be said of him, cowardice is not one of the weaknesses of his character. There is neither in his behaviour any sign of pacificism, although I. know from some of my hon. Friends who are pacifists that their personal bellicosity sometimes belies their political position.
Looking at the case as a whole, is not it clear that the character of this young man is not a callow character which evades duty to his country because he is a coward or weakling? He is a young man, apparently of courage and determination, a young man—I submit the conclusion is clear from the facts—who has been driven to this course of persistent desertion for political reasons because he loathes and hates the régime of the country in which he lives.
There is further the point of detail, the corroborative evidence of the incident which resulted in his getting a sentence of three months' imprisonment for drunkenness. Having been to Spain I should say that imprisonment for mere drunkenness, one suspects, would fill the Spanish jails and many others. There must have been something more to it than that. We know what that something was, a political denouncing of the Franco

régime. It needs a man to be drunk to be so foolish as to do that in Spain, publicly at any rate. There is this important corroborative element in the case, quite apart from the persistent history of desertion. Then there is the fact of his asking for political asylum, which in itself surely is a significant political action. All those circumstances taken together underline the political nature of this man's difficulties and the reason he has come here.
There was one omission from the speech of the Home Secretary which I found very surprising. Surely it is relevant, when considering whether to grant an applicant political asylum, to consider what will happen to him if the deportation order is applied. It must be relevant. The same to some extent applies in regard to extradition. Is it not a most relevant consideration—especially if it is a borderline case, as admittedly this must be—to ask what will happen to this man if he is put on a boat to Spain?
I do not know what experience hon. Members opposite have had of the administration of justice in Spain. What we do know is that today there are men rotting in Spanish prisons who have been there for over a decade. For political reasons, men are there without trial, without hope, without contact with friend or relation, to say nothing of contact with lawyers, not because they are murderers but because they are political opponents of the régime. Here is a man who, if he was not politically involved yesterday, as the hon. Member for Halifax has indicated, is certainly politically involved tonight. If he goes back to Spain he will be a political figure there and will suffer the fate of political prisoners at the bar of Spanish "justice", the fate of injustice, the fate of indefinite detention, the fate of a farcical trial, if a trial takes place.
For those reasons, I entreat the Home Office to look at this matter again. It would not be an act of weakness if the Home Secretary were to do that. There would be no political exultation on this side of the House because he had changed his mind. He has already indicated, in his reaction to the suggestion of my right hon. and hon. Friends that an approach should be made to France, that he is open to persuasion in this matter. Because he is a pretty determined man, that fact


most impressed me when I heard this story. There must have been some room for gnawing doubt in his mind for him to do that much.
This debate has transformed the position of this young man, if he is given the chance of mercy which we now ask the Home Office to give, because as from now his name and his case will be known all over the world. It. has been said that every word which is spoken echoes through eternity. What is clear is that every word spoken in this House in this kind of debate echoes through the world. What we now ask as a compromise measure is that the order that he should be deported on Monday should be withdrawn at once, that he should be given an extended period of stay in this country and that any application which may be made for hospitality for him elsewhere or any opportunity which he may receive to be sent elsewhere shall be placed at his disposal.
As from now it is at least possible—let me put it no higher than that—that sympathetic countries and Governments may be willing to open their doors to him. Let us not slam those doors in the face of this young man.

9.32 p.m.

Mr. Graham Page: The hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Mr. Elwyn Jones) said that this debate has transformed the position of this young man. It may be that it has brought him this publicity, but it may also be that that publicity will not have the effect which the hon. and learned Member thinks it will have. Would it not be that the country to which he might have to return would lean over backwards to treat him fairly in these circumstances, the case having been considered in this House?
The hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) admitted that if this were merely a case of a man endeavouring to avoid national service in his country, he would send him back at once.

Mr. W. Griffiths: If it were a democratic country.

Mr. Page: He would not give him asylum in this country against merely trying to escape from national service or other such duties in his own country.

Despite the implications which have been drawn from the facts by some hon. Members, it seems to me that that is simply the case here. There is no true political background to the facts as we have tried to sort them out and as they have been given to us today.
Throughout his recitation of the facts of the case, the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) continually referred to the man endeavouring to escape from a Fascist régime. Is it fair or even reasonable to draw that assumption from the facts? The only fact that this man has any political background at all is that at the age of 16 he suffered a term of three months imprisonment for being abusive of the régime. That seems to be the sole fact on which the claim that he is a political refugee is based.

Mr. Brockway: On a point of correction. I do not know why the hon. Member says that this happened at the age of 16. My information is that it was much later and that he was much more adult.

Mr. Page: I do not know whether my mathematics are wrong, but I understood that this was in 1950—

Mr. Brockway: No, no.

Mr. Page: And it is now 1958 and the man is 24. It was said that since 1950 he has endeavoured to land illegally in this country. On one occasion it was from an Egyptian ship. On a second occasion it was from a Honduran ship. There was a third occasion in 1953. On a fourth occasion he escaped to Rouen, on the fifth occasion he escaped to New York, and the sixth occasion was when he came into this country in October, 1957.
That certainly shows persistence in endeavouring to escape national service in his own country, but it shows no justification for the assumption that it is necessarily an endeavour to escape from a political régime. Indeed, from what my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said, it does not seem as if even the man himself has claimed to be a political refugee. Hon. Members opposite have claimed it for him. The whole argument of the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) was based on the assumption of this man being a political refugee, though I do not think he adopted


the argument of his right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) in saying that if a man endeavours to escape from national service that, in itself, makes him a political refugee, if it is from a dictatorship country.
To look at the régime behind the incident, to see whether there is a dictatorship behind it, surely cannot be the sole test. We must see what is to happen to the man if he goes back. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Members opposite applaud that, but I do not think that they will agree with the conclusion I draw from it—

Mr. J. Hynd: Wait and see.
During the recitation of the facts by the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) I put to him the question: What happened to this man after he went back on the Rouen occasion, and after he went back on the New York occasion? On the first occasion he was imprisoned for two years, and, on the second, for two years and six months—[HON. MEMBERS: "And a day."] Those were simple forms and terms of imprisonment such as one would expect to be imposed upon a man who has avoided his national service.
There is no political persecution there that one can see. And those were just two out of five occasions, if I have totted them up aright. He went back to Spain after landing here from an Egyptian ship, and we know nothing of any political persecution then. Again, after he had escaped on a Honduran ship, he went back to Spain, and we hear nothing of any political persecution then. He came here in 1953 and was sent back to Spain, and again we hear nothing of any political persecution.
One cannot draw from the facts of the case any conclusion that this man is a political refugee at all, or that he would be treated as such if he went back to Spain, or would suffer anything else than punishment for the crime of escaping national service—and, indeed, persistently escaping it. One might expect that his punishment would be rather heavier for that persistence if he does go back, but that is no reason for giving him leave to remain here.
I think that my right hon. Friend has come to the right conclusion, and that to

have come to any other conclusion would have created a precedent that would put us in the gravest difficulty in the future.

9.39 p.m.

Mr. James Callaghan: I make a final appeal to the Home Secretary to reconsider his decision. Whatever party cheers may have divided us during the two hours and forty minutes that this debate has occupied, there has been very little evidence of party feeling. Indeed, as I have listened to the progress of the debate, I have formed the impression that it has become one of those comparatively rare occasions when the House of Commons, without fear of Whips or care of consequences, expresses the minds of its individuals Members as they see the truth.
I am very proud to be able to take part in a debate of that character tonight, because whatever others may think about we "pygmies" who occuply this place, it is something to be proud of that the House of Commons can, for two hours and forty minutes, step aside from considering important matters affecting the Army to consider the fate of a simple Spanish sailor, about whom we have not heard previously, about whom I doubt whether we shall hear again, but whose life and whose liberty is dear to everyone in this islands, and to every hon. Member in this House no matter where he may sit.
I could not rest easily tonight if I did not ask the Home Secretary to bring compassion into his consideration of the merits of this case. I listened to him and I could understand why the administrative wheels should turn. I could understand the administrative background to this decision. I can seen that it is necessary to lay down a corpus of regulations and practice behind which we must shelter when we have to make decisions, but there come moments now and again when people feel, whatever may be the administrative practice, that a case has been established where a man's fate is more important than a strict adherence to the rules.
I believe that this is such a case. This is a young merchant seaman who obviously has all the faults and virtues of a merchant seaman. I represent many of them in Cardiff. They get drunk, speak their mind and are very ready with their fists. I cannot believe that a young


man like this, who has escaped three or four times from the country of his birth, can be anything but in desperate earnest. The fact that he has come to this country and sought shelter here makes me very proud. It makes me proud to think that this country is still a beacon among many of the peoples of Europe, so that those who wish to breathe the air of freedom come here.
I know a little about Spain. I cannot adopt the detachment of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page). During the war, I was for a short time in an aircraft carrier which went out to reinforce the East Indies Fleet. We called at Gibraltar. I never saw it. Our aircraft carrier went into Gibraltar after dark and it left before daylight, because across in La Linea the spies, harboured by Franco's régime, were reporting to Berlin every movement of the British Fleet.
Are we to stand on points of punctilio where a régime like this is concerned? I have no desire to make a long speech, but, if the Home Secretary would reverse his decision and give this young man sanctuary, there is not a man or woman in this country whose head would not be held' a little higher tomorrow. I would feel very proud if he could do that. If he cannot, will he withdraw the order for a matter of weeks to give my hon. Friends who have brought up this matter the opportunity of finding another country to which this man could be sent and to which he would be allowed to go?' This would be in our tradition.
This is something that we can surely do, and I beg of the Minister, who is a big enough Minister, to listen to the voice of the House of Commons as it has been expressed tonight, not only by hon. Gentlemen on these benches, but by at least two of his hon. Friends, the hon. and learned Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster) and the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Maurice Macmillan), who made a most courageous speech. I believe that we have heard the true voice of the British people speaking in the House of Commons tonight, and I beg the Home Secretary to reconsider this matter and to give this young man the opportunity to remain here.

9.44 p.m.

Mr. R. A. Butler: With permission, I should like to make a few observations in reply to the debate.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) has said that it is a good thing to listen to the voice of the House of Commons. I agree with that. I have listened very carefully to the arguments of both sides, and I have considered very carefully the circumstances of the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) rehearsed again the arguments that I tried to use and which led me to my decision. I must honestly tell hon. Members on all sides—because, as has been rightly said, there has been no political bias in this debate—that I think the decision I have taken on the merits of the case is the right one. I think there is no doubt that the circumstances of the appeal for political asylum made on behalf of this young man are not strong enough to prevail when contrasted with the many arguments that I have to take into account in other cases. That is the position.
I do not want to traverse again all the arguments I used in my earlier speech. I have to turn my attention to whether the circumstances of this debate have made any alteration to that judgment and secondly, whether the arguments put forward in the debate have raised any new aspect which I should consider. I have had the opportunity of considering this matter as best I can and taking what advice I can upon the matter, both administrative and from my hon. Friends and from those who have taken part in the debate.
First, concerning the circumstances of the debate. One or two hon. Members opposite have said that now that we have held this debate the young man's position has been prejudiced. Most of the responsibility for raising this matter rests upon hon. Members opposite.

Mr. Callaghan: Mr. Callaghan rose—

Mr. Butler: I am not making any political point, but we must get the facts clear for the benefit of the public outside. I heard one hon. Member remark—I cannot name him at the moment—that this debate win not have helped the young man. Other hon. Members have been in some doubt whether the debate will not have done him considerable harm. At least, nobody who is not a simpleton would claim that it has not made him somewhat of a marked man. The


responsibility, however, must rest squarely on the shoulders of those who raised the matter.

Mr. Callaghan: I quite agree, and we are ready to accept our responsibility. I do not, however, believe that the right hon. Gentleman would want to put our sins upon the shoulders of this young man.

Mr. Butler: That raises a point, with which I want to deal before I close my few remarks, concerning the administration of the Aliens Branch of the Home Office. I shall want the assistance of the House in the future administration of that Department, because I assure hon. Members that in administering the Aliens Branch of the Home Office the mixture of public pressure and private discretion is extremely difficult. If this debate helps us to understand one another better, it will have at least done something.
The point I was making was that the debate and the speeches which have been made—although mostly, as I have said, temperate in tone—will undoubtedly have made this young man a marked man; and that I take into account in my judgment. As to the arguments during the debate, I said in my opening remarks that I do not think that a case has been made. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby, who supported the arguments which I used in not granting this man political asylum.
The best thing to do on this occasion is to make it quite clear to those who consider that my decision was wrong that if they want to divide the House, or to vote against my decision, they should certainly take the opportunity, because I do not propose to go back upon the main decision I have made, namely, that this man is not a candidate for political asylum in this country. I have made that decision.
I now come to the question of what has been called a spell of time in which to consider whether there is anywhere else he should go. After listening to the debate, in the spirit of the debates of the last century in this House, when statesmen had to pay attention to what was said—I can remember one historical occasion—I say that I have to some extent breached the principles that I have enunciated in this debate by inquiring informally whether there was any chance

of this man going to France. I did that on the request of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) and his hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), and I do not regret having done it because I did it on request.
As far as I can see, I am fairly clear, as I told the House, that there is little or no hope of a visa being granted for France, and I am not prepared to make any further official approaches. I do not think that they would be effective. But I cannot deny that if friends of this young man were to find any country that would accept him there is no objection on the part of Her Majesty's Government to his going there.
My hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mr. Maurice Macmillan) said that there was no extraditable offence. That is true in this case. I stick to my judgment that I cannot give this man political asylum. Normally, the only thing for him to do would be to return to Spain. I have already conceded, by my approach to the French Government, that I would have no objection to his going elsewhere. The only solution that I can then see, as a result of considering the circumstances and arguments of the debate, and of listening to the legal experience of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northwich (Mr. J. Foster), is to stay the date of his departure and to give an opportunity to his friends to find somewhere for him to go.
I do not want, by any words of mine, to prejudice his chances with any Government. Therefore, I will not comment on what I think are his chances of finding a place to go to. If his friends can find anywhere for him to go they had better tell the Home Office, through me, and I will listen to what they have to say. On the other hand, I cannot allow this case to go on indefinitely. The ship which I told the House was in mind sails on Monday In the circumstances, I will not insist upon his going on the ship on Monday.
At this late hour I cannot check what the exact sailings are, but I can postpone his going until the next suitable vessel, which will give him a week or two in which to look around. That is the best I can do. I cannot give the exact date, but I should like to indicate that it would be the next suitable vessel,


which would be in a week or a fortnight. That would give a period of grace to his friends, if they think they have a chance of helping him, to do their best to help him. But I want to make it clear that I will not give way on my main decision that this man must leave the country.
That is the best that I can do for hon. Members. If they find that that is not enough, I beseech them to express their objection to what I have said by way of a vote. There is no question of the Government being anxious about this as a Government issue. We are only anxious about the future of an individual. We can carry this as a Government issue perfectly well. We are only anxious to get it settled in a way which is fair. I am convinced that the way I have made up my mind in this decision is fair. If the young man's friends can find a place for him to go to in the period of grace it is up to them to find it.
I should like to say something about aliens regulation. One or two hon. Members have been kind enough to use very extravagant language in favour of my kind heart. It so happens that there has been one notable case lately where I was convinced that the only possible decision for a Home Secretary was to grant a concession. It happened to be a case where there were certain humane considerations and there was no other sane course to, adopt.
At the same time, there have been a number of aliens' cases which have been very protracted and difficult to administer. We have had representations from hon. Members and we have done our best to carry out our administration in a fair and equitable manner. But I would say to hon. Members that once a decision has been taken they should either have a debate here upon it or accept it, because it is not in the interest of the country that there should be an entry of an indefinite number of aliens such as we cannot control.
A country like this is not a country of absolutely free entry. Hon. Gentlemen opposite, especially those representing industrial seats, know perfectly well

that if we had absolutely free entry, over and above what we have under "civis Romanus sum"—the British citizen who can come in from our Commonwealth—our employment position would not be tenable. It is necessary to bring these facts home.
Furthermore, a discretion is absolutely essential for the Government of the day in administering their aliens' policy. Anyone standing at this Box as Home Secretary, whether from that side of the House or this, would have to adopt certain rules. There should not be any laxity in the administration of our aliens' policy. I am making this observation at the end of this debate for a very good reason. There has been a claim that an alternative issue to this case can be found by the friends of this young man. If it can be found, let them find it; and if it cannot be found, my decision stands.

9.56 p.m.

Mr. Gordon Walker: By leave of the House, I should like, on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and, I am sure, also of hon. Gentlemen opposite, to thank the Home Secretary for the way in which he has listened to, and been influenced by, this debate. Of course, I cannot conceal that we would have been happier still if the right hon. Gentleman could have agreed with us altogether or given us even longer than two weeks. None the less, we are extremely grateful to him. This has really been a very fine night in the history of Parliament, in the history of the Home Office and in the right hon. Gentleman's own personal reputation and record.
I can tell him that none of us will want to divide on this matter. We are extremely grateful to him, and we and this young man's friends will certainly do our utmost now to take advantage of the stay of execution which the Home Secretary has granted in response to the obvious desire of both sides of the House.

Mr. Dugdale: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's generous and statesmanlike speech, Sir, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SUPPLY

Again considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1958–59

Original Question again proposed.

9.58 p.m.

Sir E. Errington: When we turned from the subject of the Army Estimates to other matters, Sir Charles, I was referring to the position of holders of the Victoria Cross. I am delighted to see the hon. Gentleman the Member for Brierley Hill in his place, because he has interested himself in this matter.
The context in which I was raising it was that of various things about which many people feel strongly. In this connection it is thought that the holders of the Victoria Cross have not had the benefit they would appear to have. I was saying that the provision made in connection with them was that the annuity of £10 in any case of need might be increased to £75. When the matter was raised on 14th November by way of Question put by the hon. Member for Brierley Hill to the Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend said:
I should like to point out that the provision of the old normal annuity of £10 can now be increased to £75."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th November, 1957; Vol. 403, c. 1143.]
Article 660 which controls this matter is rather different from what most people expect. It says:
An officer who has been awarded the Victoria Cross, and is unable, in consequence of age or infirmity occasioned by causes beyond his own control, to earn a livelihood, may at the discretion of Our Army Council, be granted an annuity, provided"—
and this is the proviso which makes nonsense of the increase—
that the total amount of the annuity thus granted, together with any other pension received from public funds, shall not exceed £75 a year.
The situation is that if holders of the Victoria Cross have any other pension of any kind, provided that the total amount exceeds £75, they get only the £10 annuity which has been the annuity for so many years.
One knows of holders of the Victoria Cross who are in great need and who get

no benefit from the increase in the amount of £10 which is all that they are entitled to receive if they have a pension from any other public source of £75.
I raise that issue only to illustrate that there are or seem to be petty meannesses in dealing with the Services. I do not know where or how they happen, but they are a strong disincentive to recruiting. Younger people, when discussing the possibility of the Army providing a satisfactory career are told of these cases which have caused considerable bitterness to the older people who remember the old days and the difficulties that they have had. I hope that a special effort will be made to deal with this type of problem. Before the interval, I referred to the widows of men whose death occurred when they were not on active service and whose case is another example of what I mean.
I press upon my right hon. Friend the necessity of being able to provide, if possible, a full career and by a full career I mean a career which will last for a person's useful life. In these days we have got away from the idea that if a person leaves the Services at forty-three or forty-five he has finished his career. In these days, when we talk about things like civilianisation, it should not be impossible for Service personnel who retire to be placed in civilian life in such a way as to ensure that they continue a useful life after their Service career is ended.
I hope that the arrangements which are made for the special demobilisation of both officers and men—although officers present a greater difficulty—will be continued, and continued so that if, as I believe is very likely, the demobilisation scheme works well, it will go on in order eventually to provide probability if not certainty of employment for those who leave the Service as the years go by.
One thing on which I want to congratulate the Secretary of State is the considerable improvement in accommodation. Both in married quarters and for Army personnel generally, at any rate in my part of the world, there has been a great effort to get this matter under control. I still feel that a good deal could be done in the arrangements for accommodation for personnel leaving the Service. I know what a problem it is when we have what is called an "irregular occupant," and I know how


difficult it is to get that occupant out of accommodation which is badly needed for other purposes.
I am not altogether happy that the local authorities in some parts—I do not by any means necessarily mean those in my own constituency—are doing all they can to help to place people who come out of the Service. I appreciate their difficulties, because they have waiting lists of their own, and these Service people add to those lists. Nevertheless, I am unhappy that sometimes personnel leaving the Services do not get quite the priority to which their service would entitle them.
There is one other matter of importance that I should like to raise, and it is in connection with the recruitment of officers. I am wondering, and I am sure that others are also wondering, whether enough officers of the right standard are becoming available. This, it seems to me, may be a very serious matter, having regard to the future rôle of the Army. If I am right in thinking that there are not enough of the right sort, I am disturbed to see that so many senior N.C.O.'s are going out of the Service. I hope that consideration will be given to the use of N.C.O.'s, particularly in view of what was suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget)—that in modern war the tendency is to sectionalise more and more the work done by the Army.
The use of N.C.O.'s has another merit in that it lessens the base of the officer pyramid for service in the Army. One of the difficulties now is that officers who go into the Service find that their opportunities for, or expectation of, reaching high rank are small and become smaller towards the top of the pyramid. I think that the increased use of non-commissioned officers would be valuable in trying to deal with the problem of young officer's prospects.
Finally, I hope that, in order to recruit up to the full number required, the standard of entrance for officers will not be lowered. I believe that it is absolutely essential if we are to have, as I believe we can have, a successful Army based on smaller numbers, to have a very high standard of junior officers.
I congratulate not only the Army upon the way in which it has accepted all these difficulties and problems, but Her Majesty's Government for the efforts that they are making to deal with these many difficulties and for dealing with them so successfully in so many cases.

10.10 p.m.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: I listened with particular interest to the last few sentences of the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington). He was very concerned about how we were to get the required number of officers for the future. This struck me as remarkable, because in the Estimates which we are discussing tonight we are providing a goodly sum in order to get rid of 14,000 officers. In other words, we are spending money in order to get officers out of the Army. It must sound paradoxical to the average man to hear hon. Members opposite wondering how we shall go about getting officers in the future when, in 1958, we are making provision, to the tune of £50 million over the three Services, to get rid of officers for whom, under present circumstances, we can find no useful employment.

Sir E. Errington: The officers who are being disposed of are of medium or senior rank. The officers to whom I was referring are the young men who are coming on.

Mr. Fernyhough: But that is not true. Junior officers and N.C.O.s are amongst those who are to receive compensation in respect of the termination of their contracts of service before they would normally have expired. There cannot be any argument about that. I am saying only that to the average man it must sound a little paradoxical that at the same time that we are having to pay men to go out we are having to increase the Estimates for the purpose of getting others to come in.
I wish that we would extend to industry the principle that we apply to the Services. As and when men and women in industry are found to be redundant, and when no useful work can be found for them in the industry to which they have given their lives, it would be a good thing if they received compensation. In the Army we are making provision for those for whom we can no longer provide


useful employment and at the same time we are also having to make provision for obtaining further recruits.
I do not object to that. I believe that those who serve in the forces are entitled to be paid the highest rates that we can afford, because of the inconvenience and risks that they must undertake and the sacrifices that they must inevitably make because of the nature of the profession. For that reason I welcome the increases.
I want to put in a word for the men who are forgotten—the 150,000 to 200,000 National Service men. In 1948, when the present Act became applicable, they were paid 28s. a week. That amount was raised, in 1955, to 31s. 6d. Under the new arrangements National Service men will not get any further increments. In 1948, the National Service man was getting 28s. a week and we all know what 28s. would buy then. Ten years afterwards, with all the increases in prices both under a Labour Administration and under the present Government, the National Service man is getting 31s. 6d. This is slave labour. The National Service man is compelled to do the job at less than the trade union rate. We should not get away with this in any other industry; we should have to pay the rate for the job.
I recognise that, because of the desire to recruit a voluntary Army, there is some necessity for a wage differential. We have arguments about differentials even in industry, but I do not think that anyone who believes in justice and fair play can defend the present differential. At first, the rates for the Regular soldier and the National Service man were identical. Upon entry in 1948, they each reached 28s. The pay for a National Service man today is 31s. 6d. and the new lowest rate of pay for a new entrant into the Regular Army is up to 84s. I believe we ought to do something more for the man who is serving because he is compelled to.
I am not asking the Ministry to say that there will be no differential; but, having regard to what is taking place in other trades, industries and professions throughout the country, and what has taken place regarding increments for the Regular soldier, I say that the National Service man should receive further con-

sideration now that increases are being granted to everyone else.
After the Under-Secretary had failed to give me satisfactory answers to a series of Questions which I asked some time ago, I intimated that I should raise the question of overseas allowances in Germany when we discussed the Army Estimates. Twelve months ago last August, after much pressure which I helped to apply, the War Office recognised the claims of certain sections of men serving in Germany. It was agreed that married personnel serving in Germany were entitled to the local overseas allowances.
These allowances vary from 9s. 3d. for a married man on the top rate to Is. 6d. for a corporal and ranks below that. I cannot understand why the overseas allowance for a man above the rank of corporal, accompanied by his wife, should be larger because he is accompanied by his wife, but that for corporals and lower ranks who have their wives with them the allowance should be the same—an extra Is. 6d. a day. That cannot be justified. The War Office has no right to discriminate to the disadvantage of a corporal and those below that rank.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: I am trying to follow what the hon. Gentleman is saying, which is that a corporal who is unaccompanied gets 1s. 6d. and the corporal who is accompanied also gets 1s. 6d. Is that right?

Mr. Fernyhough: Yes. Let me illustrate from the top. A brigadier gets approximately a 50 per cent. increase in the allowance he receives for his overseas tour in Germany if he is accompanied by his wife. That runs down the scale until we get to the corporal and he does not get any more, even though his wife is with him.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: He gets no local allowance if he has not got one?

Mr. Fernyhough: If he is a married man—this is my argument—and is serving in Germany, even though his family is in this country, he still gets the allowance.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Brigadier Prior-Palmer indicated dissent—

Mr. Fernyhough: I have here the actual letters I have received from the War Office on this subject and it is one of the things that I cannot understand. The Minister of Defence made this statement on 29th January, this year:
No, Sir. Local overseas allowance is payable only in places where the cost of living is higher than at home. This is not the case in Christmas Island, where life is simple and inexpensive."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th January. 1958; Vol. 581, c. 370.]
In other words, the overseas allowance is given wherever the cost of living is higher than at home. It must be higher in Germany or the allowance would not have been granted.
The revealing thing—I can understand the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) being perplexed about it—is that only married personnel get it. No single officer or other rank gets the overseas allowance for serving in Germany. How in the name of fortune can the War Office justify this? It acknowledges, by virtue of the fact that the married personnel, even though they have left their families in this country, have been granted over-sea allowance, that the cost of living in Germany is higher than in this country.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: No.

Mr. Fernyhough: If it is higher for married men it is higher for the single men, if they both go into the same type of shop or theatre, and ride in the same type of tram and have the same kind of entertainment. I should have thought that conditions in Germany were alike for married and single personnel and particularly if the married man's wife and family have been left in this country.
Therefore, I hope that the War Office will look at this claim of the single men serving in Germany. When I raised the matter at Question Time some time ago, the Minister of Defence told me that to give single personel serving in Germany the same allowances as married personnel not accompanied by their wives would cost an additional £2 million a year. Having regard to the number of Service men affected and the number of grievances that arise because of this discrimination, I can think of no better way, if we want to remove a lot of grievances fairly cheaply, of spending that £2 million. Therefore, I hope that further

consideration will be given to that problem.
Another matter I wish to raise was touched upon by the hon. Member for Aldershot. It concerns the provision of housing for those coming out of the forces after they have completed their period of service. A most distressing case was brought to my notice not long ago. A man who had been in the Army for 21 or 22 years came out and was unable to get a house. Eventually he took employment, with which went what I would term a tied cottage. The nature of the work did not suit him. He became worried, anxious and depressed and finally took his own life.
I am sure that that man's chief worry was the fact that he could not get a house. I believe he had an entitlement to a house. I do not believe with the hon. Member for Aldershot that he would have a right of priority for a local authority house. The responsibility for that man's predicament was that of the War Office. The War Office had moved him about so that he never had any deep roots in any locality. The War Office made it impossible in the last five or six years of his life for him to be on a local authority's housing list because no one could be sure how long he would be resident in any particular area.
I see nothing wrong with the idea of the War Office deciding that each year it will build 1,000, 2,000 or 5,000 houses, those houses to be sited evenly over the country and made available solely for the use of Service personnel when they finish their service. Of course that would cost money, but it would be money very well spent. The proceeds of that money would build something which would not be half so likely to be obsolete in six months', twelve months' or two years' time, as some of the things upon which some of this money is now spent.
I hope that the War Office will give serious consideration to this matter. With all the good will in the world it is unreasonable at present for local authorities to accept this responsibility. With a 7 per cent. Bank rate and the other restrictions placed on them by the Government many local authorities find it impossible to build any houses except on the basis of slum clearance subsidies.


If they are to build without Exchequer help Service men cannot pay the economic rent which would be demanded for the houses.
It behoves the War Office to recognise that it cannot push this responsibility on to local authorities. It is a moral obligation on the War Office. These men have given the best years of their lives to the Service. They have been mucked about, shifted about and messed about and have taken it all without much grumbling. When they retire the War Office should not think that it is relieved of responsibility and able to wash its hands of responsibility for these men. The War Office ought to be doing the job, because, as I have indicated, it is too heavy a burden, too big a burden and too impossible a burden to place on local authorities at the present time.

Mr. Charles Pannell: My hon. Friend keeps on saying that this is too big a burden to place on local authorities, but, really, is it? Could it be done another way? For instance, in an authority like Woolwich where the War Office builds any amount of military accommodation, would not it be possible to give to the Woolwich Borough Council an entitlement of so much money every year for which the Woolwich Borough Council, as a competent housing authority and without cost to the ratepayers, could act as agent for the War Office and build a certain number of houses to accommodate men coming out of the forces? What could be done for Woolwich could be done for other centres of population. I could work out a scheme quite easily for the Under-Secretary of State.

The Chairman: I think that the hon. Member is making a rather long intervention in his hon. Friend's speech.

Mr. Pannell: If my hon. Friend had objected, I should not have intervened. He was making a somewhat leisurely appraisal of an urgent problem and I was trying to help him.

Mr. Fernyhough: If my hon. Friend thinks that I was making a leisurely appraisal of the problem, then he could not have been present during the debates on the Army Estimates during the last three years, because I have said the same

thing in all of them. If what my hon. Friend says does not correspond with what I have been trying to make clear, I shall have to study English a little more, because I thought that what he said merely corroborated what I was saying.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: I wish to ask the hon. Gentleman why his conscience has pricked him during the last two years. I never heard him argue in favour of what he is now saying when his party was in power.

Mr. Fernyhough: I am not aware that when my party was in power we were graced for many months by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. He was not here in 1945–50. If he wants to know what was said in those years he had better look it up. I am certain from the contributions which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has since made to our debates that he did not take a very thoughtful and intelligent interest in what we were doing in those years.

Mr. John Barter: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that my hon. and gallant Friend is acting as his conscience?

Mr. Fernyhough: All that I can say to that is "Heaven forbid."
I hope that the War Office will give real consideration to the three points which I have raised. The first is the question of the National Service man's rate of pay at the present time. Having regard to what has been given to everybody else in the Services, I think that the National Service man is entitled to some further improvement in pay. The second point is the question of the overseas allowances and the discrimination against the single man. The third point is the problem of housing.
I know that the hour is late and that there are many hon. Members who wish to speak in the debate. Though there is much more that I should like to have said. I think that in fairness to you, Sir Charles, having called me rather early in the debate, I ought to resume my seat and let others have an opportunity to make their contributions.

10.34 p.m.

Mr. John Hobson: I make no apology for detaining the Committee for a few minutes, even at this late hour, on the extremely important subject that we are debating after an interval of about three hours, because, of course, the future of the Army is now under review by the House of Commons and the Army is in a very important stage of transition from the National Service basis to a Regular basis. A complete reorganisation is also envisaged, which will reduce our forces considerably. For those two reasons, at least, I regard the debate as one of considerable importance.
The hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) was mystified, apparently, by the fact that a certain number of personnel are being compulsorily retired while others are having to be enlisted. I do not know whether he thinks that officers in the Army do not grow old, or whether he would prefer to see the processes that went on after the Napoleonic War perpetuated after this one. We found ourselves entering the Crimean War with many officers who had served at the time of Waterloo.

Mr. Fernyhough: Having regard to the age at which we usually appoint field marshals, I cannot believe that the men who are being sacked at 45 and 50 are as degenerate as the hon. and learned Member is trying to make out.

Mr. Hobson: I am not suggesting that they are degenerate, but they do not all become field marshals and there are limited opportunities of employment for the aged. I would rather see the Army reinvigorated by the enlistment of youth than that old ideas should be perpetuated so that if we entered another war with elderly officers who can do little but think about the previous war and who have never thought about the new one.
I wish to pay tribute to the wonderful spirit in which all ranks in the Army are facing the reorganisation which they are having to undergo. Practically without exception, units that have existed as independent entities with great traditions over the centuries have accepted without a murmur of dissent the harsh decisions which have been made necessary by the present reorganisation.
There is the example of the regiment of the county in which my constituency is situated—the 6th Regiment of Foot, the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, with battle honours going back to 1695, to the Battle of Namur. The regiment has recently produced Field Marshal Montgomery. When one realises that for more than 300 years it has stood as an independent unit, proud of its tradition, proud of the service it has given to the country, and that now it has to face amalgamation and, in reality extinction, I consider that the spirit in which that unit, like so many others similarly placed, has accepted the situation is something for which the whole country should be grateful.
It applies not only to the serving officers and men; it applies to the retired officers and other ranks and the local people who have the traditions of their county regiments at heart. It is only the spirit of service which has always actuated the Army which has brought about that very remarkable result. It shows that the British Army still believes that it is intended to serve the State. That is the tradition which it has always maintained since the time of the Restoration in 1660 and the first foundation of the Regular Army.
Before dealing with the main subject that I wish to discuss I should like to raise a minor detail. The question of the provision of officers is a very troublesome one. I ask the Under-Secretary to deal with two matters. First, I want to know whether he is satisfied with the way in which the Regular Commissions Board is working. It always has a very difficult task because its function is to try to select officers who are likely to develop at 40 into commanding officers of units. They are the men upon whom the spirit of the Army depends.
Anyone who has had anything to do with the Army knows that the unit commander is the man who sets the spirit and the tone and determines whether or not his unit is a good one, whether or not his men are happy, whether or not the unit is fit for war and the other purposes for which it exists. Therefore, what the Board must, presumably, have in mind is to ascertain whether it can select for regular commissions officers of that quality.
While I realise that one must try to maintain the standard of those who are being admitted, is the Under-Secretary satisfied that the crystal with which the Board examines applicants is adequate to the task? Many people at 18 do not perhaps show the qualities needed to command a unit at 40 or give promise of the gallantry required on the field of battle. All of us must have known highly irresponsible gentlemen of 18 who have, in the end, served with the greatest possible distinction in war and who, with maturity and growth, have turned into the finest commanding officers we could wish for. Yet one can well imagine that if, at the age of 18, they were brought up before this Board they might have been "spun" for reasons of irresponsibility or otherwise. We are now in a situation in which, according to the Memorandum, there is a shortage of officers. There has also been a shortage of applicants for commissions during 1956 and 1957, yet we know that the Board is "spinning" substantial numbers of young men. One would like to be assured that the authorities are satisfied that the Board is doing this upon a satisfactory basis and with the idea in mind that what has to be ascertained is whether those young men would turn into commanding officers twenty years later.
The next point on the recruiting of officers that I would like to raise is to ask whether the Under-Secretary is satisfied that enough is being done at our public and grammar schools and elsewhere to try to attract the leaders of tomorrow into the Army. I know that some of the other Services take considerable care in their approaches to those schools. Can the Committee be assured that the Army is also telling the young men in the schools that the Army offers a life of service to the State—mainly an open-air life which, perhaps, provides an escape from the money-grubbing life in an industrial community which is not wholly attractive to all members of the community?
The main point that I would like to raise is the question of the central strategic reserve and its relation to airlift. Paragraph 45 of the Memorandum states:
The Central Reserve will, in the main, be stationed in the United Kingdom and will be organised on a brigade group basis. In order to increase its mobility and effectiveness, re-

course will be had to stores located at suitable points overseas. In an emergency, units of the Central Reserve could thus be flown to the theatre of operation with little more than their personal equipment.
The four points that I would like to raise about that are these. First, any idea that units are to be made more mobile by being flown from the United Kingdom to the various parts of the world in which they are required implies, does it not, that there must be an adequate freight lift to accompany them, apart from any question of merely lifting the personnel side of such units?
Secondly, the exact position of both the passenger and freight lifts is not at all clear, and the extent to which those are to be under the control of the Air Force or are to be obtained from civilian sources is not clear. I hope that it will be the policy of the Army to look to commercial passenger capacity and commercial freight capacity in meeting the requirements for moving the Services round the world.
Thirdly, there must, in any such scheme, be severe limitations on the capacity to move the strategic reserve of this country otherwise than by the traditional method of a sea lift. Any idea that we can move our strategic reserve round the world at will and in force by air is surely completely false and liable to be very misleading.
Lastly, I should like to ask whether the disposition of the strategic reserve is being considered in conjunction with the Commonwealth countries, whether there is a conception of a Commonwealth strategic reserve to meet the strategic needs of the Commonwealth, and whether the disposition of our forces is being linked up with the disposition of the Commonwealth forces.
Let me elaborate those four points shortly. There is at present no freight plane which is available for the lift of stores in support of the Army. Armstrong-Whitworth, an organisation located in my division, is doing its best to develop a freight plane. I should like to ask the Secretary of State to get the Minister of Supply to give priority to the development of a freight plane by an English company because neither the Armed Forces nor the commercial airlines are equipped with any sort of freight plane at all.
Unless this country does equip itself either commercially or militarily with such a freight plane, the idea that we can move our strategic reserve about the world is even more limited than it appears at first sight. It is important for the Government to act and the Government must give this priority. It does not matter whether a freight plane is provided for the use of the Air Force, or whether it is put in general commercial use. It is a strategic necessity in either event.
As to the second point, I hope that the idea that the Army should have a substantial airlift tied up in Transport Command will be frowned upon. After all, in the days of sea movement we always relied on the ordinary commercial merchant navy to move both personnel and stores. While I recognise that Transport Command ought to have a small tactical airlift for both personnel and stores, in time of war we must surely rely, for strategic purposes, upon the pool of lifting capacity which is available in the commercial airlines. We have this for trooping at the moment; the independent companies are carrying it out. But in the lifting of freight there is no pool at the moment. If any such capacity is provided in future I hope that it will be under commercial control and not locked up under military control.
The third point is the extent to which, even assuming that there is sufficient lifting capacity by air, both passenger and freight, available, it can really be used for lifting our strategic reserve around the world. I would support the remarks which were made by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) about the limitations which are placed on the use of a strategic reserve when it is simply moved by air. Part of our strategic reserve is to consist of armoured brigades. Presumably it is intended that they should be used. Such an armoured brigade will have at least 150 tanks, an armoured carrier squadron, a medium regiment of the Royal Artillery, detachments of Royal Engineers, and Signals, and, of course, an administrative tail. To move that armoured brigade around the world would be quite impracticable by air, except for the personnel who go with rifles.
It may be useful, as an extension of the Metropolitan Police force idea, to have men moving round the world with rifles to keep order, but our strategic reserve, if it contains armoured brigades, must surely be either located in the places where it is most likely to be useful or its usefulness will be severely limited by the fact that it will have to be moved by sea in the old-fashioned and traditional method. The idea that it can pick up its stores from conveniently placed depots round the world is not really practicable.
First, the unit equipment of every armoured brigade would have to be issued in quadruplicate, so that the equipment would be in this country and there would be, in addition, spares and copies of it elsewhere throughout the world. It would be far too expensive to provide this for armoured brigades. Secondly, the cost of maintaining such spares of unit equipment at four different places throughout the world would be colossal. One would need highly-skilled mechanical and technical staff to deal with the problems of storing heavy equipment of that sort for years and years, while it was both deteriorating and becoming outmoded.
Thirdly, the problems of issuing it to the unit that had just arrived for the first time in a theatre would be very substantial indeed. After all, when we tried to re-equip a division in full fighting trim with no more than a new type of tank, in February, 1945, it took weeks to do it. At that time, Cromwells were sent out for a division withdrawn from the line. It took a full month to carry out that operation, with all the facilities of an Army already established in the field to assist, and with an armoured division that had had experience for about four years of active fighting with tanks.
A unit that was simply being flown from this country for the first time to pick up a quantity of equipment that it had never seen would, I suspect, take a considerable amount of time before it could possibly be battleworthy. It might, indeed, take a longer time than would be taken in having its own equipment sent round the Cape—if that was the necessary sea journey—in order to make it effective.
That brings me to the final point, which is that if we are to have forces that are intended to meet the strategic requirements of this country, limited though they may be, surely they should be disposed round the world on the basis of the strategic requirements of the Commonwealth as a whole; and surely the Commonwealth as a whole must consider the strategic problems that face it. I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to assure the Committee that this country has had consultations about the disposition of the available forces within the Commonwealth countries, and that our strategic reserves, with those of the other Commonwealth countries, will be disposed in a manner which will secure for all of us the best basis upon which we can all build to prevent another war ever starting and to deal with it if it does.

10.53 p.m.

Mr. James Simmons: We always seem to get these Army debates mucked up. Last year, the Estimates were not ready, and we had to discuss the subject in the air, as it were. This year the debate was suspended right in the middle, and, from what I can gather, the other opportunities for discussion will amount to about two hours, when the Guillotine falls at 9.30 in the near future.
This is not traditional. By tradition, the Army debates used to be long, lively and, I think, effective. There was plenty of time to air grievances before Supply was granted, and hon. Members looked forward to those debates. There is today a disgraceful attendance for an Army debate. We always used to look forward to a good attendance, with plenty of crossing of swords, and a good time was had by all.
My hon. and gallant Friend opposite—I know it is not traditional to call them friends when they sit opposite, but I am not a traditionalist in that respect—the hon. Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) referred to tradition in his speech. I was very amused by his description of an Army football match because I have been in some of them myself; but he must not run away with the idea that it is only Army teams that adopt those tactics of kicking the ball out, when winning, ten minutes from the end of the game. I

have known first-class teams do that. I have known Barnsley do it. I remember that they met West Bromwich in the semi-final of the Cup and when they were winning they kept the ball out until the game was over.

Mr. Fernyhough: West Bromwich did that to Port Vale a couple of years ago.

Mr. Simmons: In spite of the alleged progress made in mechanisation, and in spite of other new-fangled ideas, the old foot-slogging soldier has a very important part to play in the future of the Service. Last year when we discussed the Army Estimates we had a Memorandum from the then Secretary of State, who is now rusticating among his pigs and supervising agriculture, and I presume turning swords into ploughshares. The new Secretary of State has deserted the ploughshares and now has to undertake the difficult task of balancing nuclear and conventional weapons. I hope that his brow does not get furrowed in doing it.
We are again considering manpower, which has been one of the central themes of these debates for two or three successive years. Last year views were expressed in the White Paper as to whether we should secure sufficient manpower to carry out the pledge that compulsory military service would be abolished by the end of 1962, and there was the question of the possibility of a continuance of some form of limited compulsory service. I have delved into and waded through the White Paper for this year, and I notice that the Government are very chary about making any reference to the possibility or otherwise of abolishing compulsory military service.
This year the Secretary of State says nothing about it. There is a factual section in the White Paper about manpower, without comment. We may have some comments later in this debate from the Financial Secretary as to whether he feels that the fears expressed in last year's White Paper still persist, in view of the figures published in this year's White Paper. The figures look a little more encouraging, and I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) that if we all put our shoulders to the wheel there is no


reason why we should not get somewhere near the figure we aim at for the time specified.
If the Army was 46,000 short last year, why are we spending £8,900,000 on terminal grants for officers and £4 million on terminal grants for other ranks? Incidentally, why pay only £4 million in respect of other ranks compared with over £8 million for officers? Surely there are more other ranks than officers. Why also do we more than double our expenditure on guns and small arms? The figure has risen from £3,981,000 to £8,876,000, to arm fewer bodies. It does not make sense to me, and I should like to have some explanation of it.
What kind of arms are we getting? I believe that it was the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) who mentioned the Vickers machine gun which was in operation in the 1914–18 war. Apparently we have not made any progress since then. That gun is still in use. There was a great deal of fuss some years ago about automatic rifles, but I understand that the bulk of the forces are still armed with the same old Lee-Enfield bolt rifle which we had in the 1914–18 war. Does this increased expenditure mean that we are getting better and more effective guns and small arms? If so, progress is being made. If not, there is a waste of expenditure.
I was glad to see that expenditure on publicity has risen from £40,000 to £70,000. In the debate on the Estimates last year I had some caustic things to say about the Government's public relations and publicity, and I criticised the Department, and as a result I had a courteous invitation from the head of the Department to look round the Department for myself. I spent a very useful, interesting and instructive time there and had a very good lunch, and from what I saw I believe that they are doing a very good job.
I was greatly impressed with the job they are doing with the small local papers, for I am a strong advocate of small local papers. In these days of the Press barons, Press lords and a mouth organ Press, which all says the same thing in a different way, the small independent paper has a very important rôle to pay. If, in the village, people know

that Tom So-and-So or Bill So-and-So is serving with one of the units of Her Majesty's Forces, has done something extra good and has obtained some publicity, it is very good for the morale of the Army and for recruitment.
I was particularly impressed when I went to the Department to find the wonderful service which it had with the local weekly papers, although I suspect that the big circulation daily papers still get more than their pound of flesh out of the War Office and think, "It is only taxpayers' money and we might as well have it." I hope that the good work of that Department will be continued and improved as a result of this increase in expenditure this year.
There is no doubt that the new pay code will be a great help in attracting the right kind of man to the forces. We want the right kind of man in the forces. In this modern Army we want the craftsman and the man who enters the forces determined to make a career of it, in the hope that while in the forces he will learn and will become proficient and will then be able, when he retires, time expired, to find a comparable and reasonable job outside. It is very important, as the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) said, that these men should be able to go into civilian life trained for a job and able to take their places in civilian life in remunerative jobs which will enable them to maintain the standard of life which they have had as long-serving soldiers in the Army.
But pay alone will not solve the problem. The hon. and gallant Member for Norwood rightly said that there were other things besides pay. There is also the status of the man in the Army. The Regular soldier must be made to feel that he is still a citizen with the rights of a citizen to be able to feed, clothe and shelter his wife and children adequately. He should have the right to express his opinions wherever he likes. If a craftsman, he should be entitled to full trade union rights. Let him be a member of a trade union while he is in the Services. His trade union membership will continue when he goes into civilian life and he will go into civilian life more than ever an equal with his fellow men. Those are important matters which should receive consideration.
In the bad old days, the soldier had to undergo a great number of indignities. I was very glad to hear the Secretary of State say that methods of discipline and so on in the Army were to be reviewed to see if life could be made easier—in the right sense—and more attractive. For one thing, there is the question of dress. That is very important. In my old days, we would not have stood for this old sloppy battle-dress. My old sergeant-major would have "gone off his nut" if we had gone on parade in the way that they go on parade today. We had to have boots and buttons properly polished, with not a button undone. When we walked out in our red jackets and pipe-clayed cuffs there was a pride in the corps to which we belonged and the decent soldier kept up that pride.
We have to do that in the Army today—and not only in the Army, but in the whole of our national life where there is this "don't-care" attitude and this sloppiness. The sooner we get back to a smart turn-out in the Army, the better it will be for the serving men, not only because it will make them good soldiers, but because it will make them good citizens and good men as well.
Bad publicity does the Army a great deal of harm and the treatment of those who have finished their time is one of the things that gives rise to bad publicity. I am very glad that the hon. Member for Aldershot, referred to the holders of the Victoria Cross, a matter which I have raised on several occasions in these debates. I have put down a Motion about this matter and if the hon. Member is so keen about the matter, I hope that he will sign that Motion.

[That this House, feeling that the annuity of £10, fixed in 1856 and at present only payable to other ranks holders of the Victoria Cross, inadequately expresses the nation's pride and gratitude to those whose heroism won its award, is of opinion that a substantial increase in the amount is long overdue; is of opinion that the method of special grants in cases of need in this connection is unsatisfactory; urges that the annuity should be paid irrespective of rank or means; and asks the Government to examine the position with a view to implementing the wishes of this House and the nation.]

There is a case of an Evesham V.C., Major Richard Willis, who is 81 years of

age and who recently appealed for a loan of £100 and who received more than enough money as a result of that appeal. Among those who sent him money was Noel Coward. He has said that what has been sent will enable him and his wife—she is 77 years of age—to live for another year until their son returns from Southern Rhodesia.

Major Willis was awarded the V.C. at Gallipoli where he was hit twenty-six times during the landing. He has not been prepared to disclose how much money he has received, but he has said that it will not take him and his wife into the luxury standard. He said:
Thanks to the kindness of the good people of Britain, we shall he able to continue an average living standard to which we were accustomed. Of course I should have preferred a job—
I hope that hon. Members will appreciate the spirit of the man, preferring a job at the age of 81—
but I am beginning to resign myself to the fact that people think i am too old to work.
Here is a V.C. of 81, with a wife of 77, who gets £10 a year. That amount used to be paid only to other ranks, but now it is paid to all ranks. If he wants further assistance, if he falls on evil days, he has to go through a humiliating means test.

Those whose courage and valour have won them the simplest but highest award in the annals of our Armed Forces deserve a far more generous treatment from what is supposed to be a grateful nation. It is not good enough for the Prime Minister or anybody else to say that if such men fall on evil days they can get as much as £70 a year. What is £70 a year?

There should be a substantial payment to the holders of the Victoria Cross, whether or not they are in need, as a token of the gratitude of the nation to the marvellous services that they have rendered to us, and the heroic courage that they must have displayed in order to win that award. I hope that the War Office will take the initiative in this matter. I suppose that it is really a Treasury matter, but surely the War Office has sufficient people of courage to beard the Treasury lions in their den and demand that something should be done for these people.

We look at the Estimates for the fourth year in succession with the nuclear weapon and the H-bomb as a background. In 1955 we were told that the use of nuclear weapons was the only means of countering the massive preponderance of Russia in conventional arms and forces—but only in the last resort, because the conscience of civilised nations must naturally recoil from the prospect of using these weapons. In 1956 we were told that Russia must not think that we need crave co-existence, because:
The increased power of the deterrent has made a global war more frightening and less likely.
We would use it only if attacked. The retaliatory power was said to be the vital factor.

Last year the defence of bomber bases was stressed. Civil Defence, we were told, would take care of any survivors there might be, but the initial job of the Forces was to protect the bomber bases. This year we go the whole hog; there will be nuclear retaliation straight away. We are told that that is the policy that we must pursue if we are to remain in N.A.T.O.

When we are shaping our defence forces we have to bear in mind the possibility of another Hungarian rising or its equivalent in another Iron Curtain country, which could be the signal for the start of an atomic war. There is the prospect of trouble in Berlin. Last time, we had the Berlin airlift, and the Army and the Air Force did a very good job, but if there is another bust-up in Berlin, might not it be the signal for the start of an atomic war, under paragraph 12 of the Defence White Paper? The prospect is frightening, but it does not make war less likely, in my opinion.

There is enough material in the documents issued during the last four years—in the Estimates and in regard to defence—to enable one to make the most devastating anti-war speech that has ever been made in the House of Commons or anywhere else. We are told that in the last five years defence has absorbed an average of 10 per cent. of the national product; that 7 per cent. of the working population is either in the Services or

supporting them; that one-eighth of the output of our metal-using industries, upon which our export trade largely depends, is devoted to the needs of defence, and that an undue proportion of qualified scientists and engineers are engaged on military work. Those are some of the facts which we must face when we are considering the manpower and organisation of the Army.

We were told in the 1957 White Paper that:
there is no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons.
If only a dozen got through they could inflict widespread devastation. I am not saying that; the Government are saying it. If we have large concentrations of troops in this country and we have a nuclear attack, what good will those troops be? What hope are we offered by the Government, who have given such a terrifying picture in their Defence and Services documents in the past four years? The Army Estimates are based again on the assumption that nuclear power is our salvation. I drew attention to this tendency during the debate last year. I said:
… we are being asked to vote sums of money, admittedly less than previously, for a new kind of Army, with new weapons. What worries me is whether we are going too far in the direction of nuclear war, leaving ourselves bare of the more conventional methods of defence. From what I can see at the moment we intend to equip our Army with nuclear warheads, and in the event of an attack in the West we would start the war as a nuclear war whatever the other side did. That has been said already only this week by a general in N.A.T.O. I wonder if we would do that. I thought we regarded the use of nuclear weapons as a reprehensible and horrible thing. Therefore I should have thought that if the other side used conventional weapons we would reply with conventional weapons.
But suppose the other side starts the war with conventional weapons and we have not got the conventional weapons with which to reply, we are either defenceless or we have to be the first in that war to use the weapon that we ourselves describe as the most monstrous and inhuman weapon that can be used in war.
It is a dilemma that ought to be faced, namely, whether we will commit ourselves to be the first, if necessary, to use the nuclear weapon, whatever the potential enemy does, or whether we will have sufficient power by way of conventional defence to fight a conventional war. The one thing we ought to guard


against is that the ultimate deterrent becomes the initial weapon in any future war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th May, 1957; Vol. 569, c. 294–5.]
Have we reached that position today? Has what was conceived as the ultimate weapon become the initial weapon in any major war that may break out in the near future?

In 1957 the Government were saying, that the possession of nuclear air power is not by itself a complete deterrent. This year they change their tune and say that there is no military reason why a world conflagration should not be prevented for another generation or more through the balancing fears of mutual annihilation. In fact there is no reason why this should not go on indefinitely. What a prospect; all this to go on indefinitely—living on our nerves, facing a blank future indefinitely.

That statement was followed by the statement that the overall superiority of the West is likely to increase as a consequence of the advent of medium-range ballistic rockets against which there is at present no answer. Is there an answer? We have not yet got the rockets. I understand that a few are being sent over very shortly and that we are to build bases for them. Have the Russians got the answer? In successive White Papers the Government have made our flesh creep but they give us no real answer to the problems which arise.

In 1929, when I took part in my first Army Estimates debates, I was still suffering from a "hang-over" from the First World War. I took the line of total unilateral disarmament. Today I realise that I was wrong. Since then have lived through another war. I do not believe that the answer is arrived at by simple unilateral disarmament. It is not enough even if we get safety. We should surrender something more important than our bodies or lives. We should surrender our minds, intellects and souls to the totalitarians. We dare not do it. The dead would rise up to reproach us and the unborn generations would curse us. We all hate war and have reason to hate with greater intensity the kind of war with which we are now threatened, but almost all of us would feel ashamed and frustrated living under a tyranny imposed by Communism.

Mr. Zilliacus: Why should they impose tyranny?

Mr. Simmons: They did it in Hungary, and Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Zilliacus: Does my hon. Friend seriously believe that the Soviet Union means to come over here and impose Communism? Has he taken leave of his senses? Does he not accept what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), that the Soviet Union no more wants war than we do?

Mr. Simmons: I remember Hungary. That is enough. The answer is not in weakening ourselves and waving the white flag, but in being strong enough to lead the world to peace instead of being dragged at anybody's coat-tails.
The only answer to all these Defence White Papers and Estimates is a disarmament agreement, and the only way to that is for someone to give a bold and definite lead. The Government tell us:
The Western Nations and the Soviet Union face one another with deep-seated mutual distrust. Each fears that the other has aggressive intentions.
Someone has to break the deadlock and we believe it is Britain's rôle. What are the Government doing about it? The Prime Minister tells us that he is desperately anxious that summit talks should succeed, but if he and his Government will not even postpone missile bases while the talks are in progress how can he expect success? The Prime Minister holds out his hand to his Soviet opposite number and says. "Let's link hands and climb to the summit." They reach the summit and his Soviet fellow-traveller says, "Show me the promised land, Mac". And the Prime Minister says," Look at those wonderful rocket sites and at our wonderful nuclearised Army. We can smash your industries to hell, we can immobilise your bases and we can promise you annihilation, unless you accept our idea of peace." The Russian Prime Minister can turn round and retort, "Same to you, chum. Let's go down again."
It is not by threats and fear that we shall get a summit success. That will come only when someone is prepared to


give a little. Was it not Kipling, the poet of British Imperialism, who wrote, praying
For heathen heart that puts her trust
In reeking tube and iron shard …
Thy mercy on Thy People, Lord!
The bomb, the ultimate deterrent, alone cannot save the world from war. Army expenditure cannot do it. To defence preparations must be added world statesmanship. The impetuous bravery of the fighting men is less important at this time than the courageous leadership of the statesman. Time enough to yell a defiant "No surrender" when the parleys have broken down. The statesman, by displaying leadership, can prevent the parleys breaking down and can win, by reason, a greater victory than either conventional or nuclear weapons could secure.
We must make the summit talks the beginnings of real peace and to do this we must be prepared as a nation to take as many risks for peace as we do for war. Therefore, Parliament, through the Government, must give a lead to the whole world that we are prepared to make concessions for peace, even if concessions such as the suspension of H-bomb tests, the bringing out of the air of the planes carrying the H-bombs and the postponement of the start of the missile bases, would be a danger to us; that is a risk that ought to be taken. It would be a token of good will that would put the Soviet on the defensive and would be a challenge to their sincerity. I am sure that every right-thinking man and woman in these islands hopes that Britain will give that lead for peace. Parliament must demand that leadership before it is too late, and it is much later than most of us think.

11.25 p.m.

Captain F. V. Corfield: I do not wish to keep The House long at this hour of the night, and I hope, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) will forgive me if I do not follow him in his remarks. I wish to confine my own words to a few comments on the subject of manpower.
Most people, I think, will agree that the advantages of a purely volunteer Army far outweigh one which involves

the element of conscription; but, so far as my position goes, if the men are not forthcoming and we have to rely on conscription, then the disadvantages of this fact must be faced as being far more important than the attractions of merely doing away with National Service.
Last week, in the debate on defence, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said that while troops were coming forward for the fighting arms it was difficult to get men for the support arms; in his own words, for the unromantic but essential jobs of storemen, clerks, lorry drivers, and so on. We have to bear in mind that there is only a limited record, so far, of the recruiting position under the new arrangements on which we can base conclusions, but I suggest that the state of affairs to which I have referred gives some ground for encouragement.
That is not altogether surprising, for I have always taken the view that there is always a more or less fixed number of people who will be attracted by Service life and that, provided conditions are reasonable, such people will join the Services. Increases of pay, and so on, do not make very much difference to the numbers of those of whom I am speaking. Nor, as experience between the two world wars showed us, will employment and unemployment in civilian life make a great deal of difference to the numbers joining the Army. But if we assume that the bulk of these men who will join wish to serve in a genuine fighting unit, then I think that there is probably room for a different type of engagement; that is, a different type of engagement for these auxiliary functions. One of the main reasons why the nation as a whole is not attracted to Service life is the moving about the world which is involved, and the absence of any settled married life. These people are not unpatriotic, and I believe that their service could be used to solve the present problem.
I suggest that, for many of these duties, there could be terms of engagement for men to serve purely in a particular station with, of course, the usual obligations for training, and so on, but without the obligation of posting to other stations in different parts of the world except in times of emergency. If


that was done, it would relieve the pressure on recruiting for that particular type of job, and the same principle could be adopted by which permanent garrisons overseas could make use of the local inhabitants in a similar way.
Of course, a quite different state of affairs applies in the case of forces serving in foreign stations abroad, such as in Germany, where the troops have all to be on the same Regular footing; but if we could make use of people who were not prepared to take on the ordinary terms of engagement, but a limited engagement such as I have suggested, we might make progress with recruiting for the auxiliary duties.
My second consideration is that many of our specialist corps which have grown up to pro vide these particular functions are of recent origin, or having only recently extended their functions to cover duties previously carried out by regimental soldiers. An obvious example is to be found in attaching Royal Army Pay Corps officers to front line units. I have often wondered about the wisdom or necessity of that practice of substituting Pay Corps officers to do the work which the P.R.I. has done in the past.
I have always sympathised very much with the regimental officers who have to do this job, because most of them find it extremely tedious. Nevertheless, in a period when we have relatively short careers in the Army the experience might be of some value, particularly if it is backed by a really comprehensive course which officers could attend. It might be of considerable value to them in civilian life and enable them to occupy executive posts at a fairly early stage.
The next matter with which I want to deal in connection with recruiting is that of the officer structure in the junior grades. It is obvious that in the nature of things we shall always have a considerable number of junior officers and N.C.O.s who have no hope at all of reaching the higher ranks. Uncertainty of promotion beyond the rank of major means, in many cases, that an officer looks forward to reaching the height of his career in the very early 'thirties. That is bound to have a very dampening effect on recruitment, very often among the best type of potential officer. It is fairly obvious that the ambitious type of

officer, faced with the prospect of that happening, might well think that he would be better off doing something else.
I have mentioned this before in the House and I am still quite convinced that there is something in what I propose to say. Certainly, no one would wish to put the clock back to what might be described as the pre-Belisha period when in many regiments officers served anything between twelve and eighteen years before reaching the rank of captain. I have always had very grave doubts, however, as to the wisdom or necessity of fixing the maximum age for command as low as it is today.
We are always being told that the rapid technical progress in the Army makes the strain of modern war too great for older people. From what I have read, from what my father told me and from what hon. Members have told me. I very much doubt whether conditions of active service contemplated today could result in a greater physical strain than those imposed by the appalling conditions of the 1914–18 war. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the officer's promotion rate before 1914, I doubt whether we have ever had in this country, or are ever likely to have, a Regular Army of a higher calibre than that with which we started the so-called Kaiser's war.
I should have thought that there was a considerable case to be made for extending the period of service in the junior ranks, thereby bringing them at a somewhat older age to the higher ranks. The main disadvantage of long periods as a junior officer is the boredom and frustration produced by doing the same job long after an officer knows that he is capable of fulfilling the duties of the rank above, or even those of the rank above that. This can be completely overcome today to the very great advantage not only of the individual concerned, but to the Service as a whole, by a system of secondment between the Services, or between one arm and another within a Service.
I do not for a moment suggest that we should go back to anything like the long periods of the pre-Belisha era. I think that we have gone too far in the other direction. Although I have put forward this suggestion before, although


it has met with all sorts of excuses and although I have not received very much encouragement, I hope that my right hon. Friend will look at the matter again.
The final point with which I wish to deal is that of finding reasonably attractive civilian employment for those who, inevitably, whatever other arrangements we make, will still have to retire at a fairly early age. I have had some correspondence with the Secretary of State mainly on the question of trying to find these officers places in equivalent grades in the Civil Service or other Government employment.
The attitude seems to be that such prospects are very limited, because the civil servant is more skilled than the officer is and it would upset the recruitment and promotion of the Civil Service. I do not accept that. Many Regular officers from all Services transferred to the Civil Service after the last war, and many of them have been exceedingly successful. And I do not think that it need necessarily have any effect on recruitment into the Civil Service.
If it is clearly understood on entry to certain branches that serving officers may enter at a later age, there is nothing unfair to other people who go in knowing full well that that will happen. Moreover, there is a case for some reintroduction of the short service commission to help with the problem. It might well be an additional attraction if, in certain branches of Government employment, a short service commission was almost a prerequisite for that type of employment.
We have been told over and over again by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence and successive Secretaries of State for War that it is the Government's intention to raise the status of the British soldier in society. We must face facts. When one raises someone's status one may well have to lower that of somebody else. We must make it absolutely clear that military service, with its various disadvantages—serving abroad, separation from one's family, and the discipline, which means that behaviour of the Maclean and Burgess type would not be tolerated for five minutes in the Army—deserves a good prospect in civilian life when retirement occurs at an early age.

11.37 p.m.

Dr. Barnett Stross: I hope that the hon. and gallant Member for Gloucestershire, South (Captain Corfield) will not think it discourteous of me if I do not follow his remarks, except to say that I found it difficult to agree with him when he suggested that we should let officers wait rather longer before giving them positions of responsibility in the higher grades. It seems to me that as the Army is facing novel problems it would be as well to pick out young people, who are more able to adapt themselves to new conditions, and give them advancement fairly soon.
I wish to speak on a subject about which I know something. I am not accustomed to speak in these debates, and I participate only because I am deeply interested in the defence of the civilian population. A very real provision is now being made by the Army to assist, and form a link with, services made available for the general population by way of Civil Defence. I refer to the Mobile Defence Corps.
I shall ask the Under-Secretary some pertinent questions and make some suggestions. They will be based upon my own experience in training men and women in Civil Defence. I can boast that I have helped to rescue a number of people under all sorts of conditions, and, best of all, I myself know what it is like to be rescued. In these circumstances, I feel that it is better that I should limit myself to a number of factors associated with the necessary link now being formed between local defence and the Armed Forces.
According to the Memorandum, the Mobile Defence Corps now stands at 33 battalions, and these battalions—consisting, I presume of 600 persons each—are here in the United Kingdom. I understand—I believe this is correct—that there are ultimately to be 48. I cannot see why there should be this limitation. Why should not virtually everybody in the Army have some elementary training so that they can be used to assist the civilian population if we sustain an attack by means of modern weapons from some enemy? The training would not interfere with the normal training of the soldier.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will correct me if I am wrong; I should not like to mislead the Committee, but I understand that the Mobile Defence Corps, besides being trained to be of assistance to the civilian population, linking up with the mobile civilian columns, also have a full and normal training as soldiers.
Nothing would be lost to the skill of the soldier if this other extra experience and skill were added. But a total of 48 battalions would still give us fewer than 30.000 men fully trained for this purpose, and I do not see why we should limit ourselves in this respect. At least one in every two of our 340,000 men and women in the Services should have this elementary training. As to the type of training that they should have, I presume that they would have to know something about first-aid. They would have to know something about the engineering tasks that might confront them when required to rescue people. They would have to have some knowledge of combating fire, but without special fire-fighting appliances.
These battalions would be the most disciplined groups that we should have in the country, and with training they would feel confidence in handling and rescuing wounded people.

Mr. Edelman: Would my hon. Friend say from his experience whether there is any known antidote to the effects of radiation burns, and, if so, whether there is any form of training which these mobile columns could receive?

Dr. Stross: I shall deal with every one of these points as I proceed.
The men in these units may have certain problems to face. The hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) said that the best service we can possibly render to our country is to see that war is not allowed to break out at all. That is a sentiment with which we all agree. But whatever problems may possibly have to be faced, it would be a great dis-service if we did not open our eyes and stare these horrors straight in the face and accept them as possibilities. If we do not do that, it is cowardice of a despicable order not to face the problem and fail to take action so that we may know what to do.
Perhaps it needs very great courage to face some of these brutal truths, but we must not speak lightly about spreading gloom and despondency because we recognise and tackle the problem. There are no secrets about these matters. Has not the Home Office most carefully investigated all possibilities? Have not our colleagues and allies in the United States given us ample reports?
I have been greatly helped by being allowed to see in manuscript some of the chapters of a book not yet in print—a comprehensive volume on all these matters written by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker). I think that it will soon be in print. The factual things I shall say will probably be fully documented and exactly true.
It is the intention, I understand, that the Mobile Defence Battalions, after they have finished their active service in the Army, where, of course, they will have other duties to do apart from learning how to handle casualties and how to rescue them, shall be on reserve and do 15 days' a year training while on reserve. Then they will be posted as near to their homes as possible. I leave that matter there.
I hope, however, that the Under-Secretary of State will remember that I cannot see for the life of me why we should limit ourselves to 48 battalions or, as we have at the moment, 33, and why we should not give virtually everyone some elementary training so that no one will be afraid to handle casualties. When people without training meet casualties they are frightened of wounds, frightened of broken bones. Surely it is essential that as many people as possible should know how to give assistance to their neighbours. I emphasise this. Let us have as many as possible of these men, under discipline of a type we may not be able to get from anybody else—these young men, energetic, trained.
In the First World War we did not have any Civil Defence to speak of. There was no need. In the Second World War, everybody knows that it was a very important element in our defence. Now, with the possibility of a surprise attack with nuclear weapons against us, we must give it the very highest priority, for it


becomes not a specialised but a nationwide enterprise to be able to assist one another.
I have mentioned the sort of simple training I think they should have. What sort of equipment are they to get? Obviously, they will have engineers with them. Obviously, they will have a doctor or doctors with them. I ask that they should have a higher degree of medical personnel with them than we get in the average unit. The reasons are obvious. What will they have by way of equipment? Some of it can be quite simple, but it should be plentiful, and I think that it has to be stored where it can be safe. I mean bandages, simple types of splints, metal and wooden. They, too, should be stored. While we are not in danger, while we are at peace—and we all pray we shall ever be at peace—these units can store for themselves, away from major centres of population, I hope, and in real safety, antibiotics, blood and serum. As many as possible of them should know how to give a hypodermic injection for the purpose of sedation in certain types of casualty.
Normally, the purpose of an army is said to be to seek out its opponent, grapple with it and defeat it, but no army can be indifferent to the security of the base on which it operates, and the base is the whole of our country. Therefore, the Army obviously is tremendously interested in civilian defence. We must, as far as lies within our power, by every means within our power, prevent excessive damage from being done to our cities, to our installations, and so on.
In effect, therefore, we will have three echelons of defence of the type I think of, of which the first and second will be civilian, and the third this particular Mobile Defence Corps. If one thinks in terms of total numbers, of everyone involved, including civilians, who will work with those three echelons, we have a figure that looks formidable—threequarters of a million. That would include the Industrial Civil Defence Corps, the Auxiliary Fire Service, the National Hospital Service Reserve and the mobile units that I have been describing.
We must now consider, on their behalf, what special difficulties the members of such a task force must face as compared with the last war. I have noted three things. First, they must face the vastly-increased explosive power of nuclear weapons as compared with chemical weapons. Secondly, they must face the increasing ease of delivery against us—as a possibility—of these nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they have to take note of the effects of a radioactive cloud, and be prepared to do all possible—so far as they can do anything.
In the last war it was thought to be prohibitively expensive if an average of 5 per cent. of attacking aircraft were brought down in each raid. Based on that, we can estimate the sort of problem we must face. I have here an example used by Professor Blackett as an illustration. Assume that we have 400 square miles that it is wished utterly to destroy; how can it be done? The answer is that in the last war it would have taken 10,000 sorties of bombers carrying chemical bombs, each of 10 tons. If atom bombs were being carried, 50 sorties would be enough. But if the H-bomb, say of 10 megatons, were used, one sortie—one aeroplane—would be enough. That gives some conception of how difficult it is to guarantee that we shall not be affected by some of these weapons.
We should assume that some may get through. It has been calculated that 100 bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would do very great damage, and, if they were dropped in the places of greatest human concentration and industry, would probably incapacitate us and make us unable to conduct warfare from these islands as a base. To prevent that happening to us we would have to shoot down 90 out of every 100 bombers, and that is very difficult. Equally, if we are faced with H-bombs, we must, if we are to survive, shoot down an even higher percentage.
The figures that should be considered by all of us have been discussed, of course, here, in the United States and elsewhere. Everyone will remember that the originator of the hydrogen bomb is Dr. Teller, who used to work with Oppenheimer, and assisted him in making the atom bomb. When Oppenheimer could not face the manufacture


of the H-bomb, Teller took over from him and made it. He suggested that certain things should, and must, be done. Amongst them was the suggestion that there should be deep underground shelters for the whole of the civilian population. Next, there must be shelter—real shelter—from radioactive contamination of stores of food.
Dr. Teller thought that in the United States one could store enough food for two years. He also postulated storing trucks and machinery so that if an attack was staged, and the country was paralysed temporarily, use could be made of the trucks and machinery and food and the country could survive.
The cost is staggering. He suggested that it would be 24,000 million dollars. N.A.T.O. official policy has rejected the idea. It has said, "This will not do. It is stupendous. We cannot face it." Instead, N.A.T.O. official policy is that we must combine evacuation with some shelter. Everybody understands that evacuation in a small country is a little more difficult than on a continent. We have to think in terms of the time factor and how much warning we should have. We must not blink at the fact that in Britain it would not be easy to evacuate anybody. Indeed, if we were not careful there would be great numbers of deaths among evacuated people if they were outside in the open air and there was a radioactive cloud following upon a bomb explosion.

The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but he will realise that we cannot discuss general A.R.P. arrangements. We are concerned here only with the Mobile Defence Corps.

Dr. Stross: Yes, but I do not see how we can discuss these 30,000 men—and I hope that in time there will be 150,000 of them—unless we discuss the problems which they must face. They must adapt themselves through training. If we were to say that they cannot be trained to help us that would be fantastic. It would mean that we should have to throw up the sponge. As I am now discussing the task which this section of the Army must face, I submit that I am probably in order, but I will do my best to follow your advice, Sir Gordon.
In the United States, Mr. Val Peterson, who is in command of all these protective services, expresses views which year by year have become more and more serious. That is understandable. At first, he thought that one-third of the population of the United States might he affected by a surprise attack, but at the end of last year he said that even if shelter were provided 50 per cent. of the population might be lost in the early days of an attack. We should take these figures and see how they match for us. It is very easy to fall into complete despair, but that is not our temperament and that we must not do.
Atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, or even chemical bombs might be dropped on centres of population. We know that the area of damage of the two-ton blockbuster of the old type was three acres. The area for an atom bomb is 2,000 acres and for a hydrogen bomb it is infinitely greater. It is assumed that an atom bomb of the type which we know as a tactical weapon, similar to the bombs dropped in 1945, would damage about 65,000 British-type houses as compared with the houses of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and that we should have 50,000 fatal casualties. That is assuming that it is dropped on a city with a population density of 45 per acre.
If an atom bomb were used, there would, therefore, be a great deal of work to be done. As far as human flesh will permit, we must go in to assist as soon as possible. On the periphery of the damage there would be immediate skilled work to be done by the engineers, the excavators and those who know a little about first-aid, who could take people away to the nearest area where there was a chance of hospital treatment.
If it were a hydrogen bomb, however, words almost fail us, because we know that wherever it dropped—New York, Moscow, London, Manchester or Birmingham—there would be much more extensive damage. I am advised that there would be total destruction over a diameter of eight miles and moderate-severe damage over 32 miles. This is assuming that it is a large bomb—a 10 megaton bomb.
In London, we have the L.C.C. area and the Metropolitan area. There would be no opportunity of going in to assist


in the L.C.C. area if the bomb fell in the centre, because nothing would be left alive and human helpers could not go in to assist. Outside that area there might be a fire storm 20 miles in depth. Those who are going to help must wait for that to subside. I do not know whether there are any fire-fighting appliances which could tackle such a fire. The Germans found it impossible in Hamburg; they had to wait until the fire storm subsided before they could assist.
That has covered an area with a radius 27 miles from the burst, and outside that area there would be damage and people injured, many of whom could be saved. There would be burns, but not everyone is burned to death; not every-one gets extensive third degree burns or second degree burns. There are burns from which it is possible to survive. It is, therefore, no use our giving up hope and saying that we can do nothing. Equally, it is no use our deceiving ourselves into thinking that these tasks would not be horrible, difficult and perhaps, in some cases, insuperable. In a great city there would be no doctors, for they would be dead, and there would be no nurses, for there would be none left. There would be tasks which could not be handled from inside.
Of course, all our potential enemies understand that what could happen to us could also happen to them. There are people who believe that it is likely that the countries of the world will do this to each other, but I do not agree; I think that it is most unlikely. But all of us in the Committee wonder: do we have to go on like this? In the last third of his speech my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) made an impassioned plea on this issue. My hon. Friend is right. When we see what we may do to each other as human beings in the world, wherever we be, these strange labels which we pin on each other about capitalism and Communism do not seem quite as important, and it encourages one to speak as my hon. Friend did when he said that if there is a risk entailed in making peace let us not show less courage than we have been accustomed to show in war. The prize is glittering and the prize is very great, indeed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman), who is not now in his place, asked me about radiation. Of course, it is true that if a bomb were dropped and burst at ground level it would not do as much damage by means of heat and flash and destruction as if it were burst in the air, but the radiation damage would be terribly extensive and we know the type of radioactive cloud—anything up to 200 miles long and up to 40 miles in width—which would flow as the wind would blow it.
In other words, Birmingham, only about 100 miles from London, would be within the 140-mile range where the burst of a 10 megaton hydrogen bomb would give a radioactive cloud measuring 800 roentgens in radioactivity. Anyone exposed to that for 36 hours in the open would die. We have to remember—and this is the point that I made earlier—that evacuation could be difficult and dangerous—

Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: On a point of order. Is it relevant, on the Army Estimates, to give a description of the destruction of Birmingham by a bomb which would obviously be dropped only by an air force?

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. S. Storey): I was thinking, when the hon. Member started to deal with evacuation, that he was getting somewhat far from the Army Estimates.

Dr. Stross: I apologise if I am getting out of order, but I am discussing the help which the civilian population is to get from the 33 Army battalions specially trained to help in Civil Defence and it is, therefore, completely relevant to discuss the things which those units must face and in which they must help not only themselves, but their fellow countrymen.
It has been gruesome and beastly. I accept all that, and I have not shirked it. I could have spoken at greater length. I know how tough it is to talk about these things. I have not found it easy to describe and I am a medical man with much experience and fairly hardened to these things. I hope that the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke)


does not think that I object to his interruption. I hope that I shall never have to speak in this way on this subject again. I must end on a more pleasant note and it is easy to do so.

Mr. Mellish: Before my hon. Friend leaves that topic, will he. with his scientific knowledge not agree that unilateral disarmament by Britain would not necessarily keep us free from radioactive damage, because hydrogen bombs dropped in Europe by America and Russia would affect Britain anyway?

Dr. Stross: I interrupted my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North on that very point. If we contract out and have no weapons and leave N.A.T.O. and become completely neutral, and if war breaks out between the two great nuclear giants and they drop a number of hydrogen bombs on Europe and the wind blows from the east towards us, there is no guarantee that it will not kill 60, 70, 80, or 90 per cent. of our population and virtually destroy us—as neutrals. That must be accepted.
We cannot save ourselves alone, but we can play our part in saving the whole of the world and ourselves with it. That is why I have put these matters before the Committee. They have to be faced. I wish that everybody in the country knew about them, especially the point that I have just discussed with my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish). We have to take the lead, and I think that we can do so and bring the world to safety. It is a task so well worth doing.
The other night I was discussing this question with someone who used to sit in this House—Lord Boyd Orr—and he said, "It should not be so difficult to save the world." I said, "Are you sure?" He said, "Yes; I would not bother about specific details at the summit talks; I would simply get agreement to cut world armament costs by 10 per cent. Then I would give half that back to the suffering citizens who are being so grievously taxed. They would enjoy that. The other 5 per cent. I would put into a common pool for the nations to spend together, and offer it to those who need it so badly—the underdeveloped nations of the world."
Lord Boyd Orr added, "That is £2,000 million a year. Just think what would happen if once we did that. Suspicions would tend to disappear; the wheels of industry everywhere would begin to turn, and those whom we were helping would not only bless us; they would remember us for ever as the country who started the cycle of events that destroyed suspicion and brought the world to peace."

12.11 a.m.

Dame Irene Ward: I do not want to enter into any of the general discussions which have ranged so widely. I want to exercise what I understand is my constitutional right to ask for the remedy of grievances before granting Supply.
When one approaches the War Office in connection with small details affecting individuals one finds a singular lack of knowledge on the part of that Department with regard to some of the grievances of those individuals. I have always believed that if we look after individuals and remedy injustices to them we build up a contented and happy community. That applies to the Services as well as to life in general. I have been considerably distressed at the fact that very often the War Office seems to know absolutely nothing about some of the smaller irritations which—as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) pointed out—seem to us, at any rate, to be disincentives to a happy and successful Army.
I want to discuss four points. First, want to take the case of one of my constituents. He joined the Territorials in 1932, when joining the Territorials was not a very popular thing to do. By 1939 he had become deputy adjutant of the regiment to which he belonged the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, in which regiment he has done all his service. He went right through the war with that régiment and undertook extended war service until 1949. In June of that year he applied for a short-service commission.
By 1957, when the time to bring his service to an end arrived, he having been gazetted in September, 1949—two months after he had applied for his extended war service commission—and


having served the full period, the War Office informed him that he had had a two months' break in his very long service and that his gratuity of £500 would therefore not be available to him.
When I took up the matter with the Under-Secretary he was very co-operative and sympathetic, but pointed out that there had been a break of two months. No one denied that. The point was, who was responsible? I had no knowledge of Army regulations and I wondered whether there was a regulation that when a person applied for a commission so many months had to elapse before he was gazetted. I could find no such regulation.
I therefore informed my hon. Friend that the break was due to the War Office. Here is a man who served continuously from 1932 until 1957, and came out of the Service with the rank of major. Suddenly he is told that there has been a break of two months in his service because the War Office did not gazette him until two months after his application for a commission. That is one of those Treasury inconsistencies and meannesses which makes people like me despair.
I am grateful for the way my hon. Friend has handled this question and I am looking forward to being told that, shortly, the gratuity will be paid. I mention the matter in case there may be other officers who have had a similar experience.
I will not go into the details of the second matter to which I wish to refer because it is complicated, but not long ago the Officers' Pension Society drew my attention to an anomaly regarding the payment of pensions to a small number of widows. Similar pensions had been paid by the Air Force and the Navy, but the Army was lagging behind. I find it extraordinary that in matters of this kind it is not possible to have coordinated action. I understand that Service Departments are sometimes so busy that there is not time to look at small details, but I sometimes wonder why it is not possible to detail someone to see that there is proper co-ordination.
This pension matter applies to a small number of people only, but I think that everyone is entitled to consideration. I

put down a Parliamentary Question asking whether we might expect an amendment to the regulation or whatever was necessary to bring the Army into line with the other Services, and I am glad to say that within a couple of days an undertaking was given that the Order in question would be amended.
I was told that it would be backdated to 1st January, 1958, and so I sent this good news to the society, only to discover that the society had raised this matter as long ago as 1956 and had made three further attempts to obtain the pensions in 1957. Then the society had become annoyed because four months had elapsed without the receipt of an acknowledgment from the War Office. I raised this complaint with the Secretary of State, who wrote to me in a pleasant way and said:
My Answer to your Question last Tuesday dealt, I think, with the point at issue, but I should like to say that I did much regret the delay in answering Captain Bullock's letter. He will soon, I hope, have an answer 'in terms of action' to add to the one he has already had from my Department.
That was all very nice, and one accepts the apology; but, when the anomaly had been discovered, the additional money which has come to a very small section of widows should have been backdated to the time when the society raised the case. I do not know how long the Navy and the Royal Air Force have been in paying, but when the case has been raised, letters have been received by the society from the War Office saying that the matter was under discussion, and I have had to raise the matter in the House to get justice, the least the War Office should do is to respond.
I am not blaming the War Office but the Treasury. Someone asked me whether the letter I received from the Secretary of State had an "F" on it. If so, that meant, "Dealt with by the finance department under the direction of the Treasury". It is very bad luck that the War Office should always get blamed for ill-treatment when the Treasury is to blame. I hope that my hon. Friend will tell me in due course that the pensions will be backdated.
In answer to my Question, the Secretary of State pointed out that widows need not apply, from which I assumed


that everything would be in order. The next thing that happened supports my view that the War Office does not concern itself with details. Somebody from the War Office rang the society and said that it was of importance, even though the statement had been made in the House, to find out which widows were entitled to this pension; and what did the society think could be done?
I should have thought the War Office had sufficient initiative, if it had made a mistake, to get into touch with the Director of the B.B.C., General Sir Ian Jacob who, as a soldier, would probably be interested in what happened to the widows. An announcement could have been made on the wireless saying that a mistake had been made and that widows who thought they were not covered should apply, and their case would be dealt with.
The third point is that of widows in general. I understand that this matter was raised in detail by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot. I want to reinforce this. It is intolerable that the Service Departments, the War Office in particular, should go on the whole time saying that nothing further has been done for the Service widows. It took a great deal of effort to get the basic pension altered; it had run for 100 years.
I listened to the hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) talk about what the civilian people in industrial life would do and what they would or would not stand. I cannot imagine any section of the community who have gone through what the Service widows went through in two world wars, yet we have permitted the pensions of the widows of officers and other ranks to remain unchanged for 100 years. That is a most extraordinary thing. There has been one small alteration, and when any Questions are put in the House about the matter the answer inevitably is that their position was bettered in, I think, 1956, and that since the Royal Warrant gave an increase, the War Office thinks that all that was necessary has been done. I say it has not, and that the War Office is failing in the meanest possible way.
The pension of the widow of a captain is £115 10s. a year and what the Officers' Pension Society is suggesting is an increase to £133 a year. That is only

£17 10s. more. Actually the pension is considerably less than the National Insurance pension which, as we all know, has now gone up to £130 a year. It is below the National Assistance scale. As the Government are always discussing economy and money matters I cannot see why the pension cannot be raised. If people have an income of only £115 a year they can draw National Assistance benefit. Such people may have been unfortunate in life, or unlucky, or have had no opportunity to save, and fallen on evil times; but here we are concerned with widows of members of Her Majesty's Armed Forces.
I do not think that anybody can feel that we are being generous when we are giving the widow of a captain, or a lesser rank, £115 a year by way of pension. I think that it is a scandal. I do not know how any occupants of the Government Front Bench can rest in their beds at night when they realise what is the true position.
The same applies to the widows of what we term "other ranks". We want to see justice done for those who have served in Her Majesty's Armed Forces. I hope that, even if we get a negative reply tonight—as we do all the time—the Secretary of State for War when going over the Estimates, and when all the great plans for recruiting have matured and all the decisions which have to be taken have been taken, will find a little time to look at this question. I can say no more than that. I am only too regretful that the Parliamentary system does not allow an hon. Member to register a vote against the handling of this specific problem.
There is one other matter to which I should like to refer, and that is the abatement of the pensions of those people who also receive old age pensions. It is a matter which was raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke). He made a speech on the subject during, consideration of the Naval Estimates last Tuesday, but what happened? He made his remarks, and when the Civil Lord to the Admiralty replied to the debate, he never referred to the subject at all.
I would say, of course, that this arrangement was brought in when a Socialist Government were in power.


They did so many mean things that I was naturally looking forward to my Government putting the matter right; but sometimes I find that I am bitterly disappointed.
When all these magnificent new arrangements for attracting people into the Army have been put into operation—I notice that we are increasing the amount of money being spent on publicity and all that kind of thing—shall we, at the same time as we point out the improved conditions to which we have given so much publicity, also point out that the retired pay is not what it purports to be because of this abatement?
We are always being told how difficult it is to find ways and means of helping the small fixed-income groups. Everybody says that they ought to be helped and that they wish they could be helped, but when there are ways of helping them the Government run a mile and do nothing about it. That makes me extremely disillusioned and extremely angry.
Why is it not possible to ensure that retired pay is paid in full without this abatement in view of the fact that these people have paid for their stamps under the National Insurance scheme? I hope that when my hon. Friend winds up the debate, in spite of the lateness of the hour and because it is so rarely that we can express these grievances, he will be able to tell us why this extraordinary state of affairs continues to exist. He should remember that the Service Departments, the Prime Minister and the whole of the Government are always making pledges about improving conditions.
At Margate last year the Prime Minister was very conclusive about those living on small fixed incomes. I want a specific explanation why, when we have the opportunity to do something in this direction, we do not take it.
That is all I have to say, except that when all the problems that have to be solved are solved I hope that the Secretary of State for War and the Financial Secretary will look into the case of the small fixed-income groups for whom, I think, the Service Departments have a very great responsibility.

12.34 a.m.

Mr. Robert Woof: The hon. Lady the Member for Tynemouth (Dame Irene Ward) expressed her sentiments about Service pensions in very strong language, and the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) and my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) expressed similar disgust at the pension awards and at the meagre allowances made to those who have been awarded the Victoria Cross.
We see from Vote 10, page 163 of the Estimates, that field marshals, when unemployed, are to be placed on half pay. Under the new scales they are entitled to draw £14 a day. We now understand that if they become unemployed they draw £7 a day. That is very nice.
We only hope that they do not suffer the callous injustice that many of us did under the means test system. Does a means test apply to them? If it does, I wonder whether they will be subjected to the treatment many of us were years ago, when our dole was stopped because we were said to be not genuinely seeking work when there were about 3½ million unemployed. It seems strange that, with all the adjustments that have been made, there is still one law for the rich and one for the poor.
I shall confine my observations to the disposal of the taxpayers' money, a matter which is always the subject of argument. Like the Estimates of the Ministry of Defence, the Army Estimates apply resources to meet the needs of defence. On 26th February, the Minister of Defence implied that the Government's defence policy should be looked at over a five-year period. I wonder what conditions and political pressures will, through fear or imagined fear, prevail internationally during the next five years. When we give thought to future human existence, there is no doubt that the rapid changes in these very stirring times often leave us wondering what will happen next.
I note with special interest that according to paragraph 14 of the Memorandum
it has been decided to separate the Arabian Peninsula from the Middle East Command. An independent integrated command will be established on 1st April, 1958, with headquarters in Aden. It will be responsible direct to London for our commitments in the Arabian Peninsula and in British Somaliland.


I think it true to say that of all stations the Aden Protectorate is the one to which the soldier will least want to go. It is noted for its barrenness and extremely hot climate. What length of service has a soldier to do in Aden—twelve months, eighteen months, or two years? Is any extra pay or allowance given? Much the same considerations apply to our forces in Trucial Oman.
As long as the Western industrial economy has to rely so largely on the oil lying beneath the desert sands of the countries around the Persian Gulf, one can appreciate the need for our commitments which figure in the Estimates in respect of the defence and internal security of those areas. In this connection, I should like to refer to what the Minister of Defence said in the defence debate on 26th February:
The basic aim of our policy is to play our part with others in preserving peace and freedom throughout the world and in protecting democracy against subversion and aggression … We must demonstrate the value of freedom and try to help the peoples of all countries to attain a decent standard of life … At the same time, it is essential that all the free nations should help to defend one another against the threat of armed aggression and intimidation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1958; Vol. 583, c 386.]
Every nation in the Western world is seeking an assured supply of oil, and this intensive need has given a new despotic power to rulers, sheikhs and politicians in becoming involved in oil economies. Since, as the Minister said, it is established policy to help to defend one another against aggression, intimidation and subversion, I think it would be useful to know what contribution is made by those countries which depend on oil from either the Arabian Peninsula or the Persian Gulf.
The island of Bahrein is in treaty relationship with Great Britain, and Britain is normally responsible for its foreign policy. On several occasions Great Britain has been called upon to intervene to defeat attempts of various powers to assert dominion over the area. But at the other end, the "lolly" end—the end which matters—we find that the oil concessions in Bahrein are controlled by American interests, the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Oil Company.
Recently, the Japanese have entered the Gulf. They have fixed an agreement

with the Saudi Arabian Government for oil concessions along a neutral zone lying between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Then we have the Italian Government-owned oil company, Nazionale Idiocarburi, fixing oil concessions, covering an area of 8,800 square miles, with the Government of Iran.
What is interesting about these Estimates is whether the British taxpayer is to continue to be the moneybox or the mulch cow of certain other countries, companies and interests which are getting the benefit of Britain's endeavouring to protect the stability of the area. I appreciate that the major oil industry has been built up with much thought and much skill. Considering the position of the people of the area, and how primitive their economy was, since industry was non-existent, and how backward they were, I am bound to admit that a lot of credit is due to some of the oil companies for having played a responsible part in providing employment, industrial training, increasing educational facilities, medical and welfare services, and the opening up of roads and communications. They have thus contributed to a healthier settlement for the ordinary worker. With the change, however, those peoples are realising what is to be gained from the benefits of civilisation, and they are not prepared to stand still.
On the other hand, foreign officials regard the keeping down and the keeping out of Communism as the all-important task. From what I have seen of their social and economic conditions I should say that some of them are such that Communism has no need to be imported; it is generated from the misery, despair and deep discontent within the area. At this heightened pitch Middle Eastern peoples are being primed with Soviet propaganda and economic aid, which are having effect upon their Arab friends. We are apt to forget the many grudges which, at the same time, the Arabs have against the Western Powers. While the affairs of the Middle East are steeped in its oil and in its strategic position, the appeal of all those people who are depressed by social orders just cannot be ignored.
So long as we continue to spend money to support regents, in trying to keep


rulers sweet, while they are squandering their oil revenues and depriving the great majority of their people of their legitimate rights, then so long will unrest prevail.
I was very interested to find my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross), wrapped up, I suppose, in his medical profession, displaying enthusiastic interest in the effects of radioactivity. At one time or another, there have been many suggestions about Civil Defence and the Government's inactivity in that respect, but I was interested to read in an article in the New York Times of 9th February, 1958, just what the Washington Department of Administration is advising its employees to do after an atom attack. The article is entitled:
An Atom Attack Is Matter of Form.
The Department advises its employees to go to the nearest post office and get a form—that is, if the post office still exists. The postmaster—if he is still alive—then forwards the form to the office of the Civil Service Commission, which will maintain the registration files for the area—if the Commission and the area still exist. The Commission will then notify, presumably through another department, the officials of emergency location—if they still exist. According to this report, a certain amount of hilarity has been displayed by the more sophisticated circles within the State Department—

The Temporary Chairman: The hon. Gentleman is getting rather wide when he speaks of civil defence in America. I think that it is time he came back to the Estimates.

Mr. Woof: I was trying to draw an analogy between civil defence in the United States and what my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central was trying to point out.

Mr. B. T. Parkin: On a point of order. Since there is no point in my hon. Friend expecting any answer on the subject of the Army Estimates, as the Government Front Bench is bare, might it not be convenient if a junior Minister concerned with Civil

Defence were sent for to listen to his argument on this subject?

The Temporary Chairman: That is not a point of order.

Mr. Woof: Some of the things that have been said today made it appear to me that the debate would have been more appropriately called "War and Peace." One was often reminded of the language used by Long John Silver, "They'll be the lucky ones that don't die." The fact is that the armaments race is developing into a situation of urgency and alarm.
Several times we have heard that the Communist régime prophesies that the next conflagration would deal a fatal blow to capitalism. On the other hand, we have heard a lot about capitalism still surviving I would not like to prophesy either way. It is widely held that Russia's challenge to the Western world, with its expanding heavy industry, resting on the possession of a fundamental industrial "know-how," and the race for more deadly weapons, with the terrific burden of budget expenditure, have all created new conditions in the world. These conditions cannot be ignored if we are to see which way world affairs are going.
I share the conviction that much that we are doing represents a complete reversal of the aims for which mankind has been striving for 2,000 years. There cannot be any illusion about the road we face, nor about the vital, burning problem of disarmament which affects every man, woman and child. While reserving a determination not to become the victim of rocket or guided missile psychosis, I submit that every intelligent and open-minded citizen knows perfectly well that the use of all the instruments of death and destruction in guided missiles has produced a profound feeling of apprehension and a deep concern about the threat of a new war and the conclusions to be drawn about the consequences of such a war. A supreme issue is invested in the struggle and in the ardent desire for peace.
If this problem of the arms burden cannot be solved until international agreement is reached, one despairs of understanding how public confidence is


to be bolstered up in the meantime. The people of this land have fought and worked to make the world a better place than they first found it. With indomitable courage, impelled by the common need for safety, they have exposed themselves to danger in facing the mercenary avidity of political despots. They are now faced with the new strategy of terrific and inescapable destruction for the vast, congested towns and cities of these islands. As long as we keep throwing away opportunities to take the initiative, which ought to lead to an effective solution of this great problem, public conscience will stir and express itself more and more loudly until the haunting spectre of this horror is removed.

1.0 a.m.

Colonel Richard H. Glyn: I am glad to have caught your eye, Mr. Williams, because it may not be inappropriate for a serving Territorial to say a few words on a subject which is not unimportant but which has not yet been discussed fully in the debate—the Reserve Army. Because of the lateness of the hour, I am sure that the hon. Member for Blaydon (Mr. Woof) will forgive me if I do not refer to what he said, because I wish to come directly to this subject.
The Territorial Army has been passing through a very difficult time. May I say at once that I have nothing against those National Service men whose training was completed by the Territorial Army. They were first-class people and first-class assets to us where they were able to join units of the same type as that in which they had done their Regular training, but a great problem arose in the case of the very large number of what were called the rebadged—that is, National Service men who had done their training in one type of unit and who, for geographical reasons, were posted to a Territorial unit of an entirely different nature. That happened on a much wider scale than is sometimes thought and it placed a great strain on the Territorials and the Territorial instructors. This strain has now been lifted and the Territorial Army is making great strides.
I am glad to see that although the active Army is being organised on a

brigade group basis, which I think is right, there is no suggestion as yet that the Territorial Army should be similarly organised. I hope that there will never be such a suggestion. I hope that we may have some assurance on this point, because although the Territorial Army might have to fight on a brigade group basis, and could well do so, in peacetime it should undoubtedly retain a divisional organisation.
There are a number of reasons why this is desirable, one of which will perhaps suffice tonight. It is necessary to have a large whole-time organisation in each divisional area, which is also generally an Army district. There is a very great amount of administration work which must be done by a permanent whole-time organisation, which position the division fills. A brigade organisation has staff officers who include Regulars but many of whom are Territorials, which is as it should be—I am one myself—and we are not so well equipped to deal with these day-to-day matters of administration, not because we cannot do the work but because we are not there all the time.
I particularly noted the remarks of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross), who gave us exhaustive studies of the effects of nuclear war. A certain amount has been said about the number of troops available for the Mobile Defence Force and what the hon. Member called the third echelon rescue work. I assure him and any other hon. Member who shares his fears that a very large section of the Territorial Army has been trained for this work and has taken part in exercises and practices with the fire brigade, police and all branches of Civil Defence who would be involved. They are in a good position to take on this duty should it become necessary, although we all hope that it will not.
One very important phrase in the hon. Member's speech and one which it is well to remember is that even if a hydrogen bomb were dropped—which heaven forbid—many could be saved. Too many people throughout the country seem to think that that would be the end of the world, but it would not. Many could be saved and it would be the duty of the Civil Defence services and of the Territorial Army units detailed for this service to take part in that rescue work and in everything that we are training to do.

Mr. Fernyhough: Has the hon. and gallant Member seen the latest figures? When we dropped a bomb in the Pacific we announced to the world that 75,000 square miles of the oceans were unsafe. The Americans have announced that 500,000 square miles are unsafe. If it is unsafe for shipping, what safety would there be for the people of these islands if a bomb were dropped here?

Colonel Glyn: The hon. Member is quoting figures, of which he is very fond, about areas which are unsafe. In war, great numbers of areas are unsafe. In some of those unsafe areas people are hurt, but they are still capable of being rescued and, in the circumstances he envisaged, would be rescued by the third echelon rescue work which would be undertaken by the Territorial Army. The point is not whether an area would be safe, but whether there would be survivors and people who would be rescued if there were a third echelon but who might otherwise not be rescued.
The main duty of the Territorial Army—and the Memorandum refers to this—is to fill gaps in the active Army. Perhaps it is not always realised what great differences there are between those two organisations. One of the greatest differences is the continuity of personnel in the Territorial Army. I had the experience of serving for twenty-seven years in the same Territorial unit and when I left there were many men in the unit—The Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry, one of the oldest yeomanry or Territorial units in the land—who had been in the unit for longer than I. The commanding officer who took over from me only a short time ago will have served in the unit for twenty-five or twenty-six years by the time his service is completed.
That is not exceptional in the Territorial Army, although it would be unknown in the Regular Army, where a short tour of duty in each battalion, or even in each regiment, is normal. We work very much as a team and as a family and that is how we achieve a considerable degree of efficiency, in spite of training only at week-ends, and so on.
All that has its effect. It is quite a shock to move a Territorial—whatever his rank—from one unit or formation

into another, where he knows nobody and where everything is strange. He may know his technical work, but it is something in the nature of a shock when he moves.
A very great increase in efficiency could be obtained if it were possible to associate Territorial divisions, which would be used to fill gaps, as the Memorandum says, with the active brigades in which they might be called upon to fill gaps.
If one active brigade were associated with one or more Territorial divisions, and the officers and men from these divisions could visit the brigades and be attached to them for training, and those brigades could provide representatives to attend the Territorial divisional camps, they would get to know each other and that would be a tremendous help and provide invaluable liaison if the worst should happen and we had to go to war.
It was said by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central that the Government must see that war never breaks out. That, of course, is a counsel of perfection. I am sure that every effort will be made by any reasonable Government to see that war never breaks out.
It is true that it takes two to make a quarrel but, as is often pointed out at the Old Bailey, it takes two to make a murder but only one has to have the will. It is possible for a country to undergo the ravages of war without having fought, as was discovered by one or two small and less fortunate countries in Europe in the last war.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Denmark.

Colonel Glyn: Denmark is a very good example. Anyone studying the occupation of Denmark by enemy forces will see precisely what I mean. It was one of my less pleasant duties to visit the horror camp at Belsen very shortly after it had been occupied by our forces. In it were several Danes who had survived, but there had been many others who had not. But that is enough about that.
We must realise that the question whether or not this terror comes upon us is not one that any Government can answer completely, but the Government can go a very long way towards making it unlikely by producing a sufficient de-


terrent and by showing that the country is organised in the best possible way, first to deter, and, secondly, to minimise the effect of any such happening.
I want to refer again to the most important phrase—"many could be saved." It is by showing that many could be saved—and in this country many would be saved—that we could make a valuable contribution not only for our morale but in regard to the state of mind of potential aggressors, who would be less inclined to take the chance of attacking us if they knew that to be the case. But this puts a strain on the Territorial Army. We are having to learn two techniques at once—the techniques of rescue and of conventional war.
There is one further point which I think might be of value. Many Territorial units are still below strength, although recruiting is going up, and when they go to camp they will be in difficulties because of their low numbers. At any camp there are many administrative duties to be performed. There are guard duties, fire pickets, and a unit will be called upon to find fatigue parties for N.A.A.F.I., the cookhouse and the barrack rooms. I have known of cases where 25 per cent. of the men in camp had to be employed every day on these unproductive, non-training jobs.
Many of those fatigues could be done by civilians, and a certain number of civilians are allowed to be employed in this way, although the number is limited because of the financial regulations. Only a small sum is allowed. A battalion or field regiment can take on about six or seven civilians. I suggest that this is a case where the Army and the Government can achieve a real saving by permitting more money to be spent upon employing civilians in camp. They could generally be found by the Territorial unit. The Territorial volunteers could then spend their time on training either for conventional war or on third echelon rescue work, instead of doing fatigues.
It has been said that civilians should not be used in Regular units, and that it is necessary that they should have their own cooks. I could not agree more; but in the Territorial Army the average man has all the "know-how" he needs for potato peeling and similar duties; it has been imparted to him, at no

expense to the Government, by the female members of his family. It would, therefore, be perfectly safe to allow Territorials to have more civilians with them in camp, for fatigue purposes. It would be a great asset and would have a great effect in improving the morale of the volunteers—who are probably having their year's holiday in camp and do not want to spend it doing fatigues but in training—and also their efficiency.
Anyone associated with the Territorial Army would wish to congratulate the War Office and the Secretary of State for the very greatly improved recruiting figures, which are most encouraging and of importance to us all.

1.14 a.m.

Mr. B. T. Parkin: I am very glad that the hon. and gallant Member for Dorset, North (Colonel R. M. Glyn) took up seriously the theme adopted by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross), and that he added his professional, up-to-date knowledge to the discussion of this subject, which I hope may be carried a little further by the Under-Secretary later tonight.
I followed with interest the Secretary of State's sketch, towards the end of his speech, of what he considered to be the function of the modern Army. He spent a very little time on the theme of security and limited wars, skipped lightly over the rôle of the Army in global nuclear war, and left out altogether any reference to the point that I want to touch upon later, namely, the rôle of the Army in a nuclear war which might, fortunately, have been brought fairly rapidly to a close after a partial disaster.
I noted with no pleasure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) filled in some of the gaps in the speech of the Secretary of State and talked about the addition of further equipment to the Army. I understood him to be advocating a further supply of nuclear weapons to the troops stationed in Germany. My right hon. Friend showed by his attitude that he was addressing his remarks as much to hon. Members behind him as to hon. Members on the benches opposite and I think he is aware that he does not carry all his hon. Friends with him.
Even in that argument my right hon. Friend fell into the same trap as the


hon. and gallant Member for Dorset, North and other hon. Members who are always dreaming away about the reorganisation of the Army. Some talk from recent experience and some from past experience. The hon. and gallant Member wants civilians to peel his potatoes, and someone else wants to increase the ratio of civilians to uniformed personnel, and so on.
Who is to start to calculate how much these additional requirements for equipment and extra civilian assistance will cost the remainder of the population? Are not we getting to the stage when we are bankrupting ourselves by asking for more support for the Army? Are not we doing what hon. and gallant Members like the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) plead that we should not do—leading the Army "up the garden" by promising what it will not get? If we promise the Army these things, surely in times of crisis it will be impossible to sustain them. We are asking for a scale of technical equipment which I believe to be beyond the resources of this country in time of peace let alone during the dislocation of war.

Mr. Strachey: My hon. Friend is mistaken about my position. There is no question of advocating the provision of nuclear weapons to the British Army in Europe. That was decided long ago and it is being done. The issue is whether we are unilaterally to scrap them. There is no question of advocating their provision by me or anyone else. That is a fait accompli.

Mr. Parkin: But what is not settled is the political control over them—by which member of N.A.T.O. The military leaders seem insatiable. General Norstad is requiring that all the members of N.A.T.O. shall have nuclear weapons, and soon we shall want to know who is to control them. I am sure my right hon. Friend accepts the danger of a conflict in Europe, which may be started by the Russians, in which we let off a Corporal as the only reply that we can make, and then a global nuclear war begins.
It has never yet turned out that appalling weapons destroyed humanity, as we have been told so many times they would. The H-bomb is a weapon that is merely bigger, and I would be prepared to argue

that it is not more likely to cause the extinction of the human race than any of the other bombs. We have to prepare to deal with the later stages. Military men have always said that, whatever is dropped from the sky or shot from the sea, the final stage must be carried by infantry, and by ordinary people meeting other ordinary people in a country and bringing the matter to a conclusion; and that means to a political conclusion. I would therefore ask the Minister to tell us something about the political objectives of the Army as well as about its political control.
Suppose the central government had been dislocated by the disaster of a premature, uncontrolled release of atomic weapons. We must cease to assume that they would come only from Russian territory; from what we now read, they could come from anywhere. We have been reading that vessels could arrive at these shores by way of the sea bed, and could fire shells so wide of any target that whole areas would be dislocated. What should we do then?
I once heard a sarcastic remark to the effect that someone could always be found in the War Office to say that the answer to the atomic bomb was the horse. That was intended to be funny, but I am wondering whether it is true, and whether the Army should not depend much less upon expensive and complicated equipment which has to be put all over the world in prepared dumps, and which can be paralysed, as the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing said, by the absence of a little spring which can be bought at any cycle shop. We should be thinking in terms of units which can be self-supporting and which can survive on their own. Therefore, most of the means of communication would be much more simple than the more refined and more expensive versions.
The almost self-contained unit which will have a pre-accepted political directive will know that it has to go into devastated territory and not only bring medical comforts and the elements of civilisation back again—water supplies, and so on—but also have a sympathetic understanding of what it is that the people want. It was said earlier that the victors will be those who can save the survivors. I think that the old conception of the infantry in the Army,


although they do not now go in for long marches on their feet, is one which should not be forgotten. We should bear it in mind because it compels us to remember that, after the bombing and the shelling, there will be a need to remember what the war was all about and what must be done about things as they will be.

1.30 a.m.

Mr. K. Zilliacus: Before I tackle the Estimates I should like to say a word or two about the point of view which I wish to express. Let me say now that I am not a pacifist, but neither am I a lunatic; as I see it, the whole of this arms race is based on assumptions so unrealistic as to amount to a kind of insanity.
I do not believe that anybody wants war. The arms race is kept going by fear. We cannot fight with nuclear weapons, anyway; we cannot prevent war by piling up nuclear bombs, but only by making peace. If the war once starts we shall all be dead very quickly. As a sort of psychological compensation for the stubborn reluctance to make peace we ignore the painful fact that our preparations for war are utterly unreal and land us in impossibilities and absurdities. I shall try to tackle the Estimates from that point of view.
The Estimates talk of our forces being prepared for cold war, limited wars, and global war. We are to use our forces, so far as I can make out, in cold wars for waging ideological warfare. I do not think that we can wage limited wars without engaging in global war—especially if we use atomic weapons; and once we have a global war, we are dead. The 1958 White Paper states that, in addition to N.A.T.O. we have more than 100,000 men in the Armed Forces in the Middle East and the Far East, most of whom, I suppose, are in the Army. Last year's Defence White Paper stated that the retention of such forces abroad gave rise to heavy charges placing a severe strain on the balance of payments position. The Minister of Defence made that point a few days ago.
We are told that the cost of our troops in Germany is £125 million, and that we pay £56 million—£47 million for the actual expenditure on the forces, and £9 million for what the forces spend on

what they need—in Deutschmarks. The Estimates then make the following point:
The independent experts appointed by N.A.T.O. to examine the position confirm that expenditure of this order in Deutschmarks would place a heavy additional burden on Britain's balance of payments.
I do not believe that with anything like this defence burden it will be possible to cope with the problem of inflation. I do not think that we can end inflation as long as our economy is burdened with this tremendous defence expenditure. I believe that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft), was quite right when he said in his resignation speech that our troubles were due, basically, to the fact that we were trying to be a first-class military Power and to be a Welfare State at the same time. We could not possibly do both.
I must say, therefore, that I was rather surprised when my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) took the Government to task for treating N.A.T.O. in a cavalier fashion, as he said, because we had cut our expenditure and reduced our troops. My right hon. Friend seemed to think that this was a terrible thing to do and got very close to arguing that we should spend more money on this kind of thing.
After all, the Labour Party has a very ambitious social programme for when we come into power—a Welfare State programme. I believe that we can carry it out, but only if we slash defence expenditure.

The Temporary Chairman (Mr. W. R. Williams): I think that the hon. Member ought to come nearer to what we are discussing tonight—the Estimates for the Army.

Mr. Zilliacus: I was taking the case of our expenditure on N.A.T.O. and saying that if we are to spend on that scale we cannot, at the same time, maintain the Welfare State. It will suffer death by a thousand cuts.
Not only do the preparations such as those in the Estimates and on the scale outlined, for the tasks proposed, in order to fight the cold war, limited wars, and global war, make it impossible to stop inflation and condemn the Welfare State


to waste away, but they make it doubtful whether we can end conscription. I will not elaborate on that, because it has been discussed by various people.
It is very doubtful indeed whether our troops can be raised voluntarily to the numbers required for the purposes set forth in the Estimates. Nor do I think that we can cure the situation by providing the forces with tactical atomic weapons. I recognise the dilemma. The alternative is a massive conscript Army which, as somebody said, would be ruinous. On the other hand, I think that forces equipped with tactical atomic weapons would be suicidal. And having a bit of both, as we are doing, is both ruinous and suicidal.
The Government, of course, are very evasive about just what these tactical atomic weapons are. I tried in vain to get some information at Question Time. The Minister of Defence took refuge in security considerations. All I asked was what was the definition, in terms of firepower, of a tactical atomic weapon as distinguished from a strategic nuclear weapon. I could not get an answer. The Americans, however, have been much franker than our own people on this. According to American sources, a tactical atomic weapon is a nuclear weapon up to 2½ times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. These weapons are to be put at the disposal of commanders in the field, to be used by them at their discretion in the same way as conventional arms to repel what they regard as a major attack, without the necessity of referring to their Governments before using them.
That, of course, wipes out the distinction between limited war and total war at one fell stroke. Because if anyone starts loosing off weapons 2½ times the power of the Hiroshima bomb, or even of the same power as that bomb, that will not be treated as a limited war. It will start a world war. In fact the whole idea that we can fight a war with so-called graded deterrents without starting an all-in nuclear war is, I believe, military moonshine, because any Government which goes as far as that will go all the way rather than lose after going to that length.
Most military people are, I think, agreed upon that. The idea of graded

nuclear deterrents is rather like a scheme for introducing thermostats to control the temperature in Hell. It is a completely lunatic notion. It is one of the many lunatic notions with which the whole attempt to make sense of fighting a war with weapons which would destroy all living things is studded.
I rather share the feelings of my hon. Friend the Member for Paddington, North (Mr. Parkin) about the way my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West was pressing the Government to be more lavish in the use of tactical atomic weapons. He was pushing that point very hard. Frankly, I do not think that he carries even the Parliamentary Labour Party with him, and I am certain that a Labour Party conference would repudiate the idea if it were put to it.

Mr. Strachey: The allegation which my hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) is making has no relation of any sort to my views.

Mr. Zilliacus: I have heard the debate, and I heard my right hon. Friend pressing the Government strongly on the point of the tactical atomic weapons. He did not seem to be satisfied with what they were doing in the matter. He seemed to want them to do still more. I think that the whole idea is wrong.

Mr. Strachey: What I said was that for my part I thought our forces could not be deprived unilaterally of some nuclear capacity. That was the actual phrase that I used, and that I stand by. It is a travesty, a very malicious travesty, of my views to say that that is pressing the Government to increase its dependence on tactical nuclear weapons. My hon. Friend knows perfectly well that that is a travesty of my attitude.

Mr. Zilliacus: I did not know it, but I am glad to hear it.
Let us look at the official reasons why, according to the Estimates, all these men are wanted in the Army, for what purpose they are required. Civil Defence has already been mentioned, and I will not go into that any further except to say that I do not believe that Civil Defence has any more reality than any other part of all these things. It is not a matter of how many people can


survive one hydrogen bomb. I am told that the American stocks are about 34,000 hydrogen bombs; if there is a war it certainly is a matter of counting in hundreds rather than ones or twos, and by that time we shall be thoroughly extinct.
I wish that simple point could be got over—that either a war does not start or, if it does start, there is no point in talking about it as though it were just another war that we can fight, survive and come through with more or less casualties. This time man's destructive power really has outrun his capacity to survive. That is the one elemental fact from which people are receding rather than admitting.
In July, 1955, at the Summit Conference, the then Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, admitted that the result of a war with nuclear weapons would be annihilation of the human race—as he put it, neutrals as well as belligerents. But the more we pile up the weapons the more we talk as though they are just something that we can use and still live to tell the tale.

Dr. Stross: I think that the nearest one can get to the facts is the estimate that between six and 10 large hydrogen bombs, those of the 10 megaton type, might destroy most of the life in our island, and it is estimated that in the United States 250 such bombs would probably kill about 100 million citizens.

Mr. Zilliacus: I thank my hon. Friend for putting the facts in cold and sober terms.
There is also the matter of the use of our Armed Forces for fighting colonial wars. Cyprus is mentioned, in particular, in the Estimates, and we have the memory of Kenya and Malaya. I have previously said, and I repeat it, that it is wrong in principle to use conscripts to fight colonial wars. It is an abuse of the power of the State over the individual. It is a fact that in the old colonial countries like Holland, Belgium and France, legislation exempts conscripts from serving in colonial wars unless they volunteer. It is true that Holland, in the case of the Indonesian war, in which she regarded almost her very existence as being at stake, suspended this law. It is true that France regards Algeria as part

of metropolitan France, and not as a colony, and has sent most of her army there. The war may, indeed, become a civil war in France. Technically, I suppose, as Algeria counts as part of France, it is already a civil war.
Nevertheless, that principle is enshrined in the legislation of those countries, that because colonial wars cannot be regarded as self-defence—the defence of one's own country—but are politically controversial operations, one does not conscript men and force them to kill and be killed for these purposes. We do, and I think it is wrong. The answer which is given is, "If we do not use National Service men for these purposes, we shall not have enough troops to do the necessary colonial fighting." I say that we should change our colonial policy so that we need to use less coercion and less force. We should cut our colonial political coat according to our military and economic cloth. We should have a more enlightened colonial policy.
The use of the Army in the Middle East and the Far East is said to be in fulfilment of our commitments in support of the Bagdad Pact and of S.E.A.T.O. On various occasions I have asked Questions in the House of the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary, with particular reference to the November, 1955, communiqué of the Bagdad Pact Council which committed us to using British forces to help defend the territories of Bagdad Pact countries against Communist subversion.
Finally, on 27th February last year, with the help of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who asked a very useful supplementary question, I got the Minister of Defence to say that this meant that the rulers of those countries could declare as Communist subversion any popular rising in their territory, and we were then bound to intervene at their request to put down those popular risings.
Again, I consider that is an utterly illegitimate use of British forces. That is fighting an ideological war. That is, in fact, a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, which I regard as not compatible with the Charter of the United Nations. Certainly, it is not a policy for which the lives


of British soldiers should be sacrificed or on which British money should be spent on maintaining forces.
Troops are maintained in N.A.T.O. for the purpose of supporting a policy of intransigeance, of insistence on the inclusion of a united Germany in N.A.T.O. I asked a Question on 4th December last year of the Foreign Secretary, and he confirmed that the Government stood by the declaration of his predecessor, the present Prime Minister, on 12th December, 1955, that N.A.T.O. forces were to be used to exert steady pressure upon the Soviets to force them to give ground in Eastern Germany. That is a policy that cannot possibly lead to peace and may easily lead to the opposite.
To do our Government justice, I do not believe that their hearts are in that policy. I believe that if they had a free hand, they would be ready to try a little more energetically, or a little less lackadaisically than they seem to be trying, to find some terms of accommodation with the Soviet Union that would enable us to cut these swingeing expenditures and bring most of our forces home.
The real reason why they turn down all the constructive proposals of the Opposition for winding up this desperate arms race, for lightening the terrible defence burden and cutting our forces, is that they are under the domination of Mr. Dulles. He acts as a sort of inverted Micawber, waiting for something from Moscow to turn down.

The Temporary Chairman: Order. The hon. Member has gone very wide of the subject of the debate. I should be glad if he would come nearer to the Estimates.

Mr. Zilliacus: I am on my last sentence, Mr. Williams. I am winding up my speech. I was about to say that the trouble is that our Prime Minister is a "Yes" man to the "Abominable No-man" in Washington.

1.45 a.m.

Commander C. E. M. Donaldson: I had not expected to take part in the debate at this late hour, but I rose because I dis-

agree with so much of what the hon. Gentleman the Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) has said. I think I can claim to call in aid, peculiarly enough, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), who has repudiated some of the allegations made by the hon. Gentleman.
It will be within the memory of a great many Members on this side of the Committee, indeed, of the Committee as a whole, that this is not the first occasion on which the hon. Member for Gorton has put forward the theories which he has advanced tonight. At the very close of his speech he made reference to a gentleman of another nation. It did not come within the compass of the debate, and a great many of the things he said before that may not have come within the compass of the debate, and certainly were not in keeping with the thinking of the people of this country.
When we consider the expending of the money we have to expend to sustain the forces of Britain, whether the Navy, the Army or the Air Force, the people of the country expect us to give diligent thought to that expenditure and, as representatives of the people, to keep in mind the right of the people of all parties in this country to defend their country from the things we think are evil, false, denigratory of and inimical to the democracy which we are elected to represent.
As it is late, I do not wish to detain the Committee by taking in detail the arguments adduced by the hon. Gentleman. I would simply tell him that the people of the country will, when the time comes, judge the right and wrong of the things he has adduced and the views he has expressed, and which he was entitled to express as an elected Member of the House of Commons. They have heard on previous occasions the views he has uttered tonight. It would be difficult, within the rules of order, to pursue now things which he has said, and which I should like to pursue upon some other occasion. All I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that I disagree entirely with almost all he has said, and that hundreds of thousands, indeed millions of people, not only in Britain but in the rest of the Commonwealth, equally disagree with him. The time will come when—

The Temporary Chairman: Order. The hon. and gallant Member is falling into the same error as the hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus). I should like him to confine himself to the Estimates, if he would.

Commander Donaldson: Far be from me to fall into the same error as the hon. Gentleman opposite. All I say is that I disagree with what he said. I am entitled to say that and follow his speech that far. I am quite prepared to seek another occasion on which to disagree with him in more detail, with more point and with more vigour than the rules of order now allow.

1.50 a.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: Disagreement is no sin, and I do not wish to follow the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Commander Donaldson), or I would be out of order. I wish to turn to the Army Estimates and to deal with their reality in relation to the Far East.
For years some of us have spoken of the idiocy of our defence policy in South-East Asia. I voted against the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, and if the opportunity arises again I shall vote against it again. The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation is neither a treaty nor an organisation, and I certainly do not believe that it represents the defence of the free world.
I am tired of all these euphemisms about the free world and the defence of Christianity. As someone who, not too long ago, came back from South-East Asia—after visiting Hong Kong, Singapore, Indo-China and other parts of the Far East where that Treaty operates—I say that the talk of it defending Christianity is sheer idiocy. It displays either ignorance or a complete misunderstanding of South-East Asia.
In page 6 of the Memorandum, we are told, first, that in Korea—
The Commonwealth contingent has been withdrawn. A Commonwealth Liaison Mission, however, remains in Korea under the command of a Brigadier.
My first question is: how much is that costing the British taxpayer, and will the Under-Secretary tell us the worth of the expenditure on British troops stationed there? I am talking here of British

troops, for which he is responsible—not Australian or New Zealand troops. What is it costing us to keep those men in Korea, where Syngman Rhee recognises neither democracy nor any of the freedoms for which the last war was fought to preserve?
He recognises neither trade unionism nor a free vote nor a parliamentary system. Let no hon. Gentleman opposite argue about that—it is an uncontradicted fact. It is no good the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) smiling about it. Why do we keep troops there to defend freedom when no right of free speech exists? What does it cost the taxpayer? Why do we keep those troops there?
A few months ago I spent three or four hours with Chou En-lai in Peking, in Kowloon, and in Shanghai discussing the Hong Kong problem. The Governor of Hong Kong first promised Chou En-lai that the road for trade with China would be opened. It has not been opened, nothing has moved, and unemployment grows there. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong—he has the figures—but I believe that there are some 11,000 troops in Hong Kong. What can they defend? Nothing.
Will the Minister tell the British public if the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation would come into action, and, if so, why? Chou En-lai told me that he had shown his friendship for the British public and the British nation by taking no action over Hong Kong, yet we have some 11,000 troops there. Will the Minister tell the British public what that costs the nation?
Many of those gallant young boys may differ from me in many ways, but they all worship their country. I am not being facetious on this subject. They are ready to offer their lives for what they think is the right, and all of us will always defend our country—let that be understood. If I thought that any country had acted as an aggressor against Britain I would, according to my limited ability, seek to do what I could to defend this country of ours. It might be that it would not be such a great contribution as that of military men who have already sacrificed or offered all they had to defend it. But to keep 11.000 troops in Hong Kong is not a contribution to peace in the Far East. Chou


En-lai has no intention of attacking Hong Kong. This is a place where we could save money and it would be a demonstration to the world of our intention to secure an understanding in the Far East.
It is some time since I was in Indonesia, and whether I shall visit that part of the world this year depends on whether or not there is a General Election this year—which would be my wish. The Memorandum relating to the Army Estimates states:
In November-December, 1957, a force of two British infantry companies carried out three weeks' training in conjunction with the local police at Sandakan, North Borneo.
Incidentally, as a leading article in the Army Quarterly says, it is time that we were given a definition of what is meant nowadays by companies, brigades and battalions. It is never made clear in the House of Commons what these terms now mean.
The Memorandum adds:
The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force co-operated to move the force.
I do not know whether the Minister has authority to reply, but I should like to know whether this was an exercise under S.E.A.T.O. A few weeks before I was last in Saigon, seven or eight months ago, a S.E.A.T.O. exercise had taken place. British planes and forces were there, in spite of agreement to the contrary at the Geneva Conference of 1954. The results of the Geneva Conference were a tribute to Sir Anthony Eden. Whatever the world now thinks, Sir Anthony Eden sacrificed his health in the service of this country, and the Geneva Conference was a great success.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: What has this to do with the Estimates?

Mr. Davies: If the hon. and gallant Member does not know what Sir Anthony Eden did at the Geneva Conference, in bringing about at a most difficult period a discussion on that vital area of the world, the Far East, I cannot inform him in this debate without being out of order.
As a result of that conference, there should have been no troops, either British or American, in South Vietnam. The

House of Commons has no information about our obligations under S.E.A.T.O., and I have spent a great deal of time speaking about this Far Eastern problem both inside and outside this Chamber.
On Singapore, the Memorandum on the Army Estimates says:
With British help the 1st Battalion the Singapore Regiment has been raised to 50 per cent, of its intended strength. The 1st Singapore Regiment, Royal Artillery, is no longer required and will be disbanded on 1st November, 1958.
I want to know what is to happen to the troops in Singapore. I was in Singapore not long after the debacle of the Second World War when the guns had been found to point the wrong way and there had been complete collapse. The British public, to their amazement, found that the Malayan did not love the British flag. I will not go into the political details, but there is to be a general election in Singapore in 1958 and I want to know what guarantee the British taxpayer has that if he spends millions of pounds on keeping troops there, those poor boys will have security and, if a conflagration breaks out in the Far East, they will be rescued. According to the Minister of Defence, our bases are in Singapore and Aden for the defence of the Arabian Peninsula and South-East Asia.
I have no illusions about the bomb which can create a temperature equal to that of the centre of the sun. Many years ago I spoke about that to the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) when he was Prime Minister, and the House laughed when I asked about radioactivity, because hon. Members did not know about it. They know now. How can troops be moved through radioactive seas? It is ridiculous, fantastic and a waste of the taxpayers' money.
In Singapore thirty-eight agitators were arrested in August and five members, recently elected by free vote by the public in Singapore to the Central Excutive Committee, were also arrested. We are putting troops into this area. Have we not learned through history? Have not Kenya, Cyprus and the Far East taught us that we can no longer impose on the coloured man that kind of organisation if it is against his will? Are the Army and War Office taking into account the general election which will be held in


Singapore in 1958 and have they informed Mr. Dulles, this flying bedstead of the Pacific Ocean, who is one of the most ill-informed men on the reality of Pacific politics and Asian politics—

The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Gordon Touche): Order. I am afraid that the hon. Member is straying far from the subject of the debate.

Mr. Davies: I apologise, Sir Gordon, and I accept your Ruling. May I put it another way? Are we telling the American Government that we can no longer be certain that the British Raj is certain to be able to hold areas of security in Singapore? May I ask an up-to-date question on a matter which is not dealt with in the Memorandum and should be dealt with? If the Minister has not the information perhaps he can obtain it. Being a courteous and gallant Gentleman, perhaps he will obtain it, not at this late hour but some time in the coming week. Do the events which are taking place in Indonesia imply that our forces in Singapore or Kenya are standing by? There are obligations under the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation.
Statements have been made in America on this subject. Before they made these tentative statements about the possibilities of the revolutionary situation in Indonesia, did the United States consult the Prime Minister or was Britain forced once again merely to follow on? What obligations under the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation does the Army have towards Indonesia? I know that ships of the K.P.M. company are being held in Singapore Naval Base, but that is a matter with which I cannot deal now, although I will raise it when we deal with the Navy Estimates next week.
Malaya links with Thailand. Some of us have been in Thailand. If ever there was a country which is not free, it is Thailand. To pretend that Thailand is part of the free world and that the British Army has to protect it and the British taxpayer spend money on—

The Deputy-Chairman: Order. There are no troops in Thailand who are covered by the Army Estimates.

Mr. Davies: The Memorandum says, in page 6:
The Army's participation in nuclear weapon trials on Christmas Island and at

Maralinga has continued on an increasing scale.
We have obligations under A.N.Z.U.S. and under S.E.A.T.O. in this area and one of our bases is Thailand. I will not develop that too far. You need have no fear, Sir Gordon, that I will contest your Ruling, but the Committee should be clear about why we are spending our money, and we are spending money in Malaya and on the borders of Thailand.
We are no longer responsible for the government of Malaya. I have no illusions about the "freedom" of Malaya. That resulted from a military treaty and it is freedom at a price. There are Commonwealth troops in Malaya. Are the Government prepared to withdraw troops from Malaya and allow the Government of Malaya, now a member of the United Nations, to appeal to the United Nations, if necessary, rather than continue to permit the British taxpayer to bear the burden of keeping forces in Malaya?
In page 6, the Memorandum says:
The Government of the Federation of Malaya has now assumed responsibility for the external defence …
To that should be added the words "and internal defence against the Communists inside Malaya, without the British taxpayer having to bear the burden." There are New Zealand and Australian troops in Malaya, despite its independence. What is the cost to the British taxpayer? Were we requested by the Malayan Government to keep our troops there, and if we were requested, were we requested because we asked them to request us?
One of the most vital matters in the world today is that of defence in an atomic age and yet the Gracious Speech of 5th November, 1957, had not one word to say on the subject. We were told in the recent defence debate that Aden and Kenya would be responsible to London. An element of the strategic reserve is to be stationed in Kenya and we are told by an imaginative Government—and my party will not be so imaginative when we get to power, as we shall—that those troops will be available for reinforcing Singapore and the Far East. If ever there was a daydream; if ever there was an issue far from reality, this is it.
I have been in the China Seas in a typhoon, and although I have never been there when a hydrogen bomb has exploded I know that it would create many more problems than the typhoon. I know that these troops could not be moved from Kenya to Singapore. Yet the Army Estimates take into account the cost of building—we were told that it would not be a base—heaven knows what it really will be, in Kenya, to defend Singapore. Is this supposed to be Conservative thinking? Is this practical defence in the twentieth century? Not a soldier or a ship could move.
We are then told that the troops will be controlled from London. Will that be true if we have evacuated 12 million people, and if all telephonic and radio communication is destroyed? Will we still control them from London? It is sheer humbug to say that we will.
Where are we going, with this insane policy?

Mr. J. C. Jennings: Home soon, I hope.

Mr. Davies: If the hon. Member wants to contradict—

Mr. Jennings: I said "Home soon, I hope."

Mr. Davies: If the hon. Gentleman wants to get home he had better not interrupt me.

Mr. Jennings: I was just answering the hon. Member's rhetorical question.

Mr. Davies: It is not a rhetorical question for mankind, for the British taxpayer or for the unborn children. I would advise the hon. Member to read the Lancet of a few weeks ago, when a doctor and a radiologist contributed the following little rhyme:
The nuclear boffins, God bless them all,
Have calculated the fall-out to a decimal.
But my nephew and niece
Have five legs apiece
And their intelligence"—
like that of the hon. Member—
Is infinitesimal.
I now turn to the question of the Army and its numbers. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) has made out a logical case for a conventional Army. He asked about its internal strength. Fortunately, the common people often have more sense

than Members of Parliament, but it takes them a long time to get their opinion expressed on the Floor of the House of Commons. Even if recruits were paid £20 or £30 a week there would not be a chance of getting a voluntary Army in this insane world, with this kind of policy. In the last analysis, therefore, we are forced to admit a paradox. We have reached the pons asinorum of strategy. There is no longer either a Conservative or Socialist defence policy. That may sound paradoxical, but it is true. The truth is that mankind must get together or it will be finished.
I turn next to Korea. Will the Under-Secretary please give me the figures—not necessarily tonight, at this late hour—showing how much it is costing to defend the dictator in South Korea? Will he explain why the British taxpayer should spend one penny of his money to maintain troops in South Korea, when his insurance and unemployment contributions are going up?
What is the truth about the relationship of the Army and civil defence? My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) raised this question. If the Minister asks where there is a place for the Army, there can be a little hope. There is only one place for it in a modern world and that is in connection with civil defence. While we are foolish enough to fly hydrogen bombs about we should do better to train our forces in the arts of civil defence.
The nature of war is altering and therefore the nature of society is altering. Mankind is confronting something he has never met before. At one time wars were tolerated because they meant full employment. There were uniforms, boots and belts to be provided for 5 million or 10 million men. Now a Royal Ordnance factory is as out of date as an Elizabethan castle. A ship at sea, a battalion or a brigade of men—all these are as out of date as a medieval castle.
Feudalism collapsed because of gunpowder. Capitalism was able to escape because war gave full employment. In an acquisitive society war cannot give full employment. Five thousand scientists and 100,000 technical troops could provide more power than 10 million men under arms. That is the sort of thing we may have to face, and it may bring the


idea of an acquisitive State and the ideology of Socialism nearer together in the next ten or twenty years. Therefore, I consider that these Estimates are unreal in the mid-twentieth century.

2.18 a.m.

Mr. R. J. Mellish: The Committee will agree that to make a speech from this Dispatch Box at any time is an ordeal. I have had to wait a long time to make this one.

Mr. Harold Davies: My apologies to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Mellish: Every hon. Member has the right to make his speech in his own way, and in his own time.
May I start by doing something which may be unusual—by apologising to the staff of the House for keeping them up so late? It is not, however, a question of filibustering; the Army Estimates are important and they must be adequately debated. In some respects it is unfortunate that I have to reply to this debate, because I am doing so in place of the late Wilfred Fienburgh, who was a great friend of mine. I miss him a great deal and I am fully aware that whatever speech I make could never be as good as he would have made. I do not possess his fluency and I have to use notes, which he never did. My task, on behalf of my party, is to express our views on the Army Estimates. I start off with two small points, not very important. I want to give praise on both of them and to ask questions on one of them. Before I do so, may I say that the Under-Secretary of State for War has heard every speech tonight. I know that he has taken down an enormous number of questions. If he is able to answer them all he will do very well, but we shall be here well into the dawn if he tries to answer every one.
In the Memorandum, the Minister refers once again to Army education, which does not get any publicity in the House although excellent work is done by the Army education authorities. In last year's Memorandum the Secretary of State spoke of secondary education, said how unsatisfactory it was, and added that he would study how the situation could be improved. What has been the result of the study and what is being done to overcome the difficulties of giving

secondary education to the children of the Regular soldier?
My other point refers to the voluntary organisations. I would associate my party with the excellent work done by people like S.S.A.F.A., which does a magnificent job in helping the soldier in time of trouble. During the war it helped me, on one occasion. This is a very good way of paying it back for what it has done. Although it is included in the last paragraph of the Memorandum, we want it to know that it is not forgotten by people generally or by hon. Members of this House.
A number of questions have been asked of the Under-Secretary and I hope that he will deal with the most important of them tonight. One was asked by the hon. Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer)—I am glad to see him in his place—and the other by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
The hon. and gallant Member for Worthing asked why it had taken two years to get two companies airborne and to organise the Army in such a way. My hon. and learned Friend asked whether we could say that there are two brigade groups that were uncommitted and available today, bearing in mind that in the last few years under successive Governments, there had been an expenditure of £10,000 million. The question is relevant when we are asked to consider how the very large sum of money is being spent, and I hope that we shall have an answer from the Under-Secretary.
The third question, of great importance, was put by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) and I shall deal with it later. My first criticism is that there is no mention in the Estimates of any real cooperation with N.A.T.O. There are just a number of brief references. I would ask the Under-Secretary whether, quite apart from his reply I shall get something in writing from the Secretary of State.
What has been done by Her Majesty's Army about the N.A.T.O. Alliance, for instance, about the standardisation of armaments, the production of armaments, and the assessment of military needs? I want to put on record for my party the fact that N.A.T.O. is as important to us


as it is to Government supporters. We believe that the alliance is essential and that it must be an alliance that is worth while. It should have some general purposes. Has it achieved something apart from learning just how to discuss problems? I mentioned in the defence debate last week what it had really achieved politically and some of the difficulties and problems that had arisen because of the fact that there had not been the close liaison with N.A.T.O. that there ought to have been on military matters.
The second part of the Estimates to which I want to refer is that concerned with pay. The pay of the Regular soldier has recently been increased and, on behalf of my party, I welcome the great improvement that has been made. Here I should like to pay a tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), for it is quite fair to say that when he talked, years ago, of the £10 a week soldier he was laughed at. The Observer went out of its way to print some very caustic remarks about him for suggesting that the time would come when the soldier would be paid £10 a week. Now we are doing that.
But why, when the Government do something so imaginative and so intelligent do they want to spoil it? The anomalies which have arisen are ludicrous. For example, why did the Government try to level out the soldier's pay as between the men living in and those living out by putting up rents? Such is the result that the married Regular living in will hardly get any increase at all. It is an extraordinary position. Of course, it can be claimed that this man has the privilege of living in married quarters; although it could not always be described as a "privilege" in some of the quarters that I have come across.
I am quite prepared to admit that the Government are trying desperately hard to remedy the problem of the worn-out barracks, but one of the complaints in the Army comes from those who have to move from very good quarters to accommodation which is bad. The rents have been increased and, personally, I do not think that this was a sensible thing to do.
If one breaks down the pay increases for, say, the four star private, the amount is about £3 a week. That is if he is a six-year man, but included in this is what the Army terms the "not in quarters" rate. The man on the nine-year engagement has about the same amount in increase and I mention these figures because, when talking of Regular Army recruitment for today and tomorrow, they back up my argument.
What happens is that the four star private on a six-year engagement receives £9 16s. a week, while the nine-year man has £11 4s.—assuming, in both cases, that they are married. The difference is £1 8s. a week, and I argue that, so far as the difference is concerned, it is not enough. I believe that the nine-year man should have had by far the greater proportion of any amount which was available. He is the man of the Army of today and tomorrow whom we really want and more encouragement should have been given to him.
The increase is generous in global figures but, once again the Government, in the distribution of it, have not done what they could have done with the extra pay. I shall come back to this point, but I turn now to the problem of Regular Army recruitment.

Mr. Fernyhough: Would my hon. Friend care to express an opinion about the Government having completely disregarded the legitimate claims of those still compelled to do National Service?

Mr. Mellish: I do not want to quarrel with my hon. Friend, but I understand that the Government have given this overall global sum to the Regular soldier because they are thinking in terms not merely of the Army of today, but of the Army of tomorrow. The Government are committed to the abolition of conscription, as is the Labour Party. That being so, the amount of money available should go to the Regular soldier to encourage further recruitment. I do not deny the claim of the National Service man, but we must be a bit logical about it. I do not know how much it would cost to increase the National Service man's rate to anything like that of the Regular soldier, but I think that my hon. Friend would find that it would be fabulous,


and would frighten all of us. It is important that I should put that on record.

Mr. Fernyhough: All I was trying to say was that during the last ten years there has been a substantial decrease in the value of money. In 1948, the National Service man got 28s. and today he gets 31s. 6d. I do not think that that enables him to keep pace with the 1948 figure.

Mr. Mellish: I understand my hon. Friend's point, and it is typical of him that he should be worried about the young National Service man. I am not denying the justice of his argument; I am only putting to him the cold economics of the matter. If the Government had increased the pay of the National Service man to the rate my hon. Friend is justifying on a trade union argument the figure would have been fantastically high. In any case, as there was only this sum of money available for the increase of pay, I think that it was wiser to concentrate on the Regular soldier.
On the question of manpower, I want to deal with the civilians. About 13,000 civilians became redundant in 1957 and over 10,000 more, we are told, will become redundant in 1958–59. One year's notice of the closure of depots will be given where possible. I am a bit unhappy that this is all the reference made to civilians. We owe them a great debt, but we take them for granted.
I should have thought that there would have been some form of compensation of the kind often applied by any good employer, that for X years of service the man should receive so many weeks' pay at the end of his employment. I think that the Government owe these people something. It is a bit ironic when we also talk about the possibility of using more civilians in other jobs, which probably means their further recruitment. It is no encouragement to civilians to become employees of the Government when they are treated in this way.
We should have been more generous in the way we treated these people, particularly the unestablished men, for whom no provision at all is made. Many

of the men who have been declared redundant, as I know only too well, are of an age when they will find it increasingly difficult to get other employment. I should like the Under-Secretary to tell us what the Army has tried to do for these men besides giving them the one year's notice of closure.
The Government are committed to the abolition of National Service by 1960, which means that by the end of 1962 we shall have only Regular forces and that, by the beginning of 1963, the last National Service man will have gone. We are told that the target is 165,000 Regular soldiers. This number will be required to maintain an efficient fighting force. Figures have been bandied about in the Committee. Perhaps one of the greatest authorities on this matter is my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg).
I noticed that in a debate in another place earlier this year figures were quoted by Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough. The noble Lord got them via my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley. Between them they suggested that we should be very fortunate, on the basis of existing recruiting figures, to get 105,000 men by early in 1963. It may well be that they will be right. I do not know; I am not getting involved in crystal-gazing. The Government must have some good ideas on this. If my hon. Friend is proved to be right, those in charge of the Army in 1963 will be in an awful position. Therefore, we must talk on the basis of how we can best improve recruitment now.
I hope that I may make a useful contribution to the debate by stating how I think we can improve the recruitment of Regular soldiers. When talking about pay I said that the real emphasis ought to have been placed on the nine-year men and the men serving longer than that, because they are the men we want. How do we attract them? As I said, pay is only one aspect of the problem.
I would do something far more dramatic. I believe that the finest recruiting sergeant is the Regular man himself, and that to make him the best recruiting sergeant of all we must give him security that he has never previously had in the Army. What I have to suggest touches the point raised by


my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough).
What happens? The young man joins the Army as a Regular. He marries, and children begin to come along. That is when the young man's troubles in the Army start, about married quarters, and so on. I would advocate encouraging young Regular soldiers to buy their own homes. They should be given 100 per cent. mortgages at absolutely the lowest possible fixed interest charges to buy their own homes. There is no reason why we should not do it; building societies do it, and the Army should be big enough to do it. The payments could be deducted from the soldier's pay. We should think in terms of his having his own home in the place of his choice, not where the Army wants it.
This would give the young soldier some feeling of stability. Indeed, I can imagine no greater encouragement to young men to become interested in joining the Army than saying that we encourage house ownership. I have previously said that I am a believer in a property-owning democracy. I am all for people owning their own homes, and I want to associate my party with that. The Labour Party is often regarded as being interested only in council tenants. There never was such rubbish. Hon. Friends of mine who adopt that attitude are doing the Labour Party a great disservice. We want house ownership for the Regular soldier.

Mr. Fernyhough: Mr. Fernyhough rose—

Mr. Mellish: My hon. Friend must wait a moment. I am having enough trouble making this speech without being interrupted.
I believe that house ownership is as essential to the Regular soldier as it is to the civilian. The scheme that I advocate would give the Regular an advantage over the civilian, who may find when he goes to a building society that he cannot get the kind of loan he wants.
We have heard something today about uniforms. I speak purely for myself here. It does not impress me much; I do not think it is very important whether the British soldier looks as smart as the American or not. My approach is entirely different. I believe that once the soldier is outside the gates of the

barracks he is off duty and ought to be wearing civilian clothes. He has then finished his day's work, and he should be encouraged to wear civilian clothes. He does not want to walk around in uniform and be stopped by military police and asked what he is doing and where he is going. When he has finished his day's work, or when he is going on his weekend leave, he should be encouraged to wear civilian clothes.
I speak as one who was in the Army for six years and I know something about the military police and all that goes with them. I always regarded them as absolute pests, though they never did any harm to me. Of course, they were only doing the job that they were directed to do. But I would end discipline at the barrack gates and I would allow the men to wear their civilian clothes if they wanted to do so.
Another suggestion that I would make, with a view to attracting men into the Army, is that when a soldier is due for home leave from an overseas tour of duty, he should be flown home by air. I know that we try to do that as much as possible, but that practice ought to be extended. A man proceeding on home leave ought to be treated as a V.I.P.—indeed, he is an important person. He ought to be sent back to his wife and family as quickly as possible, instead of as happened so often in the Army—and I myself was an officer, so that I can speak without any prejudice. Often the officer was flown home, and not the man. There is no justification for that treatment. The average officer does not like it anyway, and would prefer his men to get home as quickly as possible. Those small things count.
On the subject of pay and recruiting, there should be an increase in the pay given to a man on retirement. His pension should be increased. I would make a party political point here. I do not expect the Under-Secretary to agree with it. One of the things which the Labour Party will do when it gets back into power will be to introduce its national superannuation proposals, by which the soldiers will be covered. When they leave the Army they will be in a pension scheme, and they will go into civilian life carrying their pension with them. We shall do that when the opportunity occurs.
An important consideration in the future of the Regular soldier is that when he gets towards the end of his period of service he is entitled to some form of security. I would arrange a much better link with the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers' Confederation. The unions and the employers owe something to the soldier who is due to leave the Army after having given nine or twelve years' service to his country. There should be a genuine effort on the part of a committee which interviews a man leaving the Army to find a job for the man and to ensure that there is no restrictive practice which prevents him from becoming enrolled as a member of a union and going straight into civilian life. We do not want merely a quantity of Regular soldiers. We want volunteers of the right calibre, and we should give these men the highest possible incentives.
Another aspect of Army life on which I would concentrate is promotion to commissioned rank. I believe that this promotion should come almost entirely from the ranks themselves. I speak as one who spent six years in Her Majesty's Army and I can claim to have gone through the ranks, up to the rank of C.S.M. and then to commissioned rank. It is essential to have some knowledge of what the men think, say and do, and of how they live. The idea that one can get a three weeks' course at Sandhurst on man management is ludicrous. One does not learn man management in a few weeks. One can only learn it by living it. I am not denying that many officers who have gone through Sandhurst are first-class types. I would not denigrate them. But we should encourage the young soldier to become commissioned. There may be a case for giving a commission direct to a university graduate with a special degree, but, otherwise, I would make everybody to be commissioned go through the ranks before being commissioned, so that all officers would have genuine knowledge of how to handle men and genuine knowledge of what their problems are.
I would end this part of my speech with a comment which has already been made by somebody else. We have reached the extraordinary position now in which we are paying £13 million this year on increased pay in the Army—and

that could have been arranged in a different way—and, at the same time, are paying £11 million on getting people out of the Army. That is the sort of situation which is inevitable, I suppose, seeing that we are abolishing conscription in the very near future.
So much for that aspect of the Memorandum and the Estimates. I turn now to the question of operations. What sort of Army is to be available to the next Labour Government? As one of my hon. Friends has rightly pointed out, probably in a year's time the Labour Party will be elected to power and we shall have the job of running Her Majesty's Army, Navy and Air Force. We know the problem of numbers is a doubtful one, but I think that the problem of commitments is even worse.
I take up what my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West said about Germany. I do not think that we are honest about the way we have reduced our garrison in Germany, our commitment in Germany. As I understand the argument for our sending troops into Germany it was not based on consideration of what we should get from the German Government. That was not the argument. We went in as part of the force defending that part of Europe. Now we are linked with N.A.T.O. Our forces in Germany are part of our contribution to N.A.T.O. They were not sent there on the basis of how much money we got from the German Government. It seems to me to be an absolute farce now to say they are there purely on a cash basis, and that on that basis we shall allow only x number of men there. Either it is right for us to have troops in Germany or it is not right to have them there. It is not a question of money. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the question of the reduction of our forces in Germany requires a lot more answering than that which the Estimates or the Memorandum provide.
A word on Cyprus. I can only pray that by the time the Labour Party is back in power the Cyprus problem will have been—at any rate, partially—solved. There is an enormous number of men locked in Cyprus in a dispute which gets worse and worse. I shall not offend your very good chairmanship, Sir Gordon, by discussing the Cyprus question in detail, but we ought to get out as quickly as we


possibly can. If a Labour Government were returned in the immediate future we should not solve the Cyprus problem overnight. Let nobody think we could. The recent Turkish Cypriots' demonstrations, and so on, show that this is now a very difficult problem indeed to solve. I am not a great military strategist, but I understand that Cyprus as a base is absolutely futile. Suez proved that. I hope and pray that we shall get out as soon as possible.
Over to Malaya and Hong Kong, both of which were mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies). He has been there recently. He has been around and seen a lot of things. I was there during the war. I had four years in that part of the world. One thing that bothers me about our commitment there at the moment is this. I am terrified at the idea that we have there what, if I may use the term, is merely a trip force. If we have to have a garrison there, let it be a worthwhile one, or let us not have anybody there at all. It is almost pitiful to have men there merely as a token force. I should like to hear more about both garrisons, particularly that in Hong Kong.
Unlike some of my hon. Friends, I think that Korea is a good example of a minimum force, of a mission as an indication of a number of Governments' intentions. After all, we should need a vast number of troops in Hong Kong if China were to move against us there. It seems to me we should have a nominal force, a mission, there, which would show, were any operations contemplated against us, that there would be trouble from the forces of the number of countries involved. That would be better than our present policy.
I should like to back one comment made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) and by one of my hon. Friends, by asking: have we done anything further about enlistment of troops from overseas, particularly from the West Indies? I should have thought there was there a big field for enlistment if we went in for it in a realistic way. I am sure that many of those men would be glad to join the modem British Army.
I want to say just a little on the very controversial subject of the nuclear

weapons that are to be used by Her Majesty's Army. Some time ago, after giving a lecture, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein answered questions, and this is what he is reported to have said—and there is no reason to doubt it. He said:
We at S.H.A.P.E., at Supreme Headquarters in Europe, with the full political agreement of the N.A.T.O. Council, are basing all our plans on the fact that if we are attacked we use nuclear weapons in our defence.
He went on to say:
The only proviso is that the politicians have to be asked first. That might be a bit awkward, of course, and, personally, I would use the nuclear weapons first and ask afterwards. I believe that a firm statement on those lines by the West would stop any aggression.
Field Marshal Montgomery continued:
As regards the difference between the tactical and the atomic weapon, we do not distinguish them; we use a nuclear weapon if we are attacked. Now, it is a nice point which you might take me up on as to whether it is considered likely that in the limited war such as, for instance, of the size of Korea, if it occurred again, nuclear weapons would be used.
He added:
I would not call Korea a small war. It was quite a party, and it is my view that if a war of the size of Korea occurred again nuclear weapons would be used. I do not say our political masters would agree, but you asked me what I thought.
That was the very frank opinion of a very frank field marshal. We learn that our Army in the field is to be provided with nuclear weapons, and I want to know who gives the order for them to be used. Is it the commander in the field, or is it Whitehall—the politician? On this side, we believe that the politician must certainly be involved in this matter and must be asked.
I sincerely believe that if nuclear weapons of this character were used in a war of limited size, it would not, it could not, be long before the main deterrent was used. We keep talking about trying to avoid a third world war, but if the nuclear tactical weapons are to be used in a war like that their use must be under the authority and control of those in political power. I should like the Under-Secretary to be good enough to deal with that.
What I have to say will not suit some of my hon. Friends. There are always arguments about these subjects in a party like ours. We have quarrelled about


defence and the approach to defence ever since we have been a party. That is understandable. A party that was completely united about the H-bomb, for instance, and all these other terrible weapons would, in a way, be a rather strange party. On such an issue it would be rather peculiar if it were united.
I hope that the Under-Secretary will not chide us for our so-called disunity on defence, because not long ago he was a "Suez rebel." It is also the fact that there are on the other side of the Committee, numbers of hon. Members who quite fairly and properly disagree with their party on defence, tactics, and so on, but they, unlike my hon. Friends, are without their party Whip. However, there are certain aspects on defence about which parties inside parties would disagree. I know that some of my hon. Friends will not accept my views, but they know that I will not accept theirs, either.

Mr. Harold Davies: I do not want my hon. Friend to assume that there is all this division. He will find from the statement issued by the T.U.C. and the Labour Party only today that there is greater unity now in the party than there has ever been on the real, human, agonising problem of the relationship of the H-bomb to society, and this is giving a lead to the world.

Mr. Mellish: I am obliged to my hon. Friend, and I am delighted to hear him say that. Coming from him, it gives me great satisfaction. But if he had been here all day, and had listened to all the arguments on these Estimates, he would not have thought that there was that unity on this side. I merely put that on record. It is already in HANSARD. I quite agree that party policy, and not merely what the T.U.C. has said today but what has existed for many months now, has been one that has carried us all together. However, there is disagreement on certain aspects.
I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) is not in the Chamber. He made a speech which conformed to the usual pattern of his speeches on the Army Estimates and the Estimates of other Departments. He denigrated the defence of the country, he said how futile it was, and he debunked the whole approach of some of us to

defence. I have a copy of Soviet News, published by the Press department of the Soviet Embassy in London on Monday, 24th February. It contains the order of the day of the Minister of Defence, Marshal Malinovsky. I would not dare to read it all, but this is what, in part, it says:
The indestructible might of the Soviet army and navy lies in the wise leadership of the Communist Party which, all along, has displayed untiring concern for the development and strengthening of the armed forces.
In the course of a speech reported in the same issue of Soviet News, Marshal Malinovsky said:
We are fully aware that our armed forces must be strong and up-to-date, that they must be equipped with the latest weapons so as to serve the interests of our Soviet state, which upholds peace among the nations of the world.
That is fair enough. He is the Minister of Defence of Russia. He believes that his armed forces should have the best possible weapons, be properly equipped and strong enough to fight anyone.
If we say that on either side of this Committee are we wrong? Are we wrong if we say that we want our armed forces to be equipped properly and to be the best possible trained forces that we can have? Are we wrong if we say it, but without the vehemence of that speech and of that order of the day? I sincerely believe that the problem we face in defence is due not to this Government's or the previous Labour Government's policy, in the sense that earlier policy was wrong, but that the problem has been created by people outside this country who have made it necessary for us to have the armed forces which we possess.
The Labour Party was committed to conscription and the spending of millions of pounds which it did not want to spend on defence. We all came out of the Army hoping and praying for peace, and I have said many times that I believe that Ernest Bevin died in trying to secure peace for the world. I do not believe that there is safety in unilateral disarmament. I wish I did. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central confirmed that there is not. He showed quite clearly, with his scientific knowledge, that if there was an H-bomb war between America and Russia and we were completely neutral we should be so badly affected that the vast majority of


the people of these islands would lose their lives.
Now that we have the main deterrent, and the problem of how and when to use nuclear weapons, we have reached the end of a long road. If we go much further it may well be that none of us will turn back. That is why we in my party believe that it is necessary to get talks started. We all want peace, and we hope that the Government will make every endeavour to achieve it.
I said earlier that the happy, contended Regular soldier is the best recruiting sergeant we can have, and if we adopt some of the measures which I have suggested it might help to obtain such men for us. We have to recognise that such a man is a citizen to whom we all owe a great debt. We have to give him security, we want to give him a home and, above all, a future. I end on this note: the country is entitled to be proud of our Service men. All I hope is that they, in turn, will be proud of us.

3.1 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Julian Amery): I hope the hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) will permit me to congratulate him on his speech. In my view, it was worthy of his predecessor.
My hon. Friend the Member for Tyne-mouth (Dame Irene Ward) said earlier that she did not understand how Ministers in the War Office could sleep in their beds at night. We are not being given much chance. I will do my best to answer some of the questions which have been raised tonight, and, if I do not answer all, I hope the Committee will accept that any omission is due to sense of respect for the Committee collectively and a desire not to detain hon. Members too long.
It may be convenient if I group my replies under certain heads, and since we are discussing an Estimate I shall begin with finance. The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) asked how it came about that Vote 7 had a very much larger figure this year than last year. The main reason is the increase in expenditure on new equipment, in particular the Thunderbird, the FN rifle and the L.2 sub-machine gun. He also asked me why in the redundancy pay-

ments the Vote for officers was more than twice as much as that for other ranks although the numbers of officers and senior n.c.o.'s. and warrant officers retiring were not very different. The reason is that redundancy payments to some extent reflect the wage structure of the Army, and that is naturally higher in the higher echelons than in the lower.
May I turn for a moment to deployment. The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) seemed a little uncertain of the wisdom of our separation of the old G.H.Q. Middle East into two parts. I was not sure whether he fully understood what we had done. He will remember that under the old system the G.H.Q., originally in the Suez Canal zone and subsequently in Cyprus, controlled the whole of the Middle Eastern theatre, including the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean.
As a result of the uncertainty of free passage through the Suez Canal and of over-flying rights over Syria, it became apparent that it was not possible for the headquarters in Cyprus to control the forces east of what has come to be known as the Air-Sea Barrier. The decision was taken to divide the old G.H.Q. into two, with one smaller headquarters in Cyprus responsible for the Cyprus and Libya garrisons, and another headquarters at Aden responsible for Aden and the Persian Gulf.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the strategic reserve which would be stationed in Kenya and carped a little at the fact that in the Memorandum it is mentioned as an element of the United Kingdom strategic reserve.

Mr. Strachey: The Central Reserve.

Mr. Amery: The idea is simply that, in view of the uncertainties of over-flying rights in certain cases, we think there is an advantage in having an element of the reserve south of the Air-Sea Barrier. This is not a battalion which will be used for garrison purposes in Kenya. It will be there as a strategic reserve.
The hon. Member for Blaydon (Mr. Woof) spoke of the somewhat harsh conditions in the Aden Protectorate and of the great heat of the Persian Gulf, and he asked what were the terms of service


there. Two years is the ordinary tour of duty in the Aden Protectorate and eighteen months in the Persian Gulf. The heat in that part of the world can be excessive. But recently, in both the winter and the summer, I visited garrisons in the Gulf and in the Aden Protectorate and found the troops in extremely good heart.

Mr. Mellish: Is there any air conditioning?

Mr. Amery: Yes, in some cases, and in others we are providing it as fast as we can.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey asked about co-operation among the countries in N.A.T.O. We are fully represented at the S.H.A.P.E. headquarters, with the Deputy Supreme Commander at the top of our representation, and the British Army of the Rhine is fully integrated into the forces under N.A.T.O. command. In addition, of course, we are represented on the Military Standing Group in Washington. So there is practical day-to-day integration of the British element with the forces of the countries in N.A.T.O.

Mr. Mellish: Has any progress been made with standardisation of armament? I understand that six kinds of jeep are used by the N.A.T.O. forces and that not one part is interchangeable.

Mr. Amery: Standardisation is increasing all the time, although it is by no means complete as yet.
The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) asked why we maintained a British military mission in Korea. He will remember the origin of the story of how British forces went to Korea as a result of a decision of the United Nations. The mission is a gesture of our solidarity with the decision taken then and of the fact that the United Nations succeeded in checking aggression there. We do not wish to go back on that. The exercise in Borneo was a purely British exercise. The hon. Member asked what was the status of the British forces remaining in Malaya. They are there at the request of the Malayan Government.
The hon. Member also took us to task for stating in the Memorandum that the headquarters at Aden and the battalion in Kenya would he under the control of London. He said that in a nuclear war

that would not make sense. In a nuclear war a great many things would not make sense. We are talking about peace-time administration of these forces and about administration in minor operations.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey asked whether the garrisons in the Far East were strong enough. The answer to that is "Yes, they are".
I come now to the reorganisation which has taken place in the last year. Critics of our system have inveighed against the difficulties of getting things done in Whitehall, and the War Office has been a fairly frequent butt, both inside and outside the House, for charges of hesitation and delay. Looking back over the last twelve months, I have been deeply impressed by the number of problems which we have solved, the number of difficulties which we have tackled and the number of questions which we have been able to answer. The official machine has worked with a smoothness which, frankly, I did not expect to find before I went into it.
Having worked under his leadership for a year, I want to pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sudbury and Woodbridge (Mr. John Hare), who is now Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. The Army and the country owe a great deal to the imagination, sympathy and humanity with which he tackled an extremely difficult problem.
We were dealing here with one of the proudest and most sensitive elements in our national life. All the passions and sentiments that are bound up with regimental honour and tradition were involved. The loyalty and good temper with which the Army accepted all these changes should not blind us to the fact that things might very easily have gone the other way. The one exceptional instance where things did not go smoothly might easily have been the general pattern. As it was, the cooperation we received was magnificent, and it continues to be magnificent in every case.
I want to give one or two details to the Committee. Fifteen brigade depots have to be established under the reorganisation. The sites of ten of them have already been chosen. Details will be given in a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question later today. We hope to make an announcement about


the other five shortly. All but two brigades have agreed on a proposed design for a cap badge, after consultations with the Inspector of Regimental Colours. These designs still await the agreement of the Army Council and the approval of Her Majesty the Queen.
The amalgamations begin seriously this year. Ten infantry and eight Royal Armoured Corps regiments will be amalgamated, and the Royal Artillery will be reduced by nine regiments. It is a complicated business, because it is not possible to amalgamate merely on paper. The two units have to be moved together physically, and sometimes it is necessary to wait until a regiment that has gone out on overseas duty has completed its tour.
Since the publication last year of the White Paper on The Future Organisation of the Army we have found it possible, without adding to the strain on manpower, to retain a band for every regiment of the line and each battalion of the Parachute Regiment. This will now be done instead of forming brigade staff bands, as was originally proposed. The change will be widely welcomed, and I am glad that it has been possible to make it.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey talked about the importance of close cooperation with the trade unions for the re-settlement—

Mr. Mellish: And the employers.

Mr. Amery: Yes, and the employers—for the resettlement of officers and soldiers when they leave the Army. The redundancy which has been forced upon us by the reorganisation has led to the setting up of what I think will prove to be an extremely effective resettlement organisation under a board known as the Regular Forces Resettlement Service. This will link Service Departments, the Ministry of Labour and certain voluntary organisations, and it is establishing very close relations with the Trades Union Congress and employers organisations.
I will not weary the Committee with details of the resettlement procedures, except to say that we have seen to it that advisory panels consisting of a senior officer and an official of the Ministry of Labour have been sent round the overseas stations, to make sure that officers and senior N.C.O.s serving in them are not at

a disadvantage from the point of view of getting jobs if they are retired as compared with their colleagues at home. We cannot judge what the practical results of the resettlement scheme will be until nearer the end of the year. The outflow so far has been limited to 208 officers and 190 warrant officers and senior N.C.O.s. But all those have found jobs.
The hon. Member also referred to the position of our civilian employees. We are under an obligation to offer alternative employment to established employees, and we have tried to find suitable alternative employment. In many cases, especially that of the R.A.S.C. fleet, we have done so with a measure of success. The offer of alternative employment can sometimes have a disrupting effect when it means, for example, giving up a house or being separated from children. As Chairman of the War Department Industrial Council, I should like to pay a tribute to the magnificent co-operation we have received from established employees and the trades unions representing them.
The main contribution we have been able to make in the case of unestablished employees has been to provide facilities on our premises, for some months in advance of the premises being closed down, for Ministry of Labour and National Service representatives and private employers to interview potential staff.
I should like to say a word about the Women's Royal Army Corps, whose strength we hope to raise to 6,500 and ultimately to 8,000. We need more officers. We believe the Corps offers a good life with facilities for travel and, judging from the experience of the W.R.N.S. about which my hon. Friend the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty spoke to the Committee the other day, other opportunities as well. The pay of the W.R.A.C. has been raised from 75 per cent. to 85 per cent. of the male rates of pay. This means that on joining a junior private gets £3 10s. cash and a warrant officer class 1 £12. A new Service dress is being designed for the W.R.A.C. which should undergo troop trials during the year.
There is a broad measure of agreement between the two sides of the Committee on the question of pay, though I


have noted the points made by the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Bermondsey about increasing the differential between the 9-year and the 6-year man. We are all agreed that pay is not everything. But I would say also that if man cannot live by bread alone, he cannot even exist for long without it.
The hon. Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough) urged an increase in pay for National Service men. It would be difficult to justify that under present circumstances. We should remember too that we have treated National Service men more generously, I think, than any other country.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey spoke of the loss incurred by soldiers living in quarters by reason of the rise in rents. It is in line with what is happening in civilian life as a result of the Rent Act. Whether we agree or disagree with what has been done in the Rent Act, there would be no case for differentiating in favour of the soldier.

Mr. Mellish: That is an honest answer, but the hon. Gentleman will not expect me to accept it. We regard the Rent Act as obnoxious for civilians without applying to the soldier as well.

Mr. Amery: I conceded the point. I said that whether we agree or disagree with what has been done, there would be no case for discriminating in this matter.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) spoke about the gratuity for holders of the V.C. This is a matter which concerns the three Services and has been the subject of a Parliamentary Question to the Prime Minister. I cannot add tonight to the answer of my right hon. Friend, but I have noted the point which was made. My hon. Friend also spoke about the disturbance allowance. We have already made a substantial improvement in this and, while subsequently there may be a case for raising it still further, it would be a little premature to start on that just now.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot and my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth referred to certain categories of widows. I have not the information to reply to their questions now, but I will communicate with them in due course.
On the subject of accommodation, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer) mentioned a headquarters building in Southern Command being given priority over other types. Let me assure him that that is not the result of any settled policy. There are other parts of the country, in Northern Command for instance, where very much the opposite situation exists.
I was glad that the hon. Member for Bermondsey referred to the work of the Army education authorities. The Army Education Advisory Board has been fortunate in getting as its Chairman Sir Ifor Evans in succession to Mr. J. C. Masterman, who did very good work for several years. I have not the answer about secondary education to hand, so I will write to the hon. Member.
The rundown of the Army has had certain difficult consequences for N.A.A.F.I., as it has cut its turnover fairly sharply. We are taking steps to improve and modernise N.A.A.F.I. in certain directions. In particular we are proposing to hand over to it the catering arrangements of a unit at Donnington, on an experimental basis. One result of the rundown will be that N.A.A.F.I. will no longer be able to give the same rebates and discount as hitherto. These will be reduced to 1½ per cent. and 2½ per cent., respectively. This is a much better course than to raise N.A.A.F.I. prices.
The hon. Members for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) and Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Dr. Stross) discussed problems which were more directly the concern of the Home Office than of the War Office. The War Office, of course, through the M.D.C. and certain aspects of Territorial Army training, has a responsibility in this matter, but the main initiative rests with the Home Department. Let me assure the hon. Members that their points have been noted. I was particularly struck by the declaration of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central that we could not save ourselves alone.
I come to the question of recruiting. Until our debate today it has been a main issue. It is now very much less controversial. There are two questions here. First, are we getting enough volunteers? The answer is that for the moment no one can say for certain. We believe we are, but it is to some extent


a guess. We have given the Committee a good deal of information about the matter, but it will be several months before we can judge how the thing is going.
The second question is whether we shall get the right kind of volunteers. Despite the heavy reorganisation of the infantry and the cavalry, the prospects for the teeth arms remain favourable. But the shortfall is likely to come in other parts of the Army, particularly among specialists, such as electronic technicians in the Signals, and in certain sections of the R.A.M.C. Perhaps the most serious shortfall of all is the shortage of candidates coming forward for commissions.
There is no easy solution to this problem. We are naturally trying to stimulate recruitment through the public schools and the grammar schools, and are also doing all we can to advance recruitment of officers through the ranks, but I doubt whether, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, South (Captain Corfield) suggests, it would be any solution to the problem if officers spent longer in the junior ranks. But the War Office is studying the matter, and, of course, the Grigg Committee will turn its attention to it.
The dimensions of the recruiting problem are now becoming clearer. In 1956 the party opposite announced that it had decided that there should be a 4-year plan to abolish National Service and provide an all-Regular Army of 200,000 men. That was, as I think we can now agree, over-simplifying the issue. So, I think, is the opposite view that we have no chance at all of getting the recruits we need. The trend is not yet clear, but there are grounds for confidence and there is broad agreement on both sides of the Committee as to how we should set about the task. There have been various ideas canvassed. The suggestion of the hon. Member for Bermondsey of house ownership is interesting, but I cannot say offhand if it would be considered practical.
I come now to the main issue—the character and the equipment of the Army. There has been one thesis put forward in printed articles and in the defence debate speech by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)

and the hon. Members for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus), Gateshead, West (Mr. Randall), and, so far as I can understand it, the Liberal Party Amendment. I am not quite clear about that. This thesis—

Mr. Mellish: Could I remind the Committee that the Liberal Party has not been represented here and has taken no part in our discussion on these Estimates?

Mr. Amery: This thesis is that we should have only conventional forces. That at least is what the hon. Member for Coventry, East says, I am not certain about the Liberal Amendment. We are asked to resist a "conventional" Russian attack by conventional forces alone. In 1956, the hon. Member for Coventry, East embraced the H-bomb to get rid of National Service. He has now embraced National Service in order to get rid of the H-bomb. We reject his thesis altogether. We think it would be wholly wrong to equip our forces with weapons inferior to those of other countries. Britain cannot accept the rôle of providing cannon fodder for other countries in the Western Alliance. We must face the fact that if we did what the hon. Gentleman advocates we should have to have more than a million men in our ground forces and to spend something like £1,000 million more a year. I do not think this is at all practicable.
Disarmament must be the aim of us all. But it must be in conventional weapons and nuclear weapons together. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West and his right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), in the defence debate last week, seemed to have a difference of emphasis and of degree rather than of principle with the Government's position. As I saw it, without calling for stronger forces in Europe, they were anxious about whether our forces were strong enough. I was under the impression that they wanted to increase the insurance premium, if I may put it that way, between any minor act of aggression and the use of the deterrent. As I understand the position, it would already need a very major operation on the part of the Soviet Union to break through the existing N.A.T.O. forces in Europe. I think it can be said that they constitute an adequate cushion of time.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about support costs. I am afraid that I am not in a position to go beyond what my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said on the subject the other day. The matter is under discussion in N.A.T.O., and, although a charge on Army Votes, it raises issues of defence and foreign policy which are rather outside my competence.
As I understood the right hon. Gentleman, both in his speech today and in the defence debate, he felt that in order to strengthen our position in Europe we should have put more emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons. I do not think, in fact, that there is any great difference between us here.

Mr. Strachey: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. No, I suggested putting the emphasis rather on conventional forces so that at the first stage, at any rate, we should have a higher premium against using any nuclear weapons. I think that was my main emphasis.

Mr. Amery: I understood the right hon. Gentleman, particularly in that very graphic description which he gave of a possible conflict in Berlin, to have two stages in his mind and to be a little uncertain whether we had put sufficient emphasis on the tactical nuclear weapon. We have always taken the view that our forces should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and we have also taken the view that there might be a position short of global war in which such weapons could be used.
As the Committee knows, the Corporal is now being introduced into the Army.

Mr. Mellish: Can we have an answer also to the question of whose finger is on the trigger?

Mr. Amery: If the hon. Gentleman will wait he will have an answer in a moment.
The Corporal is being introduced into the Army. As my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State said last year, we are also working on the development of a British nuclear guided weapon. This will be complementary to the Corporal and designed to replace the heavier calibres of artillery. It has reached the point where we can suggest it should become standard equipment for N.A.T.O. forces. We are also considering new

types of nuclear weapons for artillery in the field. I hope this makes it clear that we are not being negligent on the question of tactical nuclear weapons. I trust, therefore, that there is not so much difference between us on this issue as I felt in the defence debate that there might be.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) asked about the Soviet tactical nuclear capacity. We have, of course, information about that, but it would be of help only to the Soviet countries if we were to make any disclosures.
I come now to the hon. Gentleman's question of who controls the trigger. He must appreciate that though we are training on the Corporal there are as yet no tactical nuclear weapons in the British Army in Germany. Therefore, the problem has not arisen in a practical form. This is one of the questions which has to be studied and considered extremely carefully.

Mr. Strachey: It has arisen surely in the case of N.A.T.O. forces in the case of the Canberra.

Mr. Amery: I am referring to the British Army's responsibility, which I understood was the point of the hon. Gentleman's question about tactical weapons over which we may have control.

Mr. Mellish: Yes, but also, of course, if we are talking in terms of our armed forces being part of N.A.T.O., we want to know where the overall responsibility lies. We ought to have a straight answer on who fires the gun—who gives permission.

Mr. Amery: I think where the hon. Gentleman is referring to weapons under the control of allied forces it might be wiser to put the question to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence or to my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, because they know what the position is and I may not express it in quite the right way.
On conventional weapons, I want to emphasise that we are attaching increasing importance to the armoured car, particularly in the internal security rôle. This is not as a replacement for the tank, but as a cheaper, more efficient method


of conducting internal security operations than any that has yet been found. We have one air portable squadron of armoured cars.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing took us to task about armoured personnel carriers. He asked whether there were any—indeed, he affirmed that there was none—in the British Army of the Rhine. I am glad to say that he is misinformed. There are Saracens in B.A.O.R. The Saracen is already the standard armoured personnel carrier in service, and it is issued at present to armoured car regiments for carrying the dismounted element of the support troops and to armoured personnel carrier squadrons in brigade groups for carrying infantry. A few Saracens are also equipped for the command vehicle rôle. It is our intention to provide armoured personnel carriers to carry infantry in the infantry brigade groups. Trials are in progress to evaluate precisely the kind of armoured personnel carrier most useful for this purpose.
Just as important from the point of view of the strength of the Army as its numbers and equipment is its mobility. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing asked why it had taken us two years to get two companies by air to the Middle East. The hon. Member for Bermondsey re-echoed the question. The answer is that that is not the case. In the Suez emergency an element of 24 Brigade was flown out to Aden and the Persian Gulf extremely quickly. So this has been done, after all, for some time. This is by no means the first time that it has happened. What is important is that we should have many exercises like Operation Quickstep in future.
Our air transport capacity is still limited, but the picture is not as dark as some of our critics represent. I cannot give exact timetables, but our ability to move a brigade in a very few days to the Middle East, and presently to the Far East, is, I think, rather better than most of our critics believe.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing asked about pre-stocking equipment and whether we were doing it. "Touch, and you shall believe." I have seen two or three of our stockpiles in recent tours. They are there, and they look to me very efficiently organised.
I cannot accept my hon. and gallant Friend's idea that our bases throughout the world are all wasting assets and that we ought to have forces permanently at sea.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) asked about the strategic reserve. Those elements which would be used lightly equipped could, of course, be airborne. The heavier elements would in present circumstances have to be seaborne, as he indicated. I thought his point about the use of aircraft carriers an interesting one, though, of course, the Committee would not expect me to say anything definite on that.

Brigadier Prior-Palmer: That was exactly my point. My hon. Friend says he does not agree with it, and then in the next breath he says he will not be expected to say anything about it.

Mr. Amery: I understood the points were quite different. I understood that my hon. and gallant Friend wanted a permanent element at sea. I understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to advocate the use of aircraft carriers as rather swifter troop carriers to go from point A to point B. He mentioned a speed of 34 knots—I do not know whether he was correctly informed—instead of the 8 knot convoy to which he also referred.
I should like to say a word on the importance that the Army attaches to the use of light aircraft in a tactical rôle. The helicopter in Cyprus has proved a most useful instrument in counter-guerilla operations, both for the purpose of observation and for carrying small raiding parties into inaccessible country. One of the internal security brigades has also carried out useful co-operation with Prestwick Pioneers operated by the Royal Air Force.
Any assessment of our strength must take account of colonial and auxiliary forces, not just the active United Kingdom Army. We have the Gurkhas, the Kings African Rifles in East Africa, and the Somaliland Scouts, whom I had the privilege of visiting not long ago and whom I found one of the smartest concerns I have seen for a long time. Hargeisa is one of the few stations in the world where the N.C.O.s regularly play polo.
We have undertaken a considerable expansion of forces in the Arabian Peninsula. The Trucial Oman Scouts have been doubled in number and reorganised. The Arabian Protectorate Levies have also been reorganised, and are making a considerable contribution to the defence of the Protectorate against incursions from the Yemen. These forces make a greater contribution to our security than is sometimes realised, and they provide wonderful opportunities for young officers and N.C.O.s.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Norwood asked if we could make greater use of Gurkhas, and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton advocated a larger African army. I once helped to write a pamphlet on the subject strongly in favour of the expansion of colonial and auxiliary forces. But there are two problems here. There are political limitations on the use of these forces, and there is the ever-present ceiling of finance. In the present financial climate we are going to be fairly hard put to it to make sure that even the small active army that we have is equipped as we would wish it to be.
I was asked about Commonwealth cooperation from the Army point of view. Nearly all the Chiefs of Staff of the Commonwealth countries were present at the C.I.G.S. annual conference at Camberley this year. We have close cooperation with the Canadians in N.A.T.O., with the Australians and New Zealanders in A.N.Z.A.M., with Pakistan in the Bagdad Pact. We have had defence talks with the South African Government recently, and there has been co-operation on many military topics with India and Ceylon. There is active defence co-operation with Malaya. There is also a Commonwealth element at the the Imperial Defence College and the Staff College. That shows that we are not too backward on that point.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Dorset, North (Colonel R. H. Glyn) raised a number of points in connection with the Territorial Army. Let me reassure him that there is no intention to reorganise the Territorial Army into brigade groups. We think that, from the point of view of home defence, the divisional organisation remains the best. The Territorial Army will continue to be trained in a fighting rôle with

home defence in all its aspects as its main aim.
When I spoke in the Army Estimates debate last year, I gave the House some advance information on the organisation of the brigade group. The right hon. Member for Belper doubted whether this information was altogether legitimate, and I am sure he will share my satisfaction at the fact that my right hon. Friend has made what one might call an "honest woman" of me. My purpose then was to give enough information to the Committee to enable military opinion outside the War Office to be able to contribute to the debate which was then in progress on this very important matter. We have since then had detailed discussions both inside the War Office and outside, and our decision has been very carefully matured. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West thought that the change of name—the departure from the divisional nomenclature—was important. I cannot help thinking myself that the fairly limited circles concerned with the organisation of military formations are well enough informed not to be influenced by a name and I think it would have been wrong merely on this psychological consideration to have varied our decision.
The real issue was the difference between the brigade group and the light division. Both concepts stemmed from a reaction against the heavy division, led in the main by Captain Liddell Hart. I have learned a great deal, more than I can well say, from Captain Liddell Hart, and though I believe he disagrees with the final conclusion we have reached, I also believe the brigade group is the fruit in many respects of ideas which animated him as they have animated a number of other military thinkers.
We had to have a basic fighting formation as small as possible yet capable also of fighting independently. I do not think there is very much in the difference between the light division and the brigade group. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State explained in his opening speech this afternoon, whereas the light division is capable of being broken up into what are virtually two brigade groups, our plan is to have one, two, three or even four brigade groups which can, if necessary, be concentrated under one divisional


headquarters. We believe our plan has the advantage of greater flexibility, in that the number of brigade groups which can be grouped under one headquarters is variable. We think this formation, chosen on its merits against the background of the European scene, has the added advantage of being better suited to the needs of our forces overseas, since it can be tailor made to suit varying circumstances.
The question has been asked, "Are we all out of step in this matter except Johnny?" I think it would be a mistake to say that all countries must have the same type of fighting organisation. These must take account of the National characteristics and way of fighting of the different countries. I would certainly say nothing derogatory about what other countries have decided should be their pattern. On the other hand, the Committee will remember that Wellington's adoption of the linear tactical formation led to the final defeat of the Napoleonic column. We have led the way in military organisation before, and it may be we shall do so again.
I am afraid that I have kept the Committee a long time, though I see from previous Estimates debates that I have not been as long as some of my predecessors, who kept the Committee for as long as an hour and forty minutes. I apologise if I have not answered all the points made. I have done my best to do so. If there are others, I will try to answer them by letter in due course.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 386,000, all ranks, be maintained for the safety of the United Kingdom and the defence of the possessions of Her Majesty's Crown, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1959.

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received this day: Committee to sit again this day.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Finlay.]

Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes to Four o'clock a.m.